Dynamic competition with customer recognition and switching costs: theory and application by Grozeva, Vesela Dimitrova
ABSTRACT




Vesela Dimitrova Grozeva, Ph.D., 2010
Dissertation directed by: Professor Daniel R. Vincent
Department of Economics
This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of dynamic interac-
tion in duopoly markets. Chapter 1 motivates the study and offers a brief overview
of the results.
In Chapter 2 I study the dynamic equilibrium of a market characterized by re-
peat purchases. Such markets exhibit two common features: customer recognition,
which allows firms to price discriminate on the basis of purchase history, and con-
sumer switching costs. Both features have implications for the competitiveness of the
market and consumer welfare but are rarely studied together. I employ a dynamic
framework to model a market with customer recognition and switching costs. In
contrast to earlier studies of dynamic competition with switching costs, these costs
are explicitly incorporated in the demand functions. Two sets of market equilibria
are characterized depending on the size of the switching cost. For all values of the
switching cost, customer recognition gives rise to a ‘bargain-then-ripoff’ pattern in
prices and switching costs amplify the loyalty price premium. When switching costs
are low, there is incomplete customer lock-in in steady state, firm profits increase
in the magnitude of the switching cost and introductory offers do not fall below
cost. When switching costs are high, there is complete customer lock-in in steady
state, firm profits are independent of switching costs and introductory prices may
fall below cost. Under incomplete lock-in and bilateral poaching, switching costs do
not affect the speed of convergence to steady state; under complete customer lock-in
and no poaching from either firm, convergence to steady state occurs in just one
period. The model also suggests that imperfect customer recognition leads to lower
profits relative to both uniform pricing and perfect customer recognition.
In Chapter 3 I use the market framework developed in Chapter 2 to exam-
ine the perception that imperfect competition hinders information sharing among
rivals in games of random matching. In contrast to previous studies of information
sharing, I propose a new channel through which competition may deter informa-
tion sharing. This approach reveals a key role for firm liquidity by showing that
information sharing among rivals is more likely to arise in markets populated by
more liquid firms. Employing a dynamic duopoly framework, in which competition
intensity varies with the degree of product differentiation, consumer switching costs
and consumer patience, I show that more intense market competition can weaken
the disincentives associated with disclosing information to a rival. I test the model’s
predictions using firm-level data on the information-sharing practices of agricultural
traders in Madagascar. As predicted by the model, traders operating in liquid mar-
kets are shown to be more likely to share information about delinquent customers.
This result is robust to the use of two alternative measures of liquidity, of which one
is credibly exogenous, and two alternative ways of defining market liquidity. Fur-
thermore, traders who report more intense competition in their market are found to
be significantly more likely to share information.
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1.1 Outline of Thesis
Economic agents rarely make choices independently of the choices made by
others. Instead, strategic interaction underlies much of economic activity and study-
ing the manifestations and outcomes of strategic interaction has opened up a vast
area of research in Industrial Organization Theory and Applied Microeconomics.
Strategic considerations may take many forms. Agents may condition their optimal
strategies on the strategies of other agents, on the current state of the economic
setting, or on their knowledge about the preceding two factors. At the same time,
agents’ own actions today may affect the state of the economic environment tomor-
row and influence the information sets and future strategies of their counterparts.
The heterogeneity of agents’ characteristics and how these characteristics affect pay-
offs imposes ever more stringent requirements on the information that agents must
have about the characteristics of their strategic partners. In this dissertation I ex-
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plore two aspects of strategic interaction among rival firms – the determination of
optimal price strategies in a dynamic duopoly market, and the decision to exchange
information about the past conduct of previous contractual partners.
This dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduc-
tion and motivation of the research. In Chapter 2, I present a model of dynamic
competition with customer recognition and consumer switching costs and study its
equilibrium properties. Customer recognition occurs when firms are able to dis-
tinguish between new and repeat customers and can offer them different prices. I
extend an earlier model of customer recognition, originally formulated by Villas-Boas
(1999), and introduce consumer switching costs in the market. Consumer switching
costs arise when customers incur transaction or learning costs as a result of buying
from a different producer. In contrast to past studies of dynamic competition with
switching costs, I am able to incorporate these costs explicitly in the demand func-
tions and derive two sets of market equilibria depending on the size of the switching
cost. I derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium prices, which enables a com-
parative statics analysis. Previous studies of dynamic competition with switching
costs have limited attention to the presence of high switching costs that induce cus-
tomer lock-in. I do not impose this limitation in my model. For all values of the
switching cost, customer recognition gives rise to a ‘bargain-then-ripoff’ pattern in
prices, and switching costs amplify the loyalty price premium. When switching costs
are low, there is incomplete customer lock-in in steady state, firm profits increase in
the magnitude of the switching cost and introductory offers do not fall below cost.
When switching costs are high, there is complete customer lock-in, firm profits are
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independent of switching costs and introductory prices may fall below cost. Under
incomplete lock-in switching costs do not affect the speed of convergence to steady
state; under complete customer lock-in, convergence to steady state occurs in just
one period. The model also suggests that imperfect customer recognition leads to
lower profits relative to both uniform pricing and perfect customer recognition.
In Chapter 3, I apply the model developed in Chapter 2 in the context of firm
behavior in developing countries. In developing countries, firms often cannot rely
on formal institutions to enforce contracts. An alternative solution is to rely on
information flows about the past performance record, or ‘reputation’, of potential
partners, in order to identify reliable contacts and discourage contract breach. How-
ever, when firms deal with a specific partner for the first time, information about
that partner’s contract performance is not readily observable. In a seminal paper,
Kandori (1992) establishes that reputation mechanisms can limit opportunism in
bilateral relationships if agents have at least some information that summarizes the
past performance of their new partner. In a real-world setting, firms are often ex-
posed to the risk of contract breach from customers and suppliers and the most likely
source of information about the reputation of these parties are other firms in the
market. However, it is commonly perceived that firms will not exchange valuable
information with their market rivals. The goal of this essay is to formally exam-
ine this perception and identify other key factors that may affect firms’ incentives
to share information with rivals. My main finding is that firm liquidity facilitates
information sharing among rivals. When firms experience breach of contract, their
cash flows and inventory stock may be disrupted and their ability to compete will
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depend on how costly it is to raise additional capital. Liquid firms will incur low
costs of capital while liquidity constrained firms will face higher such costs. Firms
realize that if they have liquid rivals, they cannot profit from the rival’ experience
of contract breach because a liquid rival faces low cost of funds. Hence, a firm
facing a liquid rival will have a weaker incentive of exposing this rival to a higher
probability of contract breach by not sharing information. Therefore, information
sharing will be more likely to arise in markets populated by more liquid firms rela-
tive to markets populated by liquidity-constrained firms. Furthermore, I show that
more intense market competition can lower the cost of disclosing information to a
rival. I test the model’s predictions using firm-level data on the information sharing
practices of agricultural traders in Madagascar and find support for the proposed
hypothesis that liquidity has a positive effect on traders’ propensity to share infor-
mation. In addition, traders who report more intense competition in their market
are found to be significantly more likely to share information.
1.2 Introduction and Motivation of Chapter 2:
Chapter 2 builds a model of dynamic competition with imperfect customer
recognition and switching costs. Customer recognition and switching costs are com-
monly present in markets where firms can distinguish their repeat customers and
can practice price discrimination on the basis of purchase history. However, the
literature has largely reviewed the impact of these two features separately and there
are no dynamic models that integrate both. In this essay, we show that the joint
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presence of imperfect customer recognition and switching costs brings qualitative
changes in the market equilibrium when compared to models that exhibit only one
of these features. Furthermore, we allow for the presence of overlapping generations
of consumers, which generates three groups of customers based on their purchase
history – new, unattached consumers; customers who switch away from their origi-
nal supplier; and customers who stay with their original suppliers. We first present
a model of ‘imperfect’ customer recognition – firms can distinguish between new
and repeat customers but they do not know if a new customer is a switcher or a
newcomer to the market. Then, we dispose of this latter assumption and show that
firms’ ability target all three groups of customers with a different price increases firm
profits. By comparing our results of the competitive outcome under imperfect cus-
tomer recognition to comparable studies of uniform pricing, it is also seen that firms
would be better off in a market where repeat customers cannot be distinguished
from new customers. This result holds for markets with high switching costs that
induce complete customer lock-in and is due to the fact that under customer recog-
nition firms compete away the gains from selling to loyal customers at a premium
in the competition for market share.1
There are few models that consider the interaction of customer recognition
and consumer switching costs, namely Chen (1997), Gehrig and Stenbacka (2002),
and Taylor (2003). Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003) consider markets that consist
of a single generation of consumers. In the initial period of the game consumers
1The comparison cannot be extended to equilibria with switching because there is no bench-
mark model of uniform pricing, i.e. a dynamic model with product differentiation, switching costs
and uniform pricing that also allows switching in equilibrium.
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enter the market and firms compete for market share. In the subsequent period(s),
there are no new incoming generations. Firms recognize their previous customers
and engage in price discrimination by offering discounts to the rival’s customers (a
practice commonly referred to as ‘poaching’). A key aspect of this analysis is that
after the initial period there are only two types of customers, – loyal customers,
who stay with their original supplier, and switchers, who change suppliers. Firms
can target each group with a different, optimally chosen price. Therefore, models
that consider competition for a single generation of consumers artificially induce
a separation between unattached consumers and switchers by assuming that all
consumers enter the market in some initial period while switching occurs in the
subsequent periods when there are no new cohorts. I extend this line of research
by considering the more realistic setting where in each period an old cohort of
consumers exits the market and a new cohort enters – thus, each period firms face
overlapping generations of consumers, – and explore the impact of firms’ inability
to distinguish between newcomers and switchers on the market equilibrium.
A setting with overlapping generations of customers is particularly relevant
for markets with high rates of new consumer entry and somewhat low switching
costs that make the change of suppliers feasible. Examples include markets for the
provision of high-speed data (e.g., cable, internet and cell phone services), credit
card services, movie rentals, and others.2 In many of these markets firms are unable
to distinguish between newcomers and switchers because it is easier to obtain infor-
2For example, as consumers choose to upgrade from dial-up to broad-band internet, the
two main internet service providers, Comcast and Verizon, face substantial demand from new,
unattached consumers. At the same time, the two firms actively engage in poaching each other’s
existing customers.
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mation on the purchase history of one’s own customers (e.g., by enticing customers
to enroll in loyalty programs offering discounts or to set up membership accounts
that reduce transaction costs), rather than on the purchase history of the rival’s
customers. For this reason, the main focus of this study is on the impact of imper-
fect customer recognition. This analysis is presented in Sections 2.2 through 2.3.1.
For the rest of the paper, the term ‘customer recognition’ will be used to refer to
imperfect customer recognition unless specified otherwise.
Since newcomers and switchers have different price elasticities, firms would
be willing to set different prices to each group if they could separate the two mar-
kets. Such practice would give rise to perfect customer recognition. Pazcal and
Soberman (2007) report that Air Canada used to give promotional offers exclu-
sively to Aeroplan members. In 2006 Blockbuster ran a promotional campaign that
gave free movie rentals to Netflix subscribers.3 In Section 2.4 I construct a simple
two-period model that is sufficient to capture the market outcome under perfect
customer recognition. I show that perfect customer recognition generates higher
profits and for sufficiently low switching costs reverses the loyalty price premiums
that loyal customers pay under imperfect customer recognition. For low switching
costs, switchers would be offered the lowest price and newcomers – the highest.
This occurs because lower switching costs erode the profits from market share and
relax competition for new customers. When switching costs are sufficiently high,
introductory offers emerge as in the case with imperfect customer recognition This
3Netflix subscribers were required to prove membership by bringing in their Netflix envelope
flaps.
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result explains the practice of inducing the rival’s customers to reveal their purchase
history and offering deeper discounts to switchers.
A systematic analysis of the impact of customer recognition in a market with
overlapping generations of consumers is necessary because firms face two conflicting
incentives in setting their price to new customers – on one hand, they want to max-
imize profits from switchers, and, on the other, they want to invest in market share.
We do not have clear intuition as to which incentive will exercise stronger downward
pressure on the price to new customers and how this will affect the competition of
market share. Villas-Boas (1999) shows that customer recognition intensifies com-
petition to the point that price to new customers may fall down to marginal cost.
It is unclear how switching costs will affect this finding. High switching costs may
weaken the incentive to poach and thereby raise the price to new customers, but
they may also increase the return to market share, so firms will bid that price down.
The literature on exogenous switching costs has shown that typically switching costs
give rise to loyalty premiums, i.e. loyal customers pay higher prices than new cus-
tomers, and in markets for homogeneous goods rents from exploiting consumers due
to switching costs are dissipated in the competition for market share. In our model
we will demonstrates that the level of the loyalty premium and the degree to which
rents from switching costs are competed away depend on the size of the switching
cost. If switching costs are sufficiently high to cause complete customer lock-in, then
the incentive to poach disappears and firms would set the price to new customers
with the only goal of capturing market share. As a result, any gains associated with
the presence of switching costs will be competed away. In contrast, when switching
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costs are low and firms can poach the rival’s customers, the loyalty price premium
and firm profits will be increasing in the size of the switching cost.
So far, the only model that incorporates switching costs and customer recogni-
tion while considering the impact of overlapping generations of consumers appears
in Gehrig and Stenbacka (2002). The authors employ a two-period model to analyze
the stationary equilibrium of the dynamic game between two infinitely-lived firms.
However, by limiting attention to the case where switching costs are sufficiently high
to prevent switching, they do not allow for the presence of switchers, which is what
makes the overlapping generations setting interesting. Their two main findings are
that introductory offers to new customers only emerge for a strictly positive level of
the switching cost and the combination of price discrimination by purchase history
and the presence of high switching costs reduces firm profits relative to a setting with
zero switching costs. In the present study, which incorporates similar features but
rests on an infinite-horizon dynamic model and investigates the market equilibrium
for all levels of the switching costs, I find that firm profits increase in the size of the
switching costs. Furthermore, Villas-Boas (1999) and this study show that under
imperfect customer recognition introductory offers would appear even if switching
costs were zero. The disparity between the results in Gehrig and Stenbacka (2002)
and the model here as well as the original framework by Villas-Boas suggests that
a dynamic model is indeed necessary to capture the complex processes in a market
characterized by overlapping generations of consumers and customer recognition.
The present model is also closely related to the broader strand of literature on
imperfect competition with customer recognition. Customer recognition gives rise
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to a non-traditional form of price discrimination commonly referred to as behavior-
based price discrimination.4 Holmes (1989) shows that price discrimination in an
imperfectly competitive market does not necessarily increase firm profits. Corts
(1998) further demonstrates that in oligopolies with differentiated goods best re-
sponse asymmetry does not allow us to make a priori predictions about the impact
of price discrimination on firm profits and social welfare. Chen (1997) and Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000) develop two-period models to examine the impact of behavior-
based price discrimination on market outcomes. Chen looks at a homogeneous-good
duopoly and shows that profits are lower when firms engage in price discrimination.
He further shows that the price to loyal customers and the discount to switchers are
increasing in the cost of switching. In his model, the presence of switching costs is the
only cause of introductory offers to switchers. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) shift the
focus towards markets with product differentiation but no switching costs and ex-
amine the market equilibrium under short-term and long-term contracts. With fixed
consumer preferences and short-term contracts, poaching gives rise to discounts for
loyal customers. This result is in contrast with the switching costs literature where
discounts are geared towards new customers. Villas-Boas (1999) extends the anal-
ysis of Fudenberg and Tirole to an infinite-horizon model and shows that, even in
the absence of switching costs, infinitely-lived firms will optimally offer discounts
to new customers. This result will persist in our model as well and is due to the
fact that there is product differentiation – customers’ choice of supplier in their first
4For an excellent survey of behavior-based price discrimination models see Fudenberg and
Villas-Boas (2005).
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purchase reveals information about their relative preferences with respect to each
firm’s product. Villas-Boas shows that customer recognition intensifies competition
for new customers and drives both the price to new customers and the price to loyal
customers down.5 All three of these studies – Chen (1997), Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000), and Villas-Boas (1999) – conclude that firms are worse off when they price
discriminate on purchase history as opposed to uniform pricing. With respect to
imperfect price discrimination, this result is preserved in the present study as well.6
The literature on switching costs examines the impact of these costs in the light
of two distinct settings: one, based on homogeneous goods and heterogeneous switch-
ing costs, and another, based on heterogeneous goods and homogeneous costs.7 The
subsequent analyses of the impact of switching costs on market competitiveness have
mostly relied on two-period models because of their tractability which allows for the
examination of a wide variety of features and problems.8 Nevertheless, there are
a few dynamic models that look at the impact of switching costs on incumbency
advantages, the incentives for collusion, and the competitiveness of the market. All
but one of these dynamic models are based on uniform pricing strategies. The only
exception is Taylor (2003) who allows for customer recognition but his framework
does not allow for overlapping generations of consumers and assumes that firms
have a finite horizon. All other dynamic models feature overlapping generations of
5In Villas-Boas’ model the price to loyal customers is set sequentially after the introductory
prices are announced and its optimal level is increasing in the introductory price of the rival.
6The lack of closed-form solutions for the uniform-pricing models preclude a comparison be-
tween profitability under uniform pricing and perfect customer recognition.
7The lack of pure-strategy equilibrium constrains the analysis of homogeneous goods and ho-
mogeneous switching costs.
8For a thorough review of the literature on switching costs see Farrell and Klemperer (2007).
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consumers and uniform pricing strategies. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and Padilla
(1995) examine a market with homogeneous products. Farrell and Shapiro (1988)
first recognize the importance of having overlapping generations of consumers on
firms’ price strategies. They make the unusual assumption that firms choose a
price leader in the dynamic game and show that switching costs soften competi-
tion. Padilla (1995) disposes of this assumption, because of its direct impact on
competition, and allows firms to set their prices simultaneously. His results confirm
that switching costs relax competition and this effect is not due to the sequential
nature of the price-setting game in Farrell and Shapiro. Our own findings are con-
sistent with this result when we limit attention to the equilibrium with switching.
On the other hand, Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and To (1996) analyze a dynamic
market with product differentiation and switching costs, which successfully prevent
consumers from changing suppliers. The former assume that consumers have an
infinite horizon as well and reaffirm the results from homogeneous markets that
switching costs lead to higher prices and profits. To (1996) modifies the model in
Beggs and Klemperer by assuming that consumers have a finite horizon and, specifi-
cally, enter the market for two periods only. The only qualitative difference between
his results and those in Beggs and Klemperer is that in To’s model convergence to
steady state is non-monotonic. In both models convergence to steady state takes a
sufficiently high number of periods and may be infinitely slow if firms are infinitely
patient.
We present a model that features customer recognition, switching costs and
overlapping generations of consumers. Two sets of market equilibria are character-
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ized depending on the size of the switching cost. For all values of the switching
cost, customer recognition gives rise to a ‘bargain-then-ripoff’ pattern in prices and
switching costs amplify the loyalty price premium. When switching costs are low,
there is incomplete customer lock-in in steady state, firm profits increase in the
magnitude of the switching cost and introductory offers do not fall below marginal
cost. When switching costs are high, there is complete customer lock-in in steady
state, firm profits are independent of switching costs and introductory prices may
fall below cost. When both firms poach in equilibrium, switching costs do not af-
fect the speed of convergence to steady state; when neither firm finds it optimal to
poach, convergence to steady state occurs in just one period. Furthermore, we find
that imperfect customer recognition generates lower profits relative to both uniform
pricing and perfect customer recognition.
1.3 Introduction and Motivation of Chapter 3:
In the absence of adequate legal protection against contract breach, firms can
reduce their exposure to contractual risk in one-shot transactions by exchanging
information about defectors. The goal of this chapter is to investigate whether
competition discourages such exchange and under what conditions.
Information sharing is particularly important in developing and transition
economies where reliance on formal means of contract enforcement is limited. On
one hand, these economies may not have adequate legal framework or efficient en-
forcement institutions to provide protection against contract breach. On the other
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hand, informal business activity, corruption and inefficiency in the legal system may
discourage the use of formal contracts and rule out recourse to the court system.9
The consequences of such institutional failtures can be highly detrimental as firms
may limit their transactions to long-standing partners, and forgo better economic
opportunities with new partners (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000).
There are several theoretically and empirically established mechanisms, through
which information sharing can help firms reduce their exposure to contractual risk.
Information sharing can alleviate adverse selection through reputation effects: when
past performance is a signal of a player’s propensity to renege on a contract, firms can
screen out defectors, conditional on receiving information about the agent’s record
(Jappelli and Pagano, 1993). Information sharing can also have a discipline effect
that discourages some players from acting opportunistically because these players
can foresee that information about their actions will be publicly available (Padilla
and Pagano, 2000). Sharing information about players’ records can also facilitate
cooperation on a wide range of problems through social-norm equilibria (Kandori,
1992; Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995).10 Case studies of informal coalition
arrangements that sustain cooperation through social norms have given rise to vari-
ations of this game (Greif, 1993; Clay, 1997) but the dissemination of information
about players’ past actions remains a key function of such coalitions.
9Schneider (2002) shows that the average size of the informal sector in 21 transition countries
amounts to 38% of official GDP. Safavian and Wimpey (2007) show that the probability of an
enterprise preferring to use only informal credit is inversely related to the quality of the overall
quality of governance in the country.
10In fact, Kandori (1992) shows that for the cooperative equilibrium to be sustained players
only need information about the ‘status’ of their current partner, i.e. whether the partner is to be
punished in the current period for past deviations. Players do not need to know the full history of
the game or the status of all players.
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Past studies of contract enforcement based on social norms (Landa, 1981;
Greif, 1989 and 1993; Clay, 1997; Bernstein, 1992 and 2001) do not endogenize
the existence of information networks. Greif (1993) presents evidence of the ac-
tive correspondence among Maghribi traders in the 11c. Cairo and their partners
in the Mediterranean region on the performance of their overseas agents. Greif
conjectures that this extensive communication network indicated the existence of
an informal traders coalition that relied on reputation mechanisms to keep agents
honest. However, Greif (2006) briefly acknowledges that if coalition members were
rivals in a common oligopolistic market, they would be reluctant to share informa-
tion that may benefit their competitors. In numerous studies Marcel Fafchamps
and co-authors have recognized that competition may be responsible for the lack
of information sharing networks in some African countries (Fafchamps et al., 1994;
Fafchamps, 1996 and 1997; Fafchamps and Minten, 1998). However, to date there
is no formal study on the subject. This paper complements the literature on so-
cial norms by examining the conditions under which inter-firm information sharing
networks in a competitive environment are viable.
So far the literature has largely addressed the issue of information sharing on
agents’ contract performance from the perspective of lending institutions only (Jap-
pelli and Pagano, 1993; Padilla and Pagano, 1997 and 2000; Bouckaert and Degryse,
2001; Gehrig and Stenbacka 2006; and Brown and Zehnder, 2008). Among these
studies, few have focused on the impact of ex ante imperfect market competition
on the endogenous emergence of information flows.11 Jappelli and Pagano (1993),
11A notable exception is Klein (1992) who models firms’ decisions to pay a fee and join a credit
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Padilla and Pagano (1997), Brown and Zehnder (2008) model banks as ex ante local
monopolists and examine various aspects of information sharing on competition in-
tensity, entry decisions and borrower performance. Jappelli and Pagano (1993) first
look at the trade-offs of sharing information with potential rivals. In their model
banks benefit from pooling information about the borrowing histories of their local
customers but also lose their monopoly power, so the threat of more intense ex post
competition can deter information sharing. Brown and Zehnder (2008) present ex-
perimental evidence in support of this theoretical result. Padilla and Pagano (1997)
propose that information sharing may serve as a pre-commitment device that helps
reduce moral hazard on behalf of borrowers – by agreeing to share information,
banks pre-commit to limit their ability to extract rents from their customers, which
increases borrower effort. Bouckaert and Degryse (2001) in turn consider the incen-
tives of a local monopolist to unilaterally reveal information about its customers’
types to a potential entrant. They find that when adverse selection is severe, not
revealing information can deter entry, which makes information sharing suboptimal.
If entry does occur, then two-way information sharing emerges when the level of
adverse selection is large, consistent with the results in Jappelli and Pagano (1993).
Padilla and Pagano (2000) investigate how the scope of the information shared
affects its disciplinary effect on borrowers in the context of perfectly competitive
markets.12 They find that sharing default information only (also referred to as
bureau. However, he does not consider the role of competition on firms’ incentives to reveal their
private information about customer performance.
12See also Verkammen (1995) and Diamond (1989) for early studies on the impact of pub-
licly observable credit histories on borrowers’ choice of projects and effort. Brown and Zehnder
(2007) present experimental evidence showing that the incentive effects of information sharing are
significant only in the absence of bilaterally repeated transactions between lender and borrower.
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‘black’ information) rather than the full borrowing history, has a stronger discipline
effect because lenders make their inferences about a player’s type on the basis of a
single incident of default. In line with this result, I limit attention to the transmission
of ‘black’ information only. More recently, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2006) consider the
effects of information sharing on the degree of market competition. They find that
information exchange has anti-competitive implications as it facilitates poaching
the rival’s ‘good’ borrowers and reduces the returns on credit relationships, thus
weakening the competition for new customers.
Empirical studies of formal information sharing regimes have focused on the
outcomes of these regimes in credit markets and provide strong evidence in support
of the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism. Public and private credit registries
have become centralized repositories of information in credit markets.13 The opera-
tion of credit bureaus is shown to reduce default rates (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002),
increase the volume of lending (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov, McLiesh and
Shleifer, 2007) and reduce lenders’ selection costs (Kallberg and Udell, 2003). Firm-
level data shows that formal information sharing mechanisms among lenders reduce
firms’ cost of credit, particularly in countries with weak legal enforcement (Brown,
Jappelli and Pagano, 2009) and soften firms’ credit constraints (Love and Mylenko,
2003). Experimental evidence further demonstrates that sharing default informa-
tion increases borrowers’ incentives to repay loans and without such exchange the
13See Klein (1992) for a discussion of firms’ decision to join a credit bureau when competition
is not a consideration. See Jappelli and Pagano (1993) and Padilla and Pagano (2000) for a
theoretical treatment of the endogenous emergence of information sharing in credit markets. Also,
see Padilla and Pagano (1997) for a study of the precision of information to be shared in order to
maximize borrower performance.
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credit market can collapse (Brown and Zehnder, 2006). Evidence from microdata
in developing countries stresses on the efficiency gains of having an operating credit
bureau, especially when borrowers understand the implications of a traceable credit
history (de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet, 2006; Ginè, Goldberg and Yang, 2009).
The empirical evidence on the existence of informal information sharing net-
works in developing economies is somewhat limited and offers mixed findings. McMil-
lan and Woodruff (2000) find that gossip within Vietnam’s manufacturing commu-
nity serves an essential role in disseminating information about suppliers and cus-
tomers who have reneged on their contracts. In contrast, Annen (2007) surveys
informal textile producers in Bolivia and finds that most traders do not disclose
information about dishonest agents and even if they do, such information is limited
to one’s family members, rather than directed towards other traders who would
benefit most from such information. Among the few studies that recognize the role
of competition on the formation of information sharing networks, Fafchamps (1996)
reports the following in a particularly illustrative case study of contract enforcement
in Ghana:
‘There seems to be no mechanism whereby information about clients’ trust-
worthiness is shared among firms other than direct recommendation by common
acquaintances. When prompted directly, firms declare that they never bother pass-
ing information about untrustworthy customers to other firms. Sharing information
would provide competitors with an undue advantage, they say. In fact, several re-
spondents appeared to relish the idea that their competitors have to deal with the
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same deadbeats by whom they had been burnt.’ (Fafchamps, 1996, pg. 441.)
On the other hand, Fafchamps et al. (1994) point out with surprise that
several competing textile producers in Kenya deliberately exchanged information
about delinquent customers. Given the mixed anecdotal evidence on the existence of
information sharing networks in different markets and the lack of a formal analysis of
this issue, the current study fills an important gap in understanding how competition
affects firms’ decisions to share information with rivals.
The theoretical investigation in this paper differs from past studies of infor-
mation sharing in credit markets in two ways. First, all existing studies model the
impact of competition through the feedback effect of information sharing on lenders’
market power. In contrast, I propose a different channel through which competition
may hinder information sharing, based on the observation that the experience of
contract breach can be particularly harmful to firms that are liquidity constrained.
Firms’ losses associated with contract breach include not only the value of the con-
tracted goods/services, as it is assumed in studies focusing on lenders, but also
the potential loss of market share and its implications for future profitability un-
der an infinite horizon. This wider impact of contract breach on firms’ ability to
compete, particularly in environments with imperfect capital markets, has not been
addressed in the literature so far. Considering firms in a developing country setting
where information sharing can act as a particularly important substitute for cred-
itor protection rights further supports the thesis that credit constraints have the
potential to affect firms’ strategic decisions. Second, I focus on firms rather than
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lending institutions. This further justifies the emphasis on liquidity and allows us
to make use of survey data at the firm level and empirically examine the factors
that may have contributed to the presence of information sharing networks in some
markets but not in others. 14 Finally, all past studies use two-period models of
banking competition, through which they derive banks’ net benefits from engaging
in information sharing while the model at hand uses a richer, dynamic framework
to model market competition.
This study is also related to the broader subject of information sharing among
competing firms. A well-established strand of the literature looks into firms’ in-
centives to pool information about uncertain demand and cost parameters. In the
presence of demand or cost uncertainty, firms’ optimal strategies depend on the type
of competition (Bertrand or Cournot) and the source of uncertainty, i.e. demand
or cost conditions (Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1982; Clarke, 1983; Vives, 1984;
Gal-Or, 1985 and 1986; Li, 1985; Raith, 1996).15 Except for models of Bertrand
competition with cost uncertainty, unilaterally revealing information about inde-
pendent values, private values or common values with strategic complementarity is
shown to be a dominant strategy (Vives, 2006). More recent studies focus on firms’
decisions to reveal information about their customers’ purchase histories in order to
determine if customers view their products as substitutes or complements (Kim and
14Previous studies that use firm-level data, e.g. Galindo and Miller (2001), Love and Mylenko
(2003), Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2009), have studied the impact of private credit bureaus
and public credit registries on credit market performance but there is no empirical study, either
based on country-level or firm-level data, that examines the determinants of the emergence of
information-sharing institutions.
15See Vives (2006) for a review of the literature on pooling private signals of uncertain demand
and cost conditions.
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Choi, 2009; Liu and Serfes, 2009).
Finally, this work also fits into the literature on informal risk-sharing arrange-
ments (Kimball, 1988; Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Fafchamps, 1995 and 2002; Besley,
1995). Information sharing arrangements reduce firms’ exposure to cost shocks trig-
gered by the experience of contract breach. Thus, engaging in costly exchange of
information about defectors can be viewed as an insurance mechanism against future
shocks. Furthermore, firm access to low-cost, informal credit reduces the strategic
cost of information sharing and facilitates information exchange. Hence, this paper
suggests complementarities between credit and risk sharing institutions.
The main finding of this study is that market liquidity facilitates information
sharing by reducing the strategic cost of disclosing information to a rival. Firms ex-
pect that withholding information about cheaters will expose the remaining firms in
the market to higher risk of contract breach and the firm that withheld information
may be able to profit from the rival’s higher exposure to risk. However, access to
liquid assets makes firms less vulnerable to the disruptions caused by experiencing
contract breach. As a result, firms that face liquid rivals have weaker incentives
to withhold information from these rivals. Assuming that firms within a market
are similar in their access to liquidity, we can formulate the hypothesis that infor-
mation sharing is more likely to emerge in markets populated by more liquid firms.
This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence based on the information-sharing
practices of agricultural traders in Madagascar. The model also suggests that more
intense competition may encourage or discourage information sharing, depending
on what market features are driving the intensity of competition. The accompany-
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ing empirical analysis shows that traders who report stronger competition in their







This paper studies the interaction of customer recognition and switching costs
in a differentiated duopoly with overlapping generations of consumers. Customer
recognition refers to the practice of offering different prices to new and repeat con-
sumers. It has become a widespread market phenomenon facilitated by the the
advancement of information technologies over the past two decade. Previously as-
sociated predominantly with subscription markets, today this practice is feasible in
a wide variety of settings as more and more consumers provide firms with unique
identifiers when using non-cash methods of payment, carrying store membership
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cards or shopping online.1 Combined with the low cost of information storage, it
is easier than ever for companies to store and retrieve information about previous
customers, opening the door to price discrimination based on purchase history. This
paper shows that the dynamic properties of the equilibrium path of a differentiated
duopoly with overlapping generations of consumers differ substantially depending
on whether customer recognition is present. At the same time, consumers in markets
characterized by repeat purchases are more likely to face real or perceived costs of
switching when they purchase from different providers over time. Such costs could
be purely transactional, e.g. the cost of opening a new account with a different sup-
plier, or they could be due to learning costs arising from the need to get accustomed
to a new supplier or a new product.2 We demonstrate that there are two qualita-
tively different equilibrium paths depending on the magnitude of the switching cost.
Furthermore, since purchase history reveals information about a consumer’s relative
preferences and allows firms to extract more surplus from their repeat customers,
the presence of switching costs has the potential to increase the value of customer
recognition. Therefore, switching costs become especially relevant in such markets.
Yet, with a few notable exceptions, the literature so far has mostly considered the
role of these two features separately from each other.
The contribution of this paper can be best understood in light of the work of
To (1996) and Villas-Boas (1999). A comparison between the present model and To
(1996) allows us to understand the impact of customer recognition in the presence of
1See Taylor (2003) for a discussion of customer recognition in subscription markets.
2The classification of switching costs into transaction and learning costs was first introduced
by Nilssen (1992).
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large switching costs. Similar to the model in To (1996), I examine a differentiated
duopoly with heterogeneous switching costs and consumers with two-period life
spans. In addition, the current paper does not impose restrictions on the size of the
switching cost; in contrast, To (1996) assumes that switching costs are sufficiently
high to prevent switching in equilibrium. For this reason, an analysis of the impact of
customer recognition is limited to markets where switching costs are high enough to
cause complete customer lock-in. Under complete lock-in, firms do not face demand
from switchers. The main point of distinction between the two models is that
in our model firms exercise customer recognition. As mentioned above, customer
recognition and the presence of switching costs are likely to occur in the same
markets and it is important to understand their interaction. I find that customer
recognition in a market with complete lock-in allows firms to set introductory prices
that exclusively target newcomers, i.e. those consumers who are in their first period
in the market. As a result, the prices offered to new customers become independent
of market share and convergence to steady state occurs in just one period. In
contrast, To’s model shows that under uniform pricing the firm with the larger
market share charges a higher price (to all customers) and the market converges
to steady-state non-monotonically and after a sufficiently large number of periods.3
Given complete customer lock-in, steady-state per-cohort profits are lower when
firms can price discriminate relative to uniform pricing. Switching costs intensify
the competition for market share and firms compete away any profits associated with
3In a model of uniform pricing and infinitely-lived consumers Beggs and Klemperer (1992)
show that convergence to steady state is monotonic but may be infinitely slow.
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the resulting customer lock-in. Steady-state profits are at most equal to the profit
in the static Hotelling model with no switching costs and incumbency advantages
in terms of profits and market share disappear within one period. Thus my results
imply that under customer recognition, the presence of high switching costs does
not protect the incumbency position of the dominant firm but rather encourages
entry.
From a practical point of view, firms’ ability to price discriminate on the
basis of purchase history allows us to derive the equilibrium prices in terms of
the magnitude of the switching cost and perform comparative statics. Dynamic
models of uniform pricing (Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; To, 1996) do not permit the
identification of the direct impact of the switching cost on prices. This is due to
the fact that in these models the switching costs do not explicitly enter the demand
functions but rather justify the assumption that repeat customers cannot switch . In
our setting we can derive the endogenous threshold, beyond which switching costs
cause complete customer lock-in. Therefore, we can characterize the equilibrium
path depending on whether switching costs are below or above this threshold level.
A comparison between our model and Villas-Boas (1996) allows us to exam-
ine the effect of switching costs on prices, profits and convergence in the presence
of customer recognition. Since the model in Villas-Boas (1996) does not feature
switching costs, the equilibrium results are limited to the case where there is only
partial customer lock-in. In our setting, partial lock-in is preserved as long as switch-
ing costs are sufficiently low. I find that the equilibrium results from Villas-Boas’
model are largely preserved except for the direct effects of switching costs on prices,
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on the volume of switching, and on the probability that both firms will be able
to poach in equilibrium. In particular, I find that the price to new customers is
weakly decreasing in the cost of switching and as long as this cost is low enough to
allow switching in equilibrium, the introductory price does not fall below marginal
cost. Furthermore, switching costs raise the price to repeat customers, expand the
loyal customer segment for each firm, increase profits and increase the likelihood
that only one firm will be able to poach for a given distribution of the market. As
long as both firms poach in equilibrium, switching costs do not affect the speed of
convergence to steady state.
By adding switching costs to Villas-Boas’ framework, we see that the size of
the switching costs matters and can lead to two distinct equilibrium paths. When
switching costs are high such that there is complete lock-in in steady state, the
properties of the equilibrium change substantially. Convergence to steady state
occurs in just one period, the price to new customers may fall below cost, and
bilateral poaching is no longer possible. In addition, under the equilibrium with
complete lock-in, I can characterize the firms’ equilibrium strategies for all values
of the consumer discount factor while under incomplete lock-in, Villas-Boas (1999)
and my own treatment of the model is subject to the restriction that consumers are
sufficiently patient.4
Finally, I examine the effect of imperfect customer recognition (ICR) on profits
by examining an otherwise identical market where firms can also distinguish between
4While I derive the closed-form solutions for the coefficients that determine the optimal price
policies of the two firms, the resulting expressions cannot be meaningfully analyzed unless we limit
attention to a consumer discount factor close to one.
27
switchers and newcomers. I refer to the latter practice as perfect customer recogni-
tion (PRC), because firms can recognize all three groups of consumers - newcomers,
switchers and loyal customers. Since, the inability to price discriminate between
newcomers and switchers under ICR is most relevant when switching does occur,
I restrict this analysis to the case where switching costs are low enough to allow
incomplete customer lock-in in steady state. I find that under PCR loyal customers
and switchers receive discounts relative to newcomers and a larger fraction of old
consumers switch in equilibrium. Furthermore, firm profits per cohort of consumers
is higher under PCR relative to ICR although this difference is decreasing in the
magnitude of the switching costs.
Section 2.2 describes the model and Section 2.3 presents the equilibrium results
for the case of low and high switching costs, respectively. Section 2.4 presents
the comparison of imperfect versus perfect customer recognition and Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 The Model
We consider a duopoly market consisting of two infinitely-lived firms, A and B,
selling a nondurable good. Consumers have uniformly distributed preferences over
the products of the two firms, which gives rise to ex-ante product differentiation.
The degree of product differentiation is exogenously determined and fixed. Each
firm produces the good at a constant marginal cost, c. Consumers enter the market
for two periods only and demand one unit of the good in each period. They have
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common valuation for the good given by v, which I assume to be sufficiently high to
induce a purchase in each period. In each period an old cohort of consumers exits
the market and a new cohort enters. I assume that all cohorts are of the same size,
although the analysis can be readily extended to accommodate cohorts of different
sizes. In any given period, a firm faces two overlapping generations of consumers:
old consumers in their second period in the market who have established a purchase
history; and newcomers, who enter the market in the current period and have not
purchased from either firm yet. If old customers purchase from the same supplier in
both periods I call them ‘loyal’ customers, while if they purchase from two different
suppliers over their lifetime, I call them ‘switchers’. Firms recognize their own loyal
customers but cannot determine if a new customer is a newcomer with no purchase
history or a switcher from the rival firm.
I use Hotelling’s framework to model product differentiation. Firms are located
at the opposite ends of the unit interval with firm A located at zero. Each cohort of
consumers has mass normalized to one and consumers are uniformly distributed over
the unit interval. For each consumer, the distance from firm A relative to firm B is
a proxy for her preference towards the two firms. I assume that these preferences
are time-invariant and known to the consumer ex ante.5 To model preferences,
suppose that customers face a linear transportation cost of  per unit of distance,
such that if a consumer is located at distance x from firm A, she will have to incur
transportation costs of x if she buys from A, or (1−x) if she buys from firm B. A
5The literature on experience goods considers settings where consumers are ex ante unaware
of their preferences and the information they obtain through purchasing from one supplier creates
an endogenous cost of switching. I do not consider such situations here but the reader is referred
to Villas-Boas (2004) for a model of dynamic competition with experience goods.
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consumer who switches suppliers in her second period also incurs a switching cost,
s, which is assumed to be time-invariant, uniform across consumers and common
knowledge.6 Firms compete for customers by offering an introductory price and a
regular price. All new customers, which could be either newcomers or switchers,
are offered an introductory price, pint, while loyal customers are offered a regular
price, piot. We assume that firms simultaneously announce their introductory prices
at the beginning of each period. However, each firm sets its regular price only
after observing the introductory price of the rival. This assumption guarantees the
existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in periods when the distribution of market
share is sufficiently unequal.7 It is well known that sequentially set prices are higher
than the Bertrand price. However, for the purposes of our analysis an upward bias
in the regular price will not affect the results in a qualitative way.
Since my setup is based on Villas-Boas (1999), I adopt the same notation,
whenever possible, to facilitate comparison of the results. Let i, j = {A,B}. Then,
let qii,t indicate demand from firm i’s loyal customers in period t, qij,t – demand from
old customers who switch from i to j in period t, and q1i,t – demand from newcomers
who purchase from i in their first period in the market. To simplify some of the
notation that follows, without loss of generality, I normalize marginal costs to zero
for both firms. In Section 2.2 I will present the equilibrium results when marginal
costs are constant, symmetric and equal to c ≥ 0.
6Since customers can switch at most once, there is no need to distinguish whether switching
costs arise strictly from learning costs (which are incurred only once with each supplier) or from
transaction costs (which are incurred every time a buyer switches suppliers).
7This is a common assumption in models of customer recognition where customers are hetero-
geneous in some characteristic (Villas-Boas, 1999; Marquez, 2002).
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To set up the firms’ problem, we first characterize the demand functions for
each of the three groups of customers: newcomers, switchers and loyal customers. I
then discuss the recursive nature of the problem and set up the firms’ value functions.
2.2.1 Demand from Newcomers
To derive each firm’s demand from newcomers, we first determine the location
of the marginal consumer among newcomers in the market. This location also
determines the distribution of the market in the current period and the market
shares that firms will inherit in the following period. We indicate the location of
the marginal consumer among newcomers at time t as xt+1, where xt+1 will also be
used to describe firm A’s market share in period t+ 1.
Indicate the consumer discount factor as c where c ∈ (0, 1]. Assuming that
consumers have perfect foresight, a newcomer located at x will purchase from firm
A in her first period in the market if this purchase yields a weakly higher surplus
over the consumer’s two-period life span in the market than the one realized when
purchasing from firm B:
v − pAnt − x+ c max
(
v − pAot+1 − x, v − pBnt+1 − s− (1− x)
)
(2.2.1)
≥ v − pBnt − (1− x) + c max
(
v − pBot+1 − (1− x), v − pAnt+1 − s− x
)
The marginal newcomer, located at xt+1, will be just indifferent between the
two sequences of purchases when
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pAnt+xt+1 + c min
(
pAot+1 + xt+1, p
B
nt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1)
)
(2.2.2)
= pBnt + (1− xt+1) + c min
(
pBot+1 + (1− xt+1), pAnt+1 + s+ xt+1
)
Since we assume that the regular price is set after the rival’s introductory
price is known, firm A will always set pAot+1 such that its marginal loyal customer at
time t + 1 is just indifferent between switching and staying after having purchased
from A at time t. If firm A wants to keep all of its customers in period t + 1, it
will set pAot+1 + xt+1 = p
B
nt+1 + s + (1 − xt+1). If it wants to let some customers
switch, then it must be true that for firm A’s marginal old customer pAot+1 + xt+1 >
pBnt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1). In either case, we have
min
(
pAot+1 + xt+1, p
B
nt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1)
)
= pBnt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1) (2.2.3)
Otherwise, firm A can always increase its profits by raising pAot+1 without affect-
ing demand from loyal customers. Therefore, the location of the marginal newcomer
at time t can be determined from:
pAnt+xt+1 + c
(
pBnt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1)
)
(2.2.4)
= pBnt + (1− xt+1) + c
(
pAnt+1 + s+ xt+1
)
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This equality determines the location of the marginal newcomer at time t as
well as the distribution of market share at the beginning of period t+ 1:
xt+1 =
(1− c) + c(pAnt+1 − pBnt+1) + pBnt − pAnt
2(1− c)
(2.2.5)
Thus, demand from newcomers can be defined as:
q1A,t = xt+1 (2.2.6)
q1B,t = 1− xt+1 (2.2.7)
2.2.2 Demand from Loyal Customers
The marginal loyal customer for firm A at time t will be just indifferent between
switching and staying. Therefore, her location, xlt can be determined from the





nt + s+ (1− xlt) (2.2.8)

























Note that the regular price does not affect demand from newcomers or switch-
ers, so firm i will choose piot independent of its own choice of p
i
nt. Thus, each firm sets
piot to maximize profits from loyal customers taking as given the rival’s introductory
price. Since we assume that firms set piot after observing p
j
nt, the choice of p
i
ot deter-
mines the optimal mass of loyal customers that a firm would like to keep given the
introductory price of its rival. If this optimal mass exceeds the firm’s actual market
share, sales to loyal customers are limited to the size of the firm’s existing customer
















 + s+ pBnt
2
,  + s+ pBnt − 2xt
)
(2.2.12)
Note that the optimal regular price is increasing in the rival’s introductory
offer.8 In fact, if pBnt is sufficiently large, firm A would keep all of its previous
customers as loyal customers so qAA,t will be constrained by firm A’s market share.
On the other hand, if pBnt is low enough, firm A’s loyal customer segment will be less
than xt.
In the cases where sales to loyal customers are less than a firm’s market share
8For an arbitrary level of the marginal cost, the optimal regular price depends on c if sales to











we define q̂ii,t as firm i’s optimal sales to loyal customers in period t. We can further
extend the interpretation of q̂ii,t as firm i’s optimal market share in period t if we
consider situations in which the acquisition of market share is costly (i.e. when the
introductory price is below cost). Upon finding a deterministic optimal path for
pAnt and p
B
nt, each firm can project how much market share it would like to capture
today in order to maximize profits from loyal customers tomorrow. We can find




nt) into (2.2.9) which yields firm A’s optimal market share as
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(2.2.13)
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(2.2.15)
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From (2.2.12) and (2.2.16) we can see that the optimal regular price is uniquely
determined given knowledge of the rival’s introductory price. The assumption that
firms set introductory and regular prices sequentially ensures that once the intro-
ductory prices are announced and firms set their regular prices accordingly, neither
firm has a profitable deviation in changing its regular price. Without this assump-
tion, there may not be pure-strategy equilibria if the prior distribution of the market
is sufficiently unequal. To see this, observe from (2.2.12) and (2.2.13) that when
market share is not a binding constraint on sales to loyal customers, the regular
price and sales to loyal customers are increasing in the rival’s introductory price.
Consider a setting where regular prices are set simultaneously with the introduc-
tory price of the rival. Suppose that firm B starts the period with a relatively high
market share and charges a low introductory price. Firm A’s best response would
be to charge a low regular price as well in order to retain some of its clientele. But
it is possible that as firm A charges a low regular price it still retains all of its old
customers because of their close proximity to A (since we assumed that firm A’s
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market share is low), so firm B’s best response may be to raise its introductory
price and target newcomers only, to which firm A’s best response will be to raise its
regular price as well. Realizing that it can now profitably poach firm A’s customers,
firm B’s best response would be to lower its price again, giving rise to another cycle
of price cuts. So, when regular prices and introductory prices are set simultaneously
an equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist. 9
2.2.3 Demand from Switchers
Demand from switchers, if positive, can be represented as the difference be-
tween the rival’s market share and its optimal sales of loyal customers. For firm A,
demand from switchers is given by
qBA,t = max (0, (1− xt)− q̂BB,t) (2.2.20)









Similarly, demand from switchers for firm B is given by:








9This is the same argument as applied in Villas-Boas (1999), pp. 611. At this point my model
follows closely the setup in Villas-Boas and my introduction of switching costs does not preclude
the need to assume sequential price setting with respect to regular prices.
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From the demand equations in (2.2.21) and (2.2.23), it is clear that a firm’s
ability to poach depends on the pre-existing distribution of market shares, sum-
marized in xt. The firm that enters the period with low market share can attract
the rival’s previous customers at a higher price because of the closer proximity of
prospective switchers. At the same time, both newcomers and switchers are offered
the same price, pnt, so each firm chooses its optimal introductory price by balancing
the incentives to gain market share and to maximize profits from poaching. Given
the symmetry of the problem, it is clear that if the firms’ only goal was to capture
market share, their introductory prices would be equal. It is the incentive to poach
that drives a wedge between the firms’ introductory prices, unless market share is
equally split at the beginning of the period.
2.2.4 Equilibrium Concept
Since current market share depends on the introductory prices from the previ-
ous period only, xt is the only payoff-relevant state variable that affects the optimal
introductory prices in period t. We will refer to xt as the state variable in pe-
riod t while pAnt and p
B
nt will represent the choice variables for firm A and firm B,
respectively. The optimal regular price is unique for a given introductory price,
so identifying the optimal pricing strategies for pint is sufficient to derive the full
schedule of prices in period t as well as the distribution of market share in period
t+ 1. We solve the dynamic problem for each firm by looking for a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (MPE), in which firms’ pricing strategies depend solely on the realized
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distribution of the newcomers’ market shares in the previous period. Based on the
solution of a similar problem in Villas-Boas (1999), we look for a MPE, in which
the price strategies regarding pint are piecewise affine in xt and the value function
of each firm is piecewise quadratic in xt.
10 We allow for the possibility that the
optimal strategies are piecewise affine because firms may pursue different strategies
depending on whether they are able to poach, which in turn depends on the state
variable xt.
11 Therefore, we specify
pAnt − pBnt = ak + bkxt (2.2.24)
pAnt = ek + fkxt (2.2.25)
pBnt = ek − ak + (fk − bk)xt (2.2.26)













k (1− xt) + Bk (1− xt)
2 (2.2.28)
We index each of the undetermined coefficients by k to indicate that they may
be different for different ranges of the state variable. Since we conjecture that
the introductory prices are piecewise affine in xt, we also write their difference as
piecewise affine in xt. Using (2.2.5) and applying p
A
nt+1 − pBnt+1 = ak + bkxt+1 where
the subscript k refers to the region containing xt+1, we can rewrite the market
distribution in period t+ 1 as a function of the current market distribution:
10Equilibria in non-affine strategies may also exist but they are outside the scope of my study.
11In the special case when c = 1, the optimal price strategies would be identical for all xt.
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xt+1 (xt) =
 (1− c) + cak + pBnt (xt)− pAnt (xt)
2 (1− c)− cbk
(2.2.29)
Finally, using f ∈ (0, 1] to indicate the firms’ discount factor, we write out
the firms’ optimization problems with respect to pint:




















































1− xt+1(pAnt, pBnt) + max
(
0, xt −









Following Villas-Boas (1999) I assume that there is some minimal level of exit
costs that a firm would incur at the end of the period if it does not realize sales
to newcomers in that period. Similarly to the assumption that regular prices are
set after introductory prices are known, the assumption on exit costs rules out the
possibility that a pure-strategy equilibrium may not exist when one firm starts out
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the period with a very small market share. For example, it may be more profitable
for a firm with low or no market share to set a price that targets switchers only
(because it can charge a higher price to rival’s customers who are located closer
to the firm) rather than compete for newcomers. But then the rival can raise its
price as well without giving up too much in demand from newcomers. Given this
higher price, the firm with low market share may find it profitable to compete for
newcomers as well, so it will lower its price. This will be followed by another price
cut by the rival and the first firm may be willing to exit the newcomers’ market
again. The presence of some minimal level of exit costs eliminates this possibility
by ensuring that a firm will always choose to sell to newcomers regardless of how
small its market share is.12 It is important to note that an assumption about exit
costs is necessary only for a limited range of the parameter values.
Exit costs are plausible if we assume that firms enter the market with the
intention to serve both new and old customers. One example of exit costs could
be the erosion of goodwill a firm has if it is based on intergenerational transfer of
information about the firm’s product. A firm that does not sell to newcomers in a
given period may have to compensate for the dissipation of goodwill by taking costly
actions to promote its product to newcomers in the next period. Alternatively, we
could think of these exit costs as the cost of reentering the market when the firm’s
market share is zero. The minimal required level of exit costs that would ensure
12Previous models of dynamic competition with switching costs have imposed similar conditions
to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. To (1996) imposes an upper bound on
the consumer reservation value while Beggs and Klemperer (1992) impose restrictions on the rate
of customer turnover and cost differentials. In both models, these conditions ensure that firms will
not pursue a strategy where they do not serve any newcomers.
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a pure-strategy equilibrium in my model can be found by setting the maximum
discounted payoff from deviating once and selling to switchers only equal to the
payoff from staying with the equilibrium strategy and selling to both switchers and
newcomers in equilibrium. We denote exit costs by E and relegate the derivation of
their minimal required level to the appendix.
2.3 Equilibrium Results
We present two sets of equilibrium results depending on the magnitude of
the switching cost. For each equilibrium I characterize the optimal price strategies
on the equilibrium path and the resulting pattern of convergence to steady state.
I present the intuition of these results in the body of the paper and relegate all
technical proofs to the appendix.
2.3.1 The Equilibrium under Incomplete Lock-in and Low
Switching Costs
In his model of customer recognition in the absence of switching costs, Villas-
Boas (1999) shows that when the current distribution of market share is not too
uneven, both firms are able to attract some of the rival’s previous customers. Based
on this result, I conjecture that when switching costs are not too large to preclude
switching, there will be incomplete customer lock-in for xt close to the middle. I
define this range as (xm, 1 − xm) and refer to it as the ”poaching region”. Upon
identifying the optimal price strategies under the conjecture that both firms poach in
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equilibrium, I derive xm and verify that my conjecture is correct for xt ∈ (xm, 1−xm).
I suppress the subscript k for all coefficients that define the firms’ optimal strategies
and value functions for xt ∈ (xm, 1 − xm). As long as the problem is symmetric, I
also know that the coefficients determining the firms’ value functions are identical
across the two firms, so I write A = B = , A = B = , A = B = .
We modify the value functions for each firm to reflect my conjecture that within
the poaching region both firms attract some of the rival’s previous customers:


















































1− xt+1(pAnt, pBnt) + xt −








After finding the best response functions and solving for the undetermined
coefficients I obtain the following:
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The equation characterizing b is given by:
[4b(8 − 2c − cb) + 16(2 − 2c − cb)][(2 − 2c − cb)2 − fb2]
+ fb
3(18 − 2c − cb) + 16fb2(2 − 2c − cb) = 0 (2.3.5)
In order to derive a tractable solution for b, I limit attention to the case where
c → 1. All results that refer to the equilibrium with incomplete lock-in are based
on this restriction. From (2.3.5) I find that for c → 1, b→ 0− and ∂b/∂c < 0.
In the exposition of the firms’ problem I assumed that marginal cost is zero. I
now generalize the setup presented in the previous section by assuming marginal cost
equals c ≥ 0. Proposition 1 below characterizes the firms’ optimal price strategies
on the equilibrium path within the poaching region.
Proposition 1. Suppose f ≥ 0, c → 1, xt ∈ (xm, 1 − xm), s ≤ , and E ≥
(3−s)2−2f (+s)2
16
. A Markov-perfect equilibrium in affine strategies exists and can be
characterized as follows. As c → 1:
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In addition to (2.3.3), (2.3.4), and (2.3.5), the relevant coefficients governing the






2 2(1− c) + 4(1− c)− 3cb− 4f − 4f
2(4 − 2c − cb)
(2.3.11)
− s(2 − 2c − cb)
2(4 − 2c − cb)
 =




e (−4(2 − 2c − cb) + 4(f − b)− f(6 − 2c − cb))
4(2 − 2c − cb)
+
f (10t2(1− c) + 4ca− 3c − (2 − 2c − cb) + 4(e− a))
4(2 − 2c − cb)
− fe(6 − 2c − cb)
4(2 − 2c − cb)
+ f
b
2 − 2c − cb
+ f
2b(t(1− c) + ca− a)
(2 − 2c − cb)2
 =− b
2(2 − 2c − cb)(18 − 2c − cb) + 16b(2 − 2c − cb)2
32 ((2 − 2c − cb)2 − fb2)
(2.3.13)
As c → 1, a → 0, b → 0, e → 0,  → 0 and  → 0. The limits of the poaching
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C = 2 − 2c − cb,
M = 4C − 4f














where −b/(2t(1− c)− cb) ∈ (2/3, 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal price strategies described in Proposition 1 have a number of
interesting features, which become evident when I consider the limit case where
c = 1. I refer to consumers with c = 1 as very patient consumers (all consumers
within the market have the same discount factor). When consumers are very patient
Proposition 1 indicates that a = b = 0, which implies that pAnt = p
B
nt for all possible
distributions of xt. That is, firms’ introductory prices become independent of market
share and equal to marginal cost. To provide intuition for this result I present the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. For c = 1, q1i,t = 0 whenever firm i deviates from the equilibrium path
47
proposed in Proposition 1 by setting pint > p
j
nt.







equilibrium price as p and note from Proposition 1 that this is true for all xt as long
as c = 1. Let p
A
nt be the deviating price for firm A. A newcomer located at x will
purchase from A if and only if:
pAnt + x+ (p+ (1− x) + s) ≤ p+ x+ (p+ x+ s)
pAnt ≤ p
It is clear that for pAnt > p, the inequality above cannot be satisfied for any x.
Therefore, if A deviates to a price above the proposed equilibrium price, p, it will
make no sales to newcomers.
The lemma above suggests that demand from newcomers is zero whenever
a firm sets its introductory price above the rival’s price. Similarly, a firm will
capture the entire market of newcomers if it undercuts the rival’s price. These
results suggest that on the equilibrium path demand from newcomers is perfectly
elastic when c = 1. This result is also present in Villas-Boas (1999) and is preserved
here even when switching costs are positive. There are a number of features present
in the model that produce this result - consumers stay in the market for an even
number of periods, there is cost and demand symmetry across the two firms, and
there is no uncertainty about the realization of consumer preferences in the mature
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market. As long as the presence of switching costs does not give rise to asymmetric
demand, this property is preserved. In my setting switching costs are symmetric
and there is no uncertainty about their realization so demand from newcomers is
symmetric across the two firms.
The perfect elasticity of newcomers’ demand helps explain the properties of
the equilibrium. Recall that we are able to derive tractable representations of the
equilibrium price strategies only when we limit attention to c close to one, so under-
standing the equilibrium properties in the limit, c = 1, is particularly important.
The perfect elasticity of newcomers’ demand explains the somewhat surprising re-
sult that as c → 1 the introductory price approaches marginal cost despite the
heterogeneity of consumer preferences. In fact, as noted in Villas-Boas(1999), com-
petition intensifies as consumers become more patient. To see this, note that using
the equilibrium result a = −b/2 we can rewrite xt+1 as follows:
xt+1 =
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt − pAnt






2 − 2c − cb
(2.3.16)
Let w = 1
2−2c−cb indicate the weight of the price differential on the location
of the marginal consumer, given by xt+1. On the equilibrium path b ≤ 0 and
∂b/∂c < 0, so ∂w/∂c > 0 – as consumer patience increases, the marginal newcomer
becomes more sensitive to the difference between the introductory prices offered
today.
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The result that consumer patience intensifies competition is in contrast with
previous results in the literature on switching costs and is due to our assumption
about imperfect customer recognition.13 In models of dynamic competition with
switching costs and uniform pricing policies (Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; To, 1996)
consumer patience softens the competition for market share. In these models firms
charge a uniform price to all customers and switching costs are high enough to
preclude switching. As a result, consumers recognize that the low-price firm today
will charge a higher price tomorrow because it has a greater incentive to exploit its
customer base today rather than invest in market share. In contrast, under customer
recognition combined with the assumption that regular prices are conditioned on the
introductory prices, the price that an old customer pays increases in the introductory
price of the rival, regardless of the decision to switch or stay. I have shown that
a → 0 and b → 0 as c → 1, so consumers realize that on the equilibrium path the
firms’ introductory prices next period will be less differentiated as c goes up. This
increases the importance of the introductory offers in the current period and makes
consumers more sensitive to these offers.
Going back to the result that pAnt = p
B
nt = c when c = 1, we observe that this
is the same price as derived in Villas-Boas’ model where switching costs are zero.
It may seem puzzling at first that the introductory price does not fall below cost
despite the perfect elasticity of newcomers’ demand and the presence of switching
costs. To provide intuition for this result, I summarize some important properties
13In subsequent results based on perfect customer recognition, we find the opposite effect –
consumer patience relaxes competition.
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of the equilibrium described above in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Along the equilibrium path described in Proposition 1 the following is
true for c → 1:
1) ∂pin/∂s < 0 for c < 1 and ∂p
i
n/∂s = 0 for c = 1 (2.3.17)
2) ∂pio/∂s > 0 (2.3.18)
3) ∂q̂ii/∂s > 0 and q̂ii →
1
2
as s→  (2.3.19)
4) ∂xm/∂s > 0 and xm →
1
2
as s→  (2.3.20)
Proof. See Appendix.
The properties described by (2.3.18) and (2.3.19) show that firms’ regular
prices and optimal sales to loyal customers increase in the size of the switching costs.
Therefore, switching costs raise profits from loyal customers. Furthermore, (2.3.17)
indicates that the introductory price is weakly decreasing in s because market share
becomes more valuable as s goes up and because the barriers to switching are higher.
Interestingly, when consumers are very patient the introductory price is independent
of the switching cost. This can be explained by result (2.3.19). The equilibrium I
characterize in Proposition 1 is valid for s ≤  (conditional on c = 1) and I find
that firms’ optimal market share, q̂ii, is no greater than 1/2. When consumers are
very patient, firms are unable to charge introductory prices above marginal cost (or
they will not make any sales to newcomers) and they are not interested in capturing
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more than half of the newcomers’ market if this entails pricing below cost. Thus, at
pin = c neither firm has an incentive to undercut the rival’s price regardless of the
value of s.
The fact that firms retain less than their share of old customers as loyal cus-
tomers explains why the equilibrium I derive here is similar to the one in Villas-Boas’
model of customer recognition, in which switching costs are zero. As long as switch-
ing costs are sufficiently low to allow poaching in equilibrium, we have that q̂ii ≤ 12
– besides increasing the value of market share and decreasing the return to poach-
ing, the presence of some low level of switching costs does not change the nature of
competition in the market.
The magnitude of the switching cost does affect the equilibrium level of prices,
profits, and the mass of consumers who switch, by varying the relative return on
market share acquisition and poaching. To see how s affects these two competing
forces in the determination of the optimal introductory price, I look at the de-
composition of the partial derivative of pint with respect to switching costs. Since
∂pAnt/∂s = ∂e/∂s+ ∂f/∂s and the latter term is zero we have:





The first term in this expression captures the impact of the value of market share
() as a function of s on the introductory price. In the proof of Corollary 1 I show
that ∂/∂s ≥ 0 and C = 2 − 2c − cb → 0+ as c → 1. As switching costs
increase, market share becomes more valuable (∂/∂s ≥ 0) and patient firms lower
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their introductory offers accordingly. The second term in ∂e/∂s depends solely
on b and captures the effect of the incentive to poach. Recall that f = b/2 and
pAnt = e+ fxt, so a higher b indicates that market share becomes more important in
determining pn. Thus, b can be viewed as a proxy of the magnitude of the incentive
to poach. It is straightforward to show that ∂C/∂b < 0, so the absolute value of
−C/(4 + 2C) increases as b goes up – a strong incentive to poach has a larger
negative impact on the equilibrium pn through s because firms have to offer larger
discounts to compensate switchers for the cost of switching. In fact, newcomers
benefit from the ongoing competition for switchers because the firms’ incentive to
poach reduces introductory prices even further. Only in the limit as c → 1 we have
C
4+2C
→ 0 – the incentive to poach no longer affects the equilibrium introductory
price.
When c < 1 the determination of the introductory offers hinges on the trade-
off between poaching and investing in market share and the size of the incoming
cohort of consumers matters. If consumers are fairly impatient and there is a large
cohort of newcomers (relative to the old cohort of consumers, some of which are
switchers today), the equilibrium introductory price may be quite high as poaching
becomes relatively less important. If there is only a small mass of newcomers in the
market, firms may forgo the high profit margin on newcomers and lower their prices
to attract more switchers. When consumers are very patient, we have shown that pn
converges to marginal cost, reducing the profit margin on switchers and newcomers
to zero. In this case, if the size of the newcomers cohort is relatively small, a firm
may find a profitable deviation in raising its price and targeting switchers only. This
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will give rise to an equilibrium in mixed strategies where firms randomize between
charging a high price targeted at switchers and undercutting the rival’s price to at-
tract newcomers, resulting in higher introductory prices on average. Thus, a small
incoming cohort of consumers may either raise or lower prices depending on the
degree of consumer patience. We can also conclude that fast growing markets with
large incoming cohorts of very patient consumers can more easily sustain introduc-
tory offers close to marginal cost (even in the absence of exit costs) because a larger
volume of sales to newcomers counteracts the temptation to raise prices and target
switchers only.
From (2.3.17)and (2.3.18) it is clear that customer recognition alone gives rise
to a ‘bargain-then-rip-off’ price pattern that is typical of switching costs models.14
Switching costs further amplify the resulting loyalty price premium, pot−pnt. Using
(2.2.12) and adjusting for c > 0, we see that
pot − pnt =






− pnt − c
2
→  + s
2
as c → 1
Finally, for c to1 we can derive the impact of switching costs on profits. Firm
i’s profits per cohort of consumers entering the market in period t are given by




































as c → 1 (2.3.25)
From Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 we can see that ∂pin/∂s→ 0 and pin− c→
0 as c → 1 while ∂pio/∂s > 0 and ∂qii/∂s > 0 for all c. Therefore, in the limit firm




as s →  . Note, however, that this is the minimum level of profits in this
market because prices are decreasing in c and I evaluate the profit function at
c → 1. In the standard Hotelling model profits from a generation of customers who
make a purchase twice would equal
(1+f )
2
. Compared to that level, profits in a
market with customer recognition, low switching costs and very patient consumers
are always lower. Based on the same result for s = 0 and  = 1, Villas-Boas (1999)
concludes that firms would be better off if they did not recognize their previous
customers. Chen (1997) reaches the same conclusion for a homogeneous market with
heterogeneous switching costs and customer recognition. In the current setting, we
see that switching costs can alleviate the disparity in profits. Unfortunately, the
literature does not provide us with a basis of comparison to determine if customer
recognition alone leads to lower profits relative to uniform pricing when switching
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occurs in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 also states that the presence of switching costs shrinks the ‘poach-
ing’ region given by (xm, 1− xm). I identify this region by looking for the range of
xt such that neither firm has a profitable deviation in a price strategy that does not
attract switchers. I find that firm A will not deviate from the equilibrium strategy
described in Proposition 1 if xt ≤ 1 − xm and, similarly, firm B will not deviate
if 1 − xt ≤ 1 − xm. Intuitively, these restrictions follow from the fact a firm with
large market share has to charge a lower introductory price in order to poach. If the
firm’s market share is sufficiently large and c < 1, the desire to poach will lower pn
to a level, at which the firm is better off raising its price and selling to newcomers
only. Since higher switching costs lower the payoff from poaching, a deviation to
a no-poaching strategy becomes profitable at lower levels of market share. As the
poaching region contracts, bilateral switching becomes less likely to be observed in
equilibrium. As (2.3.20) shows, the poaching region shrinks to a mass of zero as
switching costs approach  and c → 1 and poaching becomes unfeasible.
When the market is very unevenly distributed, i.e. xt is outside (xm, 1− xm),
only the firm with the smaller market share engages in poaching while its rival
pursues a no-poaching strategy. Villas-Boas (1999) investigates in detail the market
dynamics outside the poaching region for c < 1 and finds that it takes no more
than two periods for the market to enter the poaching region. If market share falls
in the ‘very small’ region, xt ∈ [0, xs], only firm A poaches; next period the market
enters the ‘small’ region, given by (xs, xm), where A poaches and B does not, and
in the next period market share is such that xt ∈ (xm, 1 − xm) and both firms
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poach. When switching costs are low, the market will follow a similar path before
entering the poaching region. Switching costs will affect the boundary xs, which
will affect the probability that xt falls within the ‘very small’ region and that it will
take an additional period before entering the poaching region. Since convergence
to steady state may be rather slow in this region, a change in the probability that
the market takes an additional period to enter the poaching region does not seem
to be significant enough to merit a detailed investigation of how s affects xs. For
this reason, I do not characterize the equilibrium price strategies in the ‘small’ and
‘very small’ regions. I note, however, that when c = 1 the price strategies outlined
in Proposition 1 constitute an equilibrium for all xt and convergence to steady-state
occurs in just one period from all possible realization of market share. This occurs
because the perfect elasticity of newcomers’ demand implies that both firms would
set their introductory prices equal to marginal cost regardless of xt.
The market dynamics for c < 1 are governed by the equation defining b in
(2.3.5). Note that s does not enter (2.3.5) and, hence, within the no-poaching region
switching costs do not impact the speed of convergence to steady state. Villas-Boas
(1999) shows that convergence is monotonic and may take a large number of pe-
riods. Thus, the incumbent firm preserves its incumbency advantage in terms of
market share and this result is unaffected by the presence of switching costs as long
as the latter are not too high to prevent switching. However, the ultimate impact
of the incumbency advantage is unclear. Entering the period with larger market
share benefits the incumbent because the rival is setting a higher introductory price
allowing the incumbent to set a higher regular price and retain more regular cus-
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tomers. However, large market share also hurts profitability because it implies a
lower introductory price – the incumbent has a lower profit margin on new cus-
tomers. When c = 1 incumbency advantages in terms of market share disappear
within one period, while incumbency advantages in terms of profits are zero.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Results under Complete Lock-in
When s > c and c → 1, the price strategies described in Proposition 1
no longer constitute an equilibrium because bilateral poaching is not feasible. I
now conjecture that when switching costs exceed the threshold c , there will be
a middle region for xt, within which each firm retains its entire previous clientele.
When switching costs are very high, this region will extend to the entire market - all
customers will be locked-in to their original supplier for all xt. Such high switching
costs are normally assumed to exist in the dynamic models of uniform pricing (Beggs
and Klemperer, 1992; To, 1996).
Under complete customer lock-in, both firms will pursue price strategies tar-
geting newcomers and loyal customers only. Assuming (and later verifying) that
next period the distribution of the market falls within the same no-poaching region,
we can modify the firms’ value functions as follows:
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V A (xt) = max
pAnt
( + s+ pBnt − 2txt)xt (2.3.26)










V B (xt) = max
pBnt
(
s+ pAnt + 2xt − 
)
(1− xt) (2.3.27)






Solving for the firms’ best response functions and checking for deviations, we
can characterize the equilibrium price strategies under complete lock-in in Proposi-
tion 2:
Proposition 2. Suppose c ∈ (0, 1), f ∈ (0, 1), xt ∈ (x̃m, 1 − x̃m), and s > c .















qAA = xt qBB = 1− xt, qAB = qBA = 0 (2.3.30)





The limits of the no-poaching region, (x̃m, 1− x̃m) are defined as follows:
x̃m = max (0, 1− q̂BB, x̂m) (2.3.33)
where
q̂BB =












C = 2(1− c) (2.3.36)
M = 4C − 4f (2.3.37)
The relevant coefficients governing the optimal price strategies and the firms’ value
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functions (for c normalized to zero) are given by:
a = b = f = 0 (2.3.38)
e =




(2 + f − c) + s
1 + f
(2.3.40)
 = −2 (2.3.41)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium in the no-poaching region, (x̃m, 1−
x̃m). First, note that the equilibrium price strategies are independent of market
share (f = b = 0) for all values of c ∈ (0, 1). This is in contrast to previous models
of dynamic competition with switching costs. Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Padilla
(1992) and To (1995) establish that in the presence of switching costs prices are
increasing in market share because the firm with higher market share has a stronger
incentive to exploit its customer base and forgo investment in future market share.
All three of these models, however, consider firms that charge uniform prices to all
customer segments. In a setting where firms can price discriminate on the basis of
purchase history, there is no tradeoff between exploiting one’s clientele and investing
in future market share. The main factor that drives this result is the fact that within
(x̃m, 1 − x̃m) neither firm can poach. In our setting poaching is the only channel
that establishes a relationship between the introductory price and market share.
When firms realize that they cannot successfully poach in equilibrium, their only
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objective in selecting pnt is to compete for newcomers and this renders market share
irrelevant. Hence, customer recognition in the presence of switching costs, which
are sufficiently high to induce complete customer lock-in, breaks up the relationship
between introductory prices and market share. For the same reason, we see that
a = b = 0 for all xt within the no-poaching region. This is also true in the equilibrium
with low switching costs and incomplete lock-in but only when c = 1 since in the
latter case poaching is profit-neutral.
While the inability to poach explains f = b = 0, the symmetry of the problem
explains the fact that a = 0 - firms’ introductory prices will always be identical.
From this it is clear that within the no-poaching region, convergence to steady state
will occur in just one period. In addition, when switching costs are sufficiently high,
the no-poaching region encompasses the entire market so Proposition 2 and the
convergence result extend to all values of xt. I present this result in the following
corollary:
Corollary 2. If s ≥ max((2 + c + 2f ),min(s1, s2, s3)), the no-poaching region
extends to the entire unit interval and the market converges to steady state in just
one period from all xt in [0,1].
Proof. See Appendix.
The condition on s outlined here is sufficient to ensure that x̃m = 0, so that
there is complete customer lock-in for all possible distributions of the market. This
guarantees that the introductory prices will be independent of xt and convergence
will take place within one period for all xt. This result has important implications
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for the incumbency advantages in the market. Despite the fact that a single firm can
lock in all old customers due to switching costs, it loses any incumbency advantages
from possessing larger market share in just one period upon entry by a rival firm.
Furthermore, from Proposition 2 we can see that the value function of each firm
increases in s through , the value of market share. Thus, switching costs facilitate
market entry not only because the incumbent loses her dominant position in just
one period, but also because the value of entering the market is higher.
Similar to the equilibrium with incomplete lock-in and c away from one, the
introductory prices we derive under complete lock-in decrease in the level of switch-
ing costs and fall as consumers become more patient and competition intensifies.
Furthermore, the equilibrium pn falls below cost when switching costs are suffi-
ciently high: pint < c ⇔ s > (1 − c + f )/f . Recall that under complete lock-in,
firms are competing for more than half of the newcomers’ market because at the
proposed equilibrium prices the optimal sales to loyal customers next period exceed
one-half. The optimal regular price is increasing in s, so switching costs increase
the value of market share. Similar to the equilibrium with low switching costs, the
loyalty price premium is increasing in s but it is also decreasing in the firm’s market
share because the regular price under complete lock-in depends on xt:
pAot − pAnt = s+ 2(1/2− xt) (2.3.42)
pBot − pBnt = s+ 2(xt − 1/2) (2.3.43)
From (2.3.28) and (2.3.29) we see that firms compete away all rents associated
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with the presence of switching costs – the introductory price offers a discount of
f s
(1+f )
, which is extracted next period in the form of a price premium conditional on
s, i.e. s
(1+f )
. As a result, firm profits per cohort of consumers are independent of
the magnitude of the switching costs:




1− c + f
2

It should also be noted that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for c = 1.
This is due to the market property that newcomers demand becomes perfectly elastic
as consumers become very patient. When newcomers demand is perfectly elastic and
firms compete for more than half of the market as is the case when s > c , each
firm has an incentive to undercut the rival by  → 0 in order to capture the entire
market and realize a discrete gain in profits. In contrast, under incomplete lock-in
firms anticipated that they will keep less than half of the market as loyal customers
and did not have a profitable deviation in undercutting when demand was perfectly
elastic.
Per-cohort profits are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, de-
crease in consumer patience and are at most equal to  . This profit level is equivalent
to the level of profits in a Hotelling model with no switching costs and no customer
recognition. Since switching costs do not affect profits and only act as a barrier
to switching, this result is largely driven by the presence of customer recognition.
Similar to the result in Chen (1997), we find that in steady state firms are worse
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off under customer recognition than under uniform pricing since in the latter case
the equilibrium price is above the standard Hotelling price, as shown in Beggs and
Klemperer (1992) and To(1996).
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between steady-state profits and switching
costs under complete and incomplete lock-in conditional on c → 1. I choose to
set c = .99 because the equilibrium with incomplete lock-in is only analyzed for
c → 1 and we need to compare firm profits under the equilibrium paths conditional
on the same parameter values. The positively-sloped section of the profit function
in Figure 2.1 illustrates that profits under incomplete lock-in are increasing in the
size of the switching cost. When switching costs are low and both firms find it
optimal to poach, firms anticipate that they will keep less than their market share
as loyal customers next period and competition for newcomers is not as intense as
under complete lock-in. As a result, the introductory price does not fall below cost
(despite the presence of switching costs) and profits increase in s. When switching
costs approach the threshold c , per-cohort profits approach their peak level. As
soon as switching costs exceed the threshold c , firms find it optimal to keep all
of their attached customers and complete customer lock-in intensifies completion.
Firms undercut until they dissipate all rents from the presence of switching costs
and, profits become independent of s. Nevertheless, steady-state profits per cohort
remain positive because of the underlying product differentiation. Firms undercut
until they dissipate all rents from the presence of switching costs and, profits be-
come independent of s. Nevertheless, steady-state profits per cohort remain positive
because of the underlying product differentiation. Finally, profits are decreasing in
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Figure 2.1: Steady-state profits per cohort (c = .99, f = 1,  = 1)
consumer patience because newcomers’ demand becomes more elastic as c goes up
and this puts downward pressure on the introductory price (regular prices are also
increasing in the introductory price). Therefore, the profit levels in Figure 2.1 should
be interpreted as showing the minimum level of steady-state per-cohort profits in a
market with switching costs and customer recognition.
Finally, I draw attention to the continuity of the equilibrium results with
respect to s by assuming c → 1, in which case the threshold level for s, – the
level that determines whether we have an equilibrium with switching or not, - is
approaching  . We have shown in Proposition 1 that for s → − and c → 1, the
optimal introductory price converges to marginal cost from above. From Proposition
2 it can be seen that for c → 1, pn → c − f (s − )/(1 + f ) – as s → +, the
equilibrium introductory price approaches marginal cost from below. Also, when
c → 1, q̂ii → ( + s)/(4) (from (2.3.8)) when s ≤ c and q̂ii → 1/2 as s →  .
Similarly, we can show that under complete lock-in, q̂ii → 1/2 as s → +. We can
find q̂ii under complete lock-in by plugging in the equilibrium pnt into (2.2.13).
15
15Note that in finding (2.2.13) I assumed that marginal cost is normalized to zero so I adopt
the same assumption in deriving q̂ii here
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q̂AA =





(1 + 2f ) + s
4(1 + f )
As switching costs approach the threshold value, the introductory price approaches
marginal cost and firms’ optimal market share approaches one-half. Once switching
costs exceed that threshold, pn falls below cost because firms now compete for more
than half of the market of newcomers. Steady-state profits peak as switching costs
reach c and level off for higher levels of s.
2.3.3 The Equilibrium under Incomplete, Asymmetric Lock-
in and High Switching Costs
I now present the equilibrium price strategies when the no-poaching region
does not encompass the entire market. Suppose that firm B starts period t with
low market share such that xt ∈ (1 − x̃m, 1). In this case, firm B will not play the
strategy outlined in Proposition 2 because it has a profitable deviation in choosing
a poaching strategy. Therefore, I conjecture that in period t firm B is able to
poach some of A’s previous customers while retaining its entire customer base. I
further suppose that next period the market moves into the no-poaching region
characterized by Proposition 2, which is true for a wide range of parameter values.
Under these assumptions, I designate the value function of a firm outside the no-
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poaching region as V i1 where the subscript 1 indicates the relevant range of xt
such that unilateral poaching occurs for one period only (since I assume that next
period the market distribution falls within the no-poaching region). Thus, the affine
functions governing the equilibrium price strategies in this region for period t are
given by:
pAnt − pBnt = a1 + b1xt (2.3.46)
pAnt = e1 + f1xt (2.3.47)
pBnt = e1 − a1 + (f1 − b1)xt (2.3.48)
V A(xt) = 1 + 1xt + 1x
2
t (2.3.49)
V B(xt) = 1 + 1 (1− xt) + 1 (1− xt)2 (2.3.50)
Since I suppose that xt+1 ∈ (x̃m, 1− x̃m), next period prices will be governed by the
coefficients valid for the no-poaching region (pAnt+1 − pBnt+1 = a + bxt+1 and so on).
I modify the value functions accordingly:
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V A1 (xt) = max
pAnt
(




+ pAnt ⋅ xt+1(pAnt, pBnt)
+ f
(




V B1 (xt) = max
pBnt
(





1− xt+1(pAnt, pBnt) + xt −





 + (1− xt+1) + (1− xt+1)2
)
Solving for the best response functions and checking for deviations, I find
an equilibrium in pure strategies for some, though not all, parameter values. I
characterize the MPE in pure strategies in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. Suppose c ∈ (0, 1), f ∈ (0, 1), xt ∈ (max(1− x̃m, 1− x̃s), 1) , s ∈
(c, (2 + c + 2f )) and xt+1 ∈ (x̃m, 1−x̃m). A Markov-perfect equilibrium in pure
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strategies exists and can be characterized as follows:
p̂Ant =
(7− 23c + 13f + 62f + 2c (11 + f ) + 2c(−8− 7f + 2f ))
2(1 + f )(5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f )
(2.3.53)
−




c (1 + 3f )− 2c(1 + 7f + 2f ))s
2(1 + f )(5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f ))
+
2(1− c)(1− c + 2f )






c4 + 4f − 2f )− 2− 2c (2− f )− 5f − 32f
)














(1 + f )(5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f )
+
4(1− c)(1− c + 2f )
5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f )
xt











where C and M are defined by (2.3.36) and (2.3.37), respectively.
A similar argument for the existence of an equilibrium when xt ∈ (0,min(x̃s, x̃m))
applies.
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium described above is valid for a wide range of parameter values,
suggesting that for these parameter values next-period market share falls into the
no-poaching region. Since the equilibrium price strategies are not straightforward
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to interpret, I employ a numerical analysis. It can be shown that when xt is close to
1, firm B’s introductory price is higher than firm A’s price and xt+1 approaches the
midpoint on the unit interval from above. On the other hand, when xt is farther away
from 1, firm B’s price is lower than the rival’s price, so xt+1 approaches the midpoint
of the market from below. This suggests that for xt outside the no-poaching region
convergence may be non-monotonic.
The lower bound of the region, where B poaches for one period only, is defined
as max(1 − x̃m, 1 − x̃s). Recall that 1 − x̃m is the upper limit of the no-poaching
region: when xt > 1 − x̃m firm B has a profitable deviation in poaching while A
plays a no-poaching strategy. In addition, when xt ≤ 1− x̃s firm B has a profitable
deviation in not poaching conditional on A not poaching either. If 1− x̃s ≤ 1− x̃m,
then firm B has no profitable deviation away from p̂Bnt and Proposition 3 applies
to the entire region (1 − x̃m, 1). By symmetry, similar arguments can be applied
towards finding an equilibrium when xt ∈ (0, x̃m) and A has a profitable deviation
in poaching.
If 1 − x̃s > 1 − x̃m and xt ≥ 1 − x̃s, then Proposition 3 still applies. If
1 − x̃s > 1 − x̃m but xt ∈ (1 − x̃m, 1 − x̃s) there will be no equilibrium in pure
strategies. If neither firm poaches, firm B will deviate to a poaching strategy since
xt > (1−x̃m). As B adopts the poaching strategy, p̂Bnt, and A responds by setting p̂Ant,
B now has a profitable deviation in not poaching since xt < (1 − x̃s). A numerical
analysis shows that (1− x̃m, 1− x̃s) is the empty set for a wide range of parameters.
For this reason, I do not explore the equilibrium when xt ∈ (1− x̃m, 1− x̃s).
Recall that the price strategies in Proposition 3 are optimal conditional on
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the conjecture that next period the distribution of the market falls within the no-
poaching region. For a limited range of the parameter values this conjecture is not
correct. In this case we have to solve for the equilibrium strategies by conjecturing
that next period the market stays in region 1 - the region where firm B poaches and A
does not. If xt+1 falls within (1−x̃m, 1−x̃s), then the problem is further complicated
by the lack of pure-strategy equilibria for this region. I believe that investigating
these scenarios will not contribute substantially to our present discussion so I limit
the equilibrium results to the cases described in Propositions 2 and 3.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Customer Recognition vs. Uniform Pricing
The results regarding the equilibrium with complete lock-in allow us to isolate
the impact of customer recognition on profits by comparing my results to those in
Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and To (1996). Both papers consider markets charac-
terized by product differentiation, overlapping generations of consumers, infinitely-
lived firms, complete customer lock-in due to switching costs and uniform pricing.
Beggs and Klemperer assume that consumers have infinite life spans and show that




. To (1996) modifies this analysis by considering consumers
with finite lifespans and shows that this assumption does not qualitatively alter the
level of prices.
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My own results from Section 2.3.2 show that per-cohort profits remain below
(1+f )/2 for all s, which leads us to conclude that steady-state firm profits are lower
when sellers can imperfectly price discriminate based on customers purchase history.
This result is similar to the one derived in Chen (1997), despite the dissimilar
settings (Chen’s model is based on homogeneous markets with low switching costs
and incomplete lock-in). Unfortunately, we cannot compare the outcomes under
incomplete lock-in with their equivalent under uniform prices since there are no
models of uniform pricing, product differentiation and low switching costs in the
literature yet.
2.4.2 Imperfect vs. Perfect Customer Recognition
We can also show that perfect customer recognition (PCR) yields higher profits
relative to imperfect customer recognition (ICR). The next section presents the
modified model that captures the effect of PCR on prices and profits.
Perfect Customer Recognition
Let pnt indicate the price to newcomers, pst - the price to switchers, and pot -
the price to loyal customers. Since imperfect customer recognition hampers firms’
ability to price discriminate between switchers and newcomers only when switching
occurs in equilibrium, I suppose that switching costs are low enough to prevent
complete lock-in. The upper bound on s that allows switching in equilibrium will
be determined below. When firms can separate switchers from newcomers, current
market share has no impact on pnt. Therefore, even in the presence of overlapping
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generations the firms’ problem can be represented through a two-period model where
each period firms choose pst and pot on the basis of their current market shares while
pnt is chosen by taking into account expected future profits from the customer base
installed today. Let t = {1, 2}, where t = 1 indicates the period when customers are
new and t = 2 is the period when customers are in their second period on the market.
Let x stand for firm A’s market share captured in period 1. I first consider firm A’s
problem with respect to pAo and p
A
s in period 2 where I maintain the assumption
that regular prices are set after the rival’s offer to switchers is known. Demand from





s ) = min(xt,
s+  + pBs − pAo
2
) (2.4.1)
so firm A’s optimal regular price is
pAo = arg max p
A
o ⋅min(xt,




pBs + s+ 
2




In turn, firm A’s sales to loyal customers are given by:
qAA =






pAs + s+ 
2
, pAs + s− 2(
1
2
− x)) qBB =
 + s+ PAs
4
(2.4.5)
Firm A’s demand from switchers in period 2 is given by:
qBA = max(0, (1− x)− (1−
pBo + s− pAs + 
2
)) (2.4.6)




is firm B’s mass






firm A’s optimal price to switchers is










3 − s− 4x
2
(2.4.8)













Having found the optimal price to switchers, we can substitute it into the expressions
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for pio and qii:
pAo =








 + s+ 4x
4
qAA =








 + s+ 4x
8
pBo =





5 + s− 4x
4
qBB =





5 + s− 4x
8
We can now find the firms’ total profits, Πi2, from their old customers in period 2 as
a function of the beginning-of-the-period market share, x:






(3 − s− 4x)2
16
+
( + s+ 4x)2
32






(4x−  − s)2
16
+
(5 + s− 4x)2
32
In period 1 firm A sets pAn in order to maximize the present value of profits
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per cohort entering in period 1. The marginal newcomer will purchase from A if
pAn + x+ c min
(
pAo + x, p
B
s + (1− x) + s
)
(2.4.17)
≤ pBn + (1− x) + c min
(
pBo + (1− x), pAs + x+ s
)
Using (2.4.8) and (2.4.9), firm A’s demand from newcomers can be expressed as
q1A = x =
pBn − pAn + (1 + c)
2(1 + c)
(2.4.18)
Note that under PCR demand from newcomers becomes less elastic as consumers
become more patient. The firms’ optimal introductory price to newcomers are de-
termined simultaneously and are given by:
pAn = arg max p
A
n ⋅
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 − s
8












First, the results above show that under PPD the price to new customers
again does not fall below cost (here normalized to zero) for the admissible range of
s, i.e. s <  . Second, pn decreases in the firm discount factor (because firms place
higher value on profits from market share tomorrow) and increases in consumer
patience (because we showed consumers become less price sensitive as they grow
more patient). The newcomers’ price also decreases in the switching costs and




n ) we saw that
consumers will incur s as a cost either by switching or by paying at least that
much more if they stay, so the consumer discount factor is irrelevant; on the other
hand, firms anticipate that their profits from loyal customers are increasing in s and
the more they value these profits the more they are willing to lower the price to
newcomers today in order to capture market share. Note also that switching costs
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must be below  for switching to occur in equilibrium.
Naturally, the optimal price to switchers is below the price to loyal customers,
i.e. ps < po. What remains to be determined is how the price to newcomers relates
to ps and po. Comparing pn to po, we find that lower introductory offers emerge, i.e.
pn < po, if and only if switching costs are sufficiently high:




We can further verify that the above condition will be satisfied for some range of
values in s ∈ [0, ) if c < f , because the latter condition ensures that 4c+1−f1+3f  is
less than  , the upper bound on switching costs in the model. On the other hand, if
c ≥ f or s ≤ 4c+1−f1+3f  , we find that loyal customers are offered a loyalty discount:
po ≤ pn. This occurs because low s makes switching more attractive and firms are
induced to charge lower prices to loyal customers. This, in turn, reduces the payoff
from market share and relaxes competition for new customers, resulting in higher
introductory prices.
Since po > ps, having low switching costs results in pn > po, which leads to pn >
po > ps – switchers pay the lowest price, followed by loyal customers who are offered
a discount, and finally new customers pay the highest price. Hence, low switching
costs and perfect customer recognition lead to endogenous loyalty discounts. If
switching costs are high (s >
4c+1−f
1+3f
) and firms are sufficiently patient (f > c),
then new customers still receive a discount relative to loyal customers as in the ICR
case. Furthermore, if s >
4c+2−f
2+3f





also obtain that pn < ps – i.e., for very high levels of s, newcomers are charged
a lower price than switchers because market share becomes more attractive while
sales to switchers become less profitable.
The equilibrium profits per cohort can also be shown to be higher under PCR
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=  2(16 + 16c + 2f ) + 6fs
2 + f ( − s)2
> 0
The comparison above suggests that firms would be better off if they could distin-
guish switchers from newcomers. This result may explain why some stores carry-
ing product lines from multiple suppliers issue coupons for the rival’s product at
the point of sale. The widespread implementation of bonus cards in grocery and
convenience stores could be motivated by the stores’ willingness to uniquely iden-
tify customers and trace their purchase patterns as this facilitates perfect customer
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recognition at the supplier level and increases industry profits.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I present an analysis that integrates imperfect customer recog-
nition and consumer switching costs in the context of dynamic competition in a
differentiated-goods duopoly. The model presented here builds upon Villas-Boas
(1999) and complements the study of dynamic competition with switching costs by
introducing customer recognition. This allows us to incorporate the switching cost
explicitly in the demand functions and derive closed-form solutions for the equilib-
rium prices, which enables a comparative statics analysis.
There are two sets of market equilibria depending on the level of the switch-
ing cost. For all values of the switching cost, customer recognition gives rise to a
‘bargain-then-ripoff’ pattern in prices – this feature would be present even if switch-
ing costs were zero and is due to firms’ ability to price discriminate between new
and repeat customers. When switching costs are low enough to allow customer
switching in equilibrium, they only amplify the loyalty price premium and increase
firms profits. The price to new customers does not fall below cost because firms
keep only a fraction of their equilibrium market share as loyal customers. Switching
costs do not affect the speed of convergence to steady state. When consumers are
very patient, demand from newcomers is perfectly elastic and convergence to steady
state occurs in just one period.
When switching costs are high, there can be complete customer lock-in, such
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that neither firm is able to ‘poach’ the rival’s customers. Firm profits are indepen-
dent of switching costs because any discounts that are conditional on the size of
the switching costs are extracted from the captured consumers in the form of loy-
alty premiums when in their second period in the market. Because firms compete
for more than half of the market, introductory prices may fall below cost. Under
complete customer lock-in, convergence to steady state occurs in just one period
when the current distribution of the market is such that both firms find it optimal
to retain all of their previous customers.
The model also suggests that imperfect customer recognition leads to lower
profits relative to both uniform pricing and perfect customer recognition. If firms
can distinguish new, unattached consumers from switchers, they can increase their
profits by price discriminating between these two types. Under such perfect customer
recognition, loyalty discounts would emerge if switching costs are sufficiently low;
otherwise, newcomers will be offered introductory offers, which are below the price








In the absence of adequate legal protection against contract breach, firms can
reduce their exposure to contractual risk in one-shot transactions by exchanging in-
formation about defectors. The goal of this paper is to investigate whether compe-
tition discourages such exchange. Previous studies that analyze information sharing
in a competitive environment have focused exclusively on lending institutions and on
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the impact that pooling information on borrowers’ histories has on lenders’ market
power over their customers. In contrast, I look at this issue from the perspective of
firms and consider firms’ exposure to risk from trade partners in both the upstream
and downstream markets. Furthermore, I propose a new channel through which
competition may deter information exchange among rivals. Foreseeing that sharing
information reduces the rival’s exposure to such risk, a firm holding private informa-
tion about a defector may have an incentive not to reveal this information depending
on how much it can benefit from exposing its rival to higher risk of default. Hence,
information sharing agreements may not be sustained among rivals. This approach
gives rise to two novel theoretical insights: i) in imperfect credit markets liquidity
plays a key role in facilitating the exchange of information between rivals; ii) in-
formation sharing may be easier to sustain in ex-ante more competitive markets.
I test the model’s predictions using a unique firm-level dataset on the information
sharing practices of agricultural traders in Madagascar.1 I find strong support for
the predicted positive impact of liquidity on information sharing and establish that
traders who report stronger competition in their markets are more likely to share
information.
The main premise of my model is that suffering contract breach can trans-
late into an unanticipated cash outflow that weakens the firm’s ability to compete
depending on its liquidity position. When a customer defaults on a payment or a
supplier does not deliver goods on time, the firm has to employ additional resources
1The dataset comes from a survey conducted by the International Food Policy Research In-
stitute and the Malagasy Ministry of Scientific Research. I am grateful to Marcel Fafchamps and
Bart Minten for sharing this dataset with me.
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in order to meet its own payment or delivery obligations. Some firms may antici-
pate an average rate of default in their operations and hold precautionary capital
or inventory.2 However, when a higher than the expected rate of default occurs and
the firm does not have sufficient resources, it has to borrow money to maintain the
firm’s operations - the cost of securing short-term capital will temporarily raise the
firm’s marginal cost. Hence, an episode of contract breach can be viewed as a tran-
sitory adverse cost shock to the firm that was cheated. Depending on how much the
rival firm can benefit from the resulting cost advantage, it may have an incentive to
expose the other firm to a higher risk of default and profit from its vulnerability.3
I refer to firms with low cost of funds as ‘liquid’ – for these firms the experience
of contract breach will have minimal impact on their marginal cost and, hence, on
their rival’s profitability. As a result, the rival has a weaker incentive to withhold
information and expose the firm to higher default risk. Alternatively, ‘liquidity
constrained’ firms face a high cost of funds and upon experiencing above average
rates of default, the shock to their marginal cost is larger. As a result, liquidity
constrained firms are more vulnerable to the risk of default and their rivals can
realize higher profits by withholding information. The key insight here is that the
detrimental impact of competition on information sharing depends on the liquidity
positions of the firms in a given market.
I model information sharing as the Pareto-optimal non-cooperative equilibrium
2See Fafchamps et al. (2000) for empirical evidence on Zimbabwean firms’ holdings of precau-
tionary inventory stocks in the face of high contract risk.
3This reasoning is somewhat similar to the ‘deep pockets’ concept in the predatory pricing
literature (McGee, 1958; Telser, 1966; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990) although in our case, it is
only the deep pockets of the rival that matter.
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of the information-sharing supergame between two rival firms (Friedman, 1971).
Firms use grim trigger strategies and punish rivals, who do not reciprocate in the
information exchange, by not revealing information in the future. The strategic
cost of information sharing determines the short-term incentive to deviate from the
cooperative strategy of sharing information and is given by the additional profits
a firm can realize when it withholds information and exposes the rival to higher
risk of default. On the other hand, playing the cooperative strategy gives rise to
long-term benefits arising from lower exposure to contractual risk for both firms.
The main finding of the model is that information sharing can be sustained at lower
firm discount factors when firms are liquid, because the temptation to deviate is
lower when a firm’s rival faces a low cost of funds. Furthermore, if we assume that
firms within a market are either both liquid, or are both liquidity constrained, then
we can formulate the testable prediction that information sharing is more likely to
be observed among liquid firms.
I next examine the intuitive claim that more intense competition would pro-
vide stronger disincentives to information sharing. I employ a market framework, in
which competition intensity varies along three dimensions - product differentiation,
switching costs, and consumer patience. For tractability, I limit attention to markets
in which consumers are very patient (consumers live two periods only) and charac-
terize the profits that a firm will forgo when it reveals information about a defector
to its rival - these profits comprise the strategic cost of information sharing. I show
that this cost is zero when the rival’s cost of funds is sufficiently low - i.e. when it
is below an endogenously determined liquidity threshold. This threshold depends
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on the the level of product differentiation and the magnitude of the switching costs,
which allows for a comparative statics exercise.
The effect of competition intensity is ambiguous and depends on the under-
lying market features. When driven by lower switching costs or lower degree of
product differentiation, more intense competition lowers the liquidity threshold and
on average raises the strategic cost of information sharing. However, consumer pa-
tience is also shown to play a role. The model exhibits the feature that the market
becomes more competitive as consumers become more patient. I show that the
strategic cost of information sharing is zero when consumers are infinitely patient.
I also provide an intuitive discussion for the case where consumers are not infinitely
patient, which illustrates that the strategic cost of information sharing is likely to be
positive in less competitive markets when the degree of competition is varied along
the degree of consumer patience. Previous studies of competition and information
sharing have placed little emphasis on the features of the competitive environment.4
Furthermore, the approach in these studies is to analyze how information sharing
affects competition and the the desirability of an information-sharing regime then
depends on the change in the competitive environment and its implications for the
banks’ profitability. This study contributes to the literature by presenting a more
detailed picture of the various market parameters through which competition affects
information sharing behavior rather than vice versa.
I use survey data from Madagascar to test the model’s predictions regarding
4In Jappelli and Pagano (1993) the exogenous level of competition is proxied by the cost
advantage of the incumbent bank relative to a potential entrant, while in Gehrig and Stenbacka
(2006) it is proxied by the dispersion of switching costs that borrowers incur when changing lenders.
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the impacts of liquidity and competition intensity on information sharing practices.
The data does not allow the identification of a trader’s rivals. However, assuming
that traders within a market have similar liquidity positions such that a trader’s
liquidity position is a proxy for the position of its rival, the model suggests that
more liquid firms would be more likely to share information because they are also
facing more liquid rivals. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that firms operating
in liquid markets are significantly more likely to share information about delinquent
customers. The results are qualitatively equivalent under two alternative measures
of liquidity – access to informal credit and availability of own liquid funds, – and
robust to the inclusion of a rich set of controls. One of the liquidity measures is
credibly exogenous, so its coefficient can be interpreted as a causal estimate of the
positive effect of liquidity on information sharing.
Next, I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the
intensity of competition, as reported by the trader, and information sharing. Unfor-
tunately, a lack of suitable instruments prevents me from establishing a statistically
significant causal relationship. However, to the best of my knowledge, this study
is the first to present empirical evidence on the correlation between competition
intensity and information sharing practices based on observational data.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model that links the strategic cost of information sharing to the rival’s cost of funds
and discusses firms’ incentives to share information. Section 3 describes the data
5Brown and Zehnder (2008) present experimental evidence on this relationship in a credit mar-
ket environment and find that stronger competition reduces information sharing. Their experimen-
tal design follows Pagano and Jappelli (1993) who theoretically explore the effects of competition
and adverse selection on the incentives of competing lenders to pool information.
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and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Model
3.2.1 Preliminaries
I consider the sustainability of a self-enforcing information-sharing agreement
between two rival firms. The firms may agree to share timely information about
defectors but their agreement cannot be enforced in court. In the one-shot non-
cooperative game, sharing information about defectors will be shown to be a weakly
dominated strategy. However, information sharing can be sustained as the Pareto-
optimal, non-cooperative equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated stage game. Information-
sharing practices in credit markets are often based on reciprocity. For example,
members in credit bureaus have an obligation to report information and, in turn,
can access credit reports at a much lower cost than non-members (Klein, 1992).
Case study evidence on informal information sharing arrangements suggests that
firms report defectors to other firms in the market in expectation that the favor will
be returned (Vinogradova, 2006).6
Firms have an incentive to participate in information-sharing networks because
they reduce their exposure to contractual risk. First, information sharing networks
within a market allow firms to screen out defectors if history of past default is
any indication of future propensity to cheat. Second, the existence of such networks
6In a detailed account of the information networks among small business owners in Russia,
Vinogradova (2006) reports that one business owner explicitly states that other firms share infor-
mation with him because they expect this favor to be reciprocated in the future.
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may have a disciplinary effect that reduces the fraction of cheaters in the population
(Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). On the other hand, while
firms may ex ante agree to share information, such commitment is credible ex post
only if the costs of disclosing information today do not exceed the net benefits of
reduced exposure to risk in the future. The main contribution of this paper is to
illustrate how liquidity can affect the cost of disclosing information to a rival and,
hence, on the viability of information-sharing practices.
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 3.1. In some initial period t0
firms declare their intent to share information; the ensuing obligation is not enforce-
able by courts or other third parties, so even though we use the term ‘agreement’ it
should be noted that this agreement is non-binding. At the beginning of each subse-
quent period firms simultaneously choose whether to disclose their private informa-
tion or not; afterwards they sign contracts with agents (i.e. customers, suppliers or
other trade partners), a fraction of whom have unilateral incentive to breach their
contracts with the firm. Firms do not sign contracts with agents who are known to
have defaulted in the past (defectors). Not revealing private information about the
identity of defectors is equivalent to deviating from the information sharing agree-
ment. Deviations in the current period are discovered at the end of that period –
firms are assumed to be able to verify if the information transmitted by their rival
at the beginning of the period reflected the full scope of the information the rival
possessed at the time. Also at the end of the period, firms discover the aggregate
default rate for the period.
Naturally, a discussion of the emergence of an information sharing regime is
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of events.
warranted to the extent that it benefits firms by reducing their exposure to con-
tractual risk.7 Hence, I presume that i) in the absence of competition firms have
incentives to share information ex-post (e.g. the benefits from information sharing
outweigh the physical cost of information transmission) and that there are no other
feasible and possibly cheaper means of enforcing contracts (e.g. engaging in long-
term bilateral relations or resorting to third parties to enforce contracts); and ii)
there is a time lag between two cheating incidents by the same agent so that the
exchange of information can have any value.
Sharing information is assumed to be a game of complete information in the
sense that deviations from the cooperative strategy are detected perfectly and with
no lag. Failing to report on the identity of a defector or falsely reporting honest
7The magnitude of these benefits may depend on the number of firms pooling information, the
share of dishonest agents in the population, the share of agents who are deterred from cheating by
the knowledge that their actions will be public knowledge, and the magnitude of the contractual
losses being avoided. I assume that these factors are held constant throughout the analysis.
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agents as defectors is considered to be a deviation from the information-sharing
strategy. These assumptions are consistent with the theoretical setting in Kan-
dori (1992) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), whose insights we use to
motivate information sharing as a feasible device that facilitates the emergence of
reputation mechanisms in games of random matching. They are needed to avoid
the plethora of issues related to truth-telling in repeated games where the actions of
agents are observed by only a subset of the population.8 Within this context, An-
nen (2007) tackles truthful information sharing and shows that truth-telling can be
obtained as a unique dominant strategy equilibrium.9 He also points out that this
equilibrium is harder to sustain among competing players who have an incentive
to slander each other because slandering triggers a punishment on the opponent.
This result suggests that truth-telling may be a serious issue in information sharing
if firms can benefit from misreporting the performance on honest agents. At this
point, it is assumed in our model that firms report information truthfully.
Firms start each period with the expectation that some fraction of their trade
partners will cheat. Contract breach can take many forms - for example, customers
may cheat by not repaying their credit or by pre-ordering goods that they do not
purchase later; similarly, suppliers may cheat by not delivering the contracted goods
on time or by delivering goods of lower quality. Such incidents can cause a disruption
to the cheated firm’s expected stream of cash and inventory flows. To cope with
this disruption, the firm can either seek additional funds, internally through retained
8See Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996 and 2003), and Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005).
9This equilibrium does not satisfy the assumption in Kandori (1992) and Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite (1995) that players only need to communicate ‘simple’ information in the form of
labels.
92
earnings or externally through borrowing, or it can rely on excess inventory whenever
available. I do not distinguish between a firm borrowing capital or negotiating the
delivery of goods on credit as they both serve the same purpose of supporting the
firm’s operations.10 Either alternative is costly and the additional costs of securing
additional inventory or cash holdings add up to the marginal cost of operation in
the next period.
Originally, firms are assumed to be symmetric in their average default rate
but informational asymmetries, arising from one firm sharing information while the
other one does not, give rise to asymmetric exposure to risk and asymmetric marginal
costs of operation in the next period. The firm that is exposed to a higher average
rate of default (e.g. because its rival deliberately did not disclose information) has to
incur higher costs of maintaining its operations in the next period. Hence, a higher
risk of default for one of the firms in the market can be interpreted as causing an
adverse cost shock to that firm in the following period.
All else equal, the magnitude of the cost shock will be increasing in the firm’s
cost of funds. Naturally, the cost shock will be smaller for a firm that relies on
retained earnings or has cheap access to trade credit relative to a firm that borrows
from a moneylender. Hence, I refer to firms with a low cost of securing liquid assets
(such as cash and inventory) as liquid; firms for which these costs are high will be
referred to as liquidity-constrained. While I recognize that a firm may be unable
to borrow at times of need and face capacity constraints, I do not explicitly model
10Fafchamps et al (2000) propose that excess inventory holdings may be motivated by the desire
to insure against contractual risk and find evidence of this motive in their data on Zimbabwean
export firms who are particularly prone to contract risk from overseas partners.
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this possibility as it entails analyzing a Bertrand-Edgeworth version of the dynamic
model described below with potentially no pure-strategy equilibria.11 Therefore, the
case where a firm in reality experience binding capacity constraints due to contract
breach can be modeled as a very high cost of funds.
A firm’s decision to share information has a direct effect on the probability
that its rival experiences a higher than anticipated rate of cheating. If a firm can
derive sufficiently high benefits from the rival’s higher exposure to risk, then it will
have incentives to deviate from the information sharing agreement by withholding
information. To fix ideas, consider the stage game in Figure 3.2. Firms can take
two actions: they can reveal information (‘Share’ ) or they can withhold information
(‘Do not share’ ).
Figure 3.2: The information-sharing stage game.
Firm B
Do not share Share
Firm A
Do not share k, k m, l
Share l, m n, n
The parameters, k, l,m and n, that can describe the one-shot information
sharing game are as follows. It is assumed that firms benefit from receiving infor-
mation about defectors because it reduces their exposure to contractual risk: n > k
and m > k.12 However, unilaterally revealing information is costly not only because
the firm does not lower its exposure to risk (since it does not receive information
11For characterization of the equilibria in a one-period model of Bertrand-Edgeworth competi-
tion with product differentiation, see Boccard and Wauthy (2005).
12Note that n, the firms’ payoff when they both share information, can be adjusted to absorb
the physical cost of information transmission and it is assume that this cost is sufficiently small to
make information sharing desirable in the absence of competition.
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from its rival) but also because its risk of default is now higher relative to that of
its rival; hence, l < k. The assumption that we challenge in this paper is that in a
competitive environment m > n – firms are better off when they receive information
from their rival but do not return the favor. One of our main goals is to identify
conditions under which m = n. Note that if m > n, the only Nash equilibrium of
the stage game is (Do Not Share, Do Not Share) information sharing can only be
sustained if firms are sufficiently patient. However, if m = n, there are two Nash
Equilibria – (Do Not Share, Do Not Share) and the Pareto-optimal (Share, Share),
– and information sharing becomes a question of coordinating on the latter or it can
be sustained under minimal requirements on the firms’ discount factors.
Based on the asymmetry in the firms’ exposure to risk when one of them
withholds information, the model will explore to what extent that firm can benefit
from this deviation. Such benefits will arise from the competitive advantage that
the deviating firm obtains when it exposes its rival to a higher risk of default.
The key finding of the model will show that for a given firm m = n when the
firm’s rival is sufficiently liquid and m > n if the rival is liquidity constrained. The
natural corollary of this result is that an information sharing agreement is more easily
sustained among liquid firms than it is among firms that are liquidity-constrained
as the latter have a strictly positive incentive to deviate; the liquid firms have no
incentive to deviate at all.
I illustrate firms’ strategic motives to withhold information by using a dynamic
model of imperfect competition featuring infinitely-lived firms and overlapping gen-
erations of consumers. While a simpler static model would be sufficient to illustrate
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how liquidity can affect firms’ incentives to share information, the dynamic model I
develop can additionally shed light on the complex ways in which competition inten-
sity can affect information sharing incentives. I begin by characterizing the steady-
state equilibrium of the market when the firms have symmetric cost structures. This
implies that they also have symmetric average probabilities of experiencing contract
breach from agents. Next, I re-examine the market equilibrium when one firm is
exposed to relatively higher probability of contract breach during a single period –
this is equivalent to the experience of a transitory cost shock that affects a single
firm only. If a firm realizes higher profits when its rival is hit by such shock, then
the additional profits would constitute the firm’s strategic cost of information shar-
ing as revealing information about defectors reduces the probability that the firm
will realize these profits. In terms of the notation in Figure 3.2 the strategic cost
of information sharing will is captured by the difference m − n. Finally, I discuss
how the cost of funds affects firms’ incentives to share information, perform com-
parative statics with respect to the competition parameters and formulate testable
hypotheses.
3.2.2 The market
This section characterizes the market and its equilibrium properties when there
is no uncertainty regarding the firm’s next period costs. I will discuss how relaxing
this assumption affects the market equilibrium in Section 3.2.3. The model of mar-
ket competition that I introduce below possesses a number of features that make
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it particularly suitable for our analysis and justify the level of sophistication and
the limitations that come with it. First, I use a duopoly model because the po-
tential benefits from a firm’s distress accrue to a single rival and the incentive to
withhold information, if any, is strongest.13 Second, the model has features, such
as product differentiation, consumer switching costs and consumer patience, that
provide exogenous variation in the intensity of competition and allow us to inves-
tigate how ex ante more intense competition affects information sharing, based on
different competition parameters. Third, I introduce imperfect customer recogni-
tion – firms distinguish between new customers and repeat customers but cannot
distinguish a newcomer from a switcher. Customer recognition is exogenous and
further intensifies the competition for market share. It also makes the model more
tractable as it allows us to derive intuitive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium
prices.14 It is also important to note that aside from their impact on competition,
customer recognition and consumer switching costs are two features that add more
realism to the model as they are both commonly found in markets characterized
by relational contracting and weak rule of law.15 Fourth, by assuming that firms
are infinitely-lived, face overlapping generations of customers and consumers incur
switching costs, I allow firm profits to be path dependent. This captures the possi-
13Greif (2006, pg. 446) notes that in ‘thick’ markets the cost of providing information could be
negligible but this would not be the case in ‘thin’ markets where firms may be unwilling to help
their rivals.
14For a discussion of the role of customer recognition on prices in dynamic models of product
differentiation and switching costs, see Grozeva (2009). For a comparable model without customer
recognition and assuming complete customer lock-in, see Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and To
(1996).
15Numerous case studies document that in relation-based market interaction, customer recog-
nition and switching costs arise as firms prefer to deal with their established partners even if
this entails forgoing better deals from new partners (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Vinogradova,
2006).
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bility that a transitory adverse cost shock may affect the future stream of profits of
both firms, thus amplifying the shock’s effect.
I consider a duopoly market consisting of two infinitely-lived firms, i = {A,B},
selling a nondurable good. Consumers have uniformly distributed preferences over
the products of the two firms, which gives rise to ex-ante product differentiation.
The degree of product differentiation is exogenously determined and fixed. Each
firm produces the good at a constant marginal cost, c. Consumers enter the market
for two periods only and demand one unit of the good in each period. They have
common valuation for the good given by v, which I assume to be sufficiently high
to induce a purchase in every period. Each period an old cohort of consumers
exits the market and a new cohort of equal size enters. In any given period, a
firm faces two overlapping generations of consumers: old consumers in their second
period in the market who have established a purchase history; and newcomers, who
enter the market in the current period and have not purchased from either firm
yet. If customers purchase from the same supplier in both periods they are referred
to as ‘loyal’ customers, while if they purchase from two different suppliers over
their lifetime, they are referred to as ‘switchers’. Firms recognize their own loyal
customers but cannot determine if a new customer is a newcomer with no purchase
history or a switcher from the rival firm.16
Using Hotelling’s framework to model product differentiation, suppose that
firms are located at the opposite ends of the unit interval with firm A located at
16This setup is an extension of the model of dynamic competition developed in Villas-Boas
(1999). The main difference lies in the fact that I include switching costs in the analysis, which
enables us to extend the analysis to markets with complete customer lock-in. See Grozeva (2009)
for a detailed exposition of the equilibria under incomplete and complete customer lock-in.
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0 and firm B – at 1. Each cohort of customers has mass normalized to one and
consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Consumer preferences,
as proxied by location on the unit interval, are time-invariant and known to the
consumer ex ante. I stipulate that customers face a linear transportation cost of 
per unit of distance, so a consumer located at x will incur transportation costs of x
if she buys from A, or (1 − x) if she buys from firm B. A consumer who switches
suppliers in her second period also incurs a switching cost, s, which is assumed
to be time-invariant, uniform across consumers and common knowledge. All new
customers (i.e. newcomers and switchers) are offered an introductory price, pint,
where the superscript i indicates the firm, the subscript t indicates the time period
and the subscript n indicates that this is the price offered to new customers. Loyal
customers are offered a regular price, piot, where the notation is similar except that
the subscript o indicates that this is the price to old customers. Firms simultaneously
announce their introductory prices at the beginning of each period but each firm
sets its regular price only after observing the introductory price of the rival. This
assumption guarantees the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in periods when
the distribution of market share is very unequal.17
Let qii,t indicate demand from firm i’s loyal customers in period t, qij,t – demand
from old customers who switch from i to j, j = {A,B}, in period t, and q1i,t –
demand from newcomers at time t who purchase from i in their first period in the
market. Initially, I suppose that marginal costs are constant, symmetric and equal
17This is a common assumption in models of customer recognition where customers are hetero-
geneous in some characteristic: Villas-Boas (1999) applies it to firms, and Marquez (2002) applies
it to banks.
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to c ≥ 0. I start by characterizing the demand functions for each of the three
groups of customers: newcomers, switchers and loyal customers. Then, I present
the steady-state equilibrium of the market and discuss the market dynamics.
Demand from newcomers
To derive each firm’s demand from newcomers, I first determine the location
of the marginal consumer among newcomers in the market. This location also
determines the distribution of the market in the current period and the market
shares that firms will inherit in the following period. I indicate the location of
the marginal consumer among newcomers at time t as xt+1, where xt+1 will also
stand for firm A’s market share in period t + 1. Indicate the consumer discount
factor as c where c ∈ (0, 1]. Assuming that consumers have perfect foresight, a
newcomer located at x will purchase from firm A in her first period in the market
if this purchase renders a weakly higher surplus than purchasing from firm B over
the consumer’s two-period life span in the market:
v − pAnt − x+ c max
(
v − pAot+1 − x, v − pBnt+1 − s− (1− x)
)
(3.2.1)
≥ v − pBnt − (1− x) + c max
(
v − pBot+1 − (1− x), v − pAnt+1 − s− x
)
The marginal newcomer, located at xt+1, will be just indifferent between the
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two sequences of purchases when
pAnt+xt+1 + c min
(
pAot+1 + xt+1, p
B
nt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1)
)
(3.2.2)
= pBnt + (1− xt+1) + c min
(
pBot+1 + (1− xt+1), pAnt+1 + s+ xt+1
)
Since it is assumed that the regular price is set after the rival’s introductory
price is known, firm A will always set pAot+1 such that its marginal loyal customer at
time t + 1 is just indifferent between switching and staying after having purchased
from A at time t. If firm A wants to keep all of its customers in period t + 1, it
will set pAot+1 + xt+1 = p
B
nt+1 + s + (1 − xt+1). If it wants to let some customers
switch, then for firm A’s marginal customer located at xt+1 it must be true that
pAot+1 + xt+1 > p
B
nt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1). In either case, we have
min
(
pAot+1 + xt+1, p
B
nt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1)
)
= pBnt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1) (3.2.3)
Otherwise, firm A can always increase its profits by raising pAot+1 without affect-
ing demand from loyal customers. Therefore, the location of the marginal newcomer
at time t can be determined from:
pAnt+xt+1 + c
(
pBnt+1 + s+ (1− xt+1)
)
(3.2.4)
= pBnt + (1− xt+1) + c
(
pAnt+1 + s+ xt+1
)
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This equality also determines the distribution of market share at the beginning of
period t+ 1:
xt+1 =
(1− c) + c(pAnt+1 − pBnt+1) + pBnt − pAnt
2(1− c)
(3.2.5)
Demand from newcomers can be defined as:
q1A,t = xt+1, and q1B,t = 1− xt+1 (3.2.6)
Demand from loyal customers
The marginal loyal customer for firm A at time t will be just indifferent between
switching and staying. Therefore, her location, xlt can be determined from the





nt + s+ (1− xlt) (3.2.7)
























Note that the regular price does not affect demand from newcomers or switch-
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ers, so firm i will choose piot independent of its own choice of p
i
nt. Thus, each firm sets
piot to maximize profits from loyal customers taking as given the rival’s introductory
price. The choice of piot also determines the optimal mass of loyal customers that
a firm would like to keep, given the introductory price of its rival. If this optimal
mass exceeds the firm’s actual market share, sales to loyal customers are limited to
the size of the firm’s existing customer base - xt for firm A, and 1− xt for firm B.
For c > 0 firm A’s regular price can be found as follows:
max
pAot
(pAot − c) ⋅min
(









c+  + s+ pBnt
2








c+  + s+ pAnt
2
, s+ pAnt + 2xt − 
)
(3.2.12)
Note that the optimal regular price is increasing in the rival’s introductory
offer. For example, if pBnt is sufficiently large, firm A would keep all of its previous
customers as loyal customers so qAA,t will be constrained by firm A’s market share.
On the other hand, if pBnt is low enough, firm A’s loyal customer segment will be less
than xt.
In the cases where sales to loyal customers are less than a firm’s market share
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I define q̂ii,t as firm i’s optimal sales to loyal customers in period t. One can further
extend the interpretation of q̂ii,t as firm i’s optimal market share in period t if we
consider situations in which the acquisition of market share is costly. Upon finding a
deterministic optimal path for pAnt and p
B
nt, each firm can project what is the optimal
market share to invest in today in order to maximize profits from loyal customers




nt) into (3.2.8), which yields q̂AA,t as
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4
(3.2.14)
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 + s+ pAnt − c)2
8
, (s+ pAnt + 2xt − )(1− xt)
)
(3.2.18)
From (3.2.11) and (3.2.12) we can see that the optimal regular price is uniquely
determined, given knowledge of the rival’s introductory price. The assumption that
firms set introductory and regular prices sequentially ensures that once the introduc-
tory prices are announced and firms set their regular prices accordingly, neither firm
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has a profitable deviation in changing its regular price. Without this assumption,
there may not be pure-strategy equilibria when the distribution of market shares is
very unequal.
Demand from switchers
Demand from switchers, if positive, can be represented as the difference be-
tween the rival’s market share and its optimal sales of loyal customers. For firm A,
demand from switchers is given by
qBA,t = max (0, (1− xt)− q̂BB,t) (3.2.19)

















From the demand equations in (3.2.20) and (3.2.21), it is clear that a firm’s
ability to poach depends on the pre-existing distribution of market shares, sum-
marized in xt – the firm that enters the period with low market share can attract
the rival’s previous customers at a higher price because of the closer proximity of
prospective switchers. At the same time, both newcomers and switchers are offered
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the same price, pnt, so each firm chooses its optimal introductory price by balancing
the incentives to gain market share and to maximize profits from poaching. Given
the symmetry of the problem, if the firms’ only goal was to capture market share,
their introductory prices would be equal. However, the incentive to poach causes
the introductory price to be dependent on market share, which leads to path depen-
dence of current period profits. In fact, xt is the only payoff-relevant state variable
in period t that affects the choice variables pAnt and p
B
nt. The optimal regular price is
unique for a given introductory price, so identifying the optimal pricing strategies
for pnt is sufficient to derive the full schedule of prices in period t as well as the
distribution of the market at the beginning of period t+ 1.
The symmetric market equilibrium
I solve the dynamic problem for each firm by looking for a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (MPE), in which firms’ pricing strategies depend solely on the realized
distribution of the newcomers’ market shares in the previous period. Specifically,
based on the solution of a similar problem in Villas-Boas (1999), I look for a MPE,
in which the price strategies regarding pint are piecewise affine in xt and the value
function of each firm is piecewise quadratic in xt.
18 Again following Villas-Boas
(1999) I assume that there is some minimal level of exit costs, E, that a firm would
incur at the end of the period if it does not realize sales to newcomers in that
period.19 This assumption rules out the possibility that a pure-strategy equilibrium
18Equilibria in non-affine strategies may also exist but they are outside the scope of our study.
The equilibrium presented here is robust to deviations in affine strategies only.
19One can think of exit costs as arising from the loss of goodwill when the firm does not invest
in market share. For example, if newcomers can obtain information about a firm’s product only
106
may not exist when one firm starts out the period with a very small market share. It
is necessary for some parameter ranges only and does not have a qualitative impact
on the results that follow.
I characterize the equilibrium of the market for c = 1 and s ≤  . There is
switching in equilibrium, except when s =  in which case the equilibrium mass of
switchers reaches zero.20 Restricting attention to the limit of the consumer discount
factor is justified for two reasons. First, letting c = 1 allows us to derive intuitive
closed-form solutions of the equilibrium price strategies. Second, as I will show
below, competition intensifies as consumers become more patient. Thus, assuming
c = 1 allows us to focus on the most competitive version of this market, which is in
line with our interest in analyzing whether competition hinders information sharing.
I discuss how lower values of the consumer discount factor affect the equilibrium
results in Section 3.2.3.




Markov-perfect equilibrium in affine strategies exists and can be characterized as
through existing loyal customers, a firm that made no sales to newcomers in the past period may
have to incur expenditures on promoting its product.



















,  + s+ c− 2(1− xt)
)
(3.2.24)




qAB = max(0, xt − q̂AA) (3.2.26)
qBA = max(0, 1− xt − q̂BB) (3.2.27)
xt+1 = 1/2 ∀ xt ∈ [0, 1] (3.2.28)
Proof. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
In equilibrium, the price to new customers equals marginal cost and is inde-
pendent of market share, loyal customers are charged a premium, and the market is
equally split. To provide intuition for these results I present certain features of the
market equilibrium in the following lemmas. I first draw attention to the property
that demand from newcomers becomes more elastic as c increases.
21
Lemma 1. Competition for newcomers intensifies as consumers become more pa-
tient. As a result, pin and p
i
o fall as c goes up.
The next property is closely related to Lemma 1. I find that as consumers
become very patient, i.e. c = 1, newcomers’ demand becomes perfectly elastic.
21This property is also present in Villas-Boas’ model of dynamic competition where switching
costs are zero. (Villas-Boas, 1999)
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Lemma 2. When c = 1, demand from newcomers is perfectly elastic.
Lemmas 1 and 2 help explain why the introductory prices do not fall below
marginal cost despite the positive return on market share and the perfect elasticity
of demand. Lemma 2 shows that when c = 1 competition for market share can be
characterized by Bertrand price competition with homogeneous goods. Unlike most
models with switching costs and product homogeneity where all future profits from
customer lock-in are dissipated in the competition for market share, in this setting
firms do not have an incentive to undercut when the price falls down to marginal
cost. First, when pn = c additional sales to newcomers do not increase profits. Sec-
ond, since demand from newcomers is perfectly elastic, consider a market sharing
rule such that the market is split anywhere within the (q̂AA, 1− q̂BB) range whenever
consumers are indifferent between the two firms. Profits from new customers are
zero, so a sharing rule that allows firms to capture at least their future loyal cus-
tomers will be robust to unilateral deviations. For example, if firm A can capture
customers in (0, q̂AA), i.e. its future loyal customers, selling to newcomers located
outside this range does not raise firm A’s profits neither in the present period, nor
in the next period. At this point, I assume that the market is equally split in case
of a tie and consumers in each half of the market buy from the firm that is closest
to them. In the next sections, we will see that the sharing rule has to be modified
to guarantee existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 1 reveals that the equilibrium introductory price is independent
of the current distribution of the market, given by xt. This is due to the fact that
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sales to switchers are profit-neutral and xt becomes irrelevant in the determination
of pnt.
22 It also follows that convergence to steady state, x̄ = 1/2 under the equal
sharing rule, occurs in just one period. This result is summarized in the next
corollary:
Corollary 1. Under the conditions outlined in Proposition 1 and given xt ∈ [0, 1]
the market converges to steady state, x̄ = 1/2, in just one period.
From the equilibrium price expressions we can see that the introductory price
is independent of s while the regular price is increasing in s. Naturally, sales to
loyal customers increase in s while sales to switchers decrease in s. Therefore,
firm profits unambiguously increase in the magnitude of the switching cost and
competition becomes more relaxed as switching costs increase. Similarly, firm profits
are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, as higher transportation costs
further relax competition. Positive steady-state per-period firm profits arise solely






as s→  (3.2.29)
3.2.3 The decision to share information
I now examine how the market equilibrium changes when one firm experiences
a higher incidence of contract breach relative to its rival as this will illustrate how
22It should be noted that for some parameter values, it is the presence of exit costs that guar-
antees that a firm with no market share would choose to compete for newcomers instead of raising
its price and targeting switchers exclusively. However, the presence of exit costs will not have a
qualitative effect on the rest of the results.
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the latter can benefit from withholding information. I first characterize the equilib-
rium path following a period of cost asymmetry. Corollary 1 facilitates the analysis
because the impact of a transitory, one-period cost shock will be limited to this
period’s strategies only – as soon as cost symmetry is restored next period, firms’
strategies will depend on the current distribution of the market only and the market
reaches steady state in the subsequent period.
The impact of an asymmetric cost shock
In the absence of a shock, in period t the equilibrium prices are given by:






and the corresponding sales to newcomers, loyal customers and switchers as









while steady-state profits are given by (3.2.29). As long as the firms are facing
symmetric marginal costs and the market is on the equilibrium path, these values
are identical across the two firms, so I suppress the firm-specific notation for the
steady-state values from now on.
Consider the general case where in period t− 1 firm j’s default rate is higher
than of the rival so in period t it operates with marginal cost c̃ > c, reflecting the
additional cost of securing funds. The shock’s magnitude is given by Δc = c̃ − c,
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where Δc > 0. The shock lasts one period only and its duration and magnitude are
common knowledge. Firm i’s cost is unchanged and equal to c. At this point, I seek
to characterize the equilibrium outcome in period t and assume that the shock is
unanticipated by both firms. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 3.2.3
In order to derive the equilibrium in the period in which the shock occurs,
I present two lemmas that help us analyze firm behavior when the market goes
through a period of cost asymmetry. I will discuss firms’ best responses in terms
of their introductory prices only, because the regular prices are set sequentially and
are conditional on the rival’s introductory price. Recall from Corollary 1 that as
soon as symmetry is restored, the market converges to steady state in just one
period. Thus, both firms correctly anticipate that after a shock in period t, in the
equilibrium introductory price in period t+ 1 will be equal to its steady-state level,
p∗n = c , and profits from loyal customers will depend on market share gained in
period t. The following two lemmas hold regardless of the current distribution of
the market.
Lemma 3. Let pi∗nt indicate firm i’s best response to the rival’s price, p
j
nt. Then,





i (firm i undercuts);




nt ≤ ci (firm i matches or exceeds the rival’s price).
Part (a) of Lemma 3 states that whenever the rival’s introductory price is
above firm i’s marginal cost, firm i has an incentive to undercut because it can
capture the entire market of newcomers by lowering its price just below the rival’s
price, pjnt. Since p
j
nt > c
i firm i’s sales to newcomers are profitable and a discrete
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increase in the demand from newcomers justifies a price decrease. Furthermore, for
some parameter values it is possible that firm i’s optimal response is to lower its
price well below pjnt in order to optimize profits from switchers and newcomers. In
either case, firm i’s best response is to sell below the rival’s price.
The second part of Lemma 3 states that if the rival’s price is below firm i’s
marginal cost, firm i can take on two actions. On one hand, it can match the rival’s
price, effectively selling at a price below cost. Unless the rival’s price is too low,
this is a best response for any market sharing rule that allows the firm to capture
at least its loyal customer segment when prices are equal. On the other hand, firm
i can set a price above the rival’s and target switchers only. In that case, Lemma 2
points out that demand from newcomers will be zero so firm i will forgo the payoff
from establishing market share. To establish which one of these two actions would
be a best response for firm i, we need to consider the corresponding stream of profits
from either strategy. Since the market reverts to its steady-state equilibrium next
period, the decision to invest in market share today or target switchers exclusively
will only affect profits from loyal customers in period t+1 but it will have no impact
on the firm’s stream of profits in periods t + 2 and onwards. Note that the future
value of market share and the presence of exit costs when the firm makes no sales to
newcomers motivate firms to sell at an introductory price below cost when necessary.
However, if this price is too low, firm i may be better off raising its introductory
price above cost and selling to switchers only. 23
23The minimum level of exit costs is not sufficient to deter firm i from taking this action because
the discounted payoff from market share is lower when the introductory price is below cost.
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Let pi indicate firm i’s ‘break-even’ introductory price, i.e. the introductory
price that renders firm i indifferent between investing in market share (by lowering
its price to the rival’s level) and targeting switchers only (by raising its price above
cost). If the rival’s price is below firm i’s break-even price, firm i’s payoff from
targeting switchers exceeds the payoff from investing in market share so firm i’s best
response is to raise its price above cost. Otherwise, firm i is better off matching
the rival’s price and capturing market share. This result is summarized in the next
lemma, which characterizes firm i’s best response in terms of pi, conditional on the
rival’s price being equal to or below firm i’s cost.
















Based on these two lemmas we can characterize the equilibrium during a period
of cost asymmetry. Suppose that firm A receives a cost shock in period t. It operates
at marginal cost c̃ for the duration of the period. Proposition 2 characterizes the
equilibrium in period t, conditional on xt = 1/2, i.e. the market is currently in
steady state:
Proposition 2. Let pA designate firm A’s break-even price. Under the condi-
tions outlined in Proposition 1, there exist threshold values Δc and Δc, such that a
subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium in period t exists and can be characterized
as follows:
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(a) If Δc ≤ Δc, then
pAnt = p
B










AA, qBB,t = q
∗
BB, (3.2.34)
xt+1 = 1/2 (3.2.35)
ΠA,t < Π
∗, ΠB,t = Π
∗ (3.2.36)
ΠA,t+1 = Π
∗, ΠB,t+1 = Π
∗ (3.2.37)
(b) If Δc ≥ Δc, where Δc > Δc:
pAnt = p













AA, qBB,t > q
∗
BB, (3.2.40)
xt+1 = 0 (3.2.41)
ΠA,t < Π
∗, ΠB,t > Π
∗ (3.2.42)
ΠA,t+1 < Π
∗, ΠB,t+1 = Π
∗ (3.2.43)
These strategies describe the unique pure-strategy equilibrium when Δc ≥ Δc.
When Δc ∈ (Δc,Δc), there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. For all values of Δc
the market reverts to the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 in period t+ 1.
From part (a) of Proposition 2 we see that a sufficiently small cost shock (Δc ≤
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Δc) does not disturb the market away from its symmetric-cost equilibrium aside from
firm A’s adjustment of the price to loyal customers to reflect its higher marginal
cost. Consequently, firm B’s profits remain unchanged despite its temporary cost
advantage. This important result illustrates that the low-cost firm does not realize
any benefits from the distress of its rival when the cost shock to the latter is not too
big. The intuition for this result is based on the observation that for c = 1 demand
from newcomers is perfectly elastic. Suppose that firm B sets pBnt = c. Lemma 3
states that undercutting is not a best response for firm A when the rival’s price is
below firm A’s marginal cost. Therefore, A can match B’s price and capture half
of the newcomers market or it can set a higher price and sell to switchers only.
Matching the rival’s price is costly for firm A because the rival’s price is below firm
A’s cost. Hence, firm A would incur a loss of c̃− c, equivalent to Δc, for each unit
sold to a new customer. The payoff from doing so is equal to the profit realized on
the loyal customers next period and the exit costs that are avoided by the acquisition
of market share. By finding the highest value of Δc such that firm A is willing to
invest in market share, we identify an upper limit on firm A’s cost shock, Δc. As
long as Δc ≤ Δc firm A’s best response is to match the rival’s price because this
allows it to capture market share. Note also that firm A’s break-even price, pA, can
be identified by pA = c̃−Δc.
Part (b) of Proposition 2 describes the impact of a ‘large’ shock, i.e. Δc > Δc.
When A’s cost shock is large, it cannot compete successfully for new customers in
period t. Upon setting pAnt = p
A, firm A is outbid by firm B because pA is greater
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than B’s marginal cost (Lemma 3).24 Firm B captures the full market of newcomers
today at a price above its own cost. The main implication of this result is that given
the realization of a large shock to firm A, firm B realizes higher profits from all three
customer segments in period t. In particular, it is able to maintain an introductory
price above cost and sell to all newcomers while its regular price and the size of
the loyal customer segment increase as well because the rival’s introductory price
is above p∗n.
25 Thus, it realizes higher profits from both segments of the market
in period t. In period t + 1, cost symmetry is restored, firm B realizes its normal
level of profits, while firm A makes zero profit because it had failed to build a loyal
customer base. The market goes back to steady state at the end of period t+ 1.
Note also that for intermediate values of Δc there is no equilibrium in pure
strategies. The condition Δc > Δc is stronger than Δc > Δc – the latter condition
implies that A cannot compete for newcomers while the former also ensures that firm
A faces no demand from switchers at all. Hence, when Δc > Δc A does not have
a profitable deviation in raising its price away from pA once it has been undercut.
A profitable deviation would exist if firm A faced demand from switchers at pA;
therefore, Δc > Δc is needed to ensure that firm A’s cost is sufficiently high to
induce no demand from switchers. I do not characterize the equilibrium with mixed
strategies but note that as s→  , the range of Δc, for which pure-strategy equilibria
do not exist, approaches the empty set, (Δc→ Δc).26 Furthermore, it will be shown
24Alternatively, firm B may set pBnt = p
A and this strategy may still be a candidate for an
equilibrium if the market sharing rule is modified to split the market xt+1 = 0. For clarity, I
suppose that firm B outbids A by setting a slightly lower price.
25Recall from (3.2.13) that ∂q̂ii,t/∂p
j
nt > 0.
26See the proof to Proposition 2 for more details.
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that Δc ≡ Δc when the shock is anticipated since the market distribution from the
preceding period will be such that qBA,t will be zero.
As demonstrated in the proof to Proposition 2, in the presence of a small
shock the equilibrium is not unique. Any pair of prices such that pAnt = p
B
nt = p
and p ∈ [pA, c] would constitute a Nash equilibrium in period t and a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the subgame from period t onwards. Part (a) of Proposition 2
presents the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, assuming that this is the equilibrium that
firms will coordinate on. Intuitively, pAnt = p
B
nt = c is not the unique equilibrium
( despite the framework’s similarity to the model of Bertrand competition with
homogeneous market demand), because sales today also represent an investment
in market share. Firms are willing to sustain small losses today and sell below
cost in order to gain market share that will bring in profits tomorrow. The perfect
elasticity of demand makes deviations above the rival’s price unprofitable and if for
any reason one firm sets a price slightly below cost, the other firm is forced to match
this price in order to capture any market share at all. The lower bound on the price
range within which all identical prices constitute an equilibrium is determined by
max(pA, pB). When firms are symmetric, firms’ break-even prices are identical so
pA = pB is an equilibrium that exhausts profits from future market for both firms. In
the asymmetric cost case here, this lower bound is given by the price that exhausts
all future profits for the high-cost firm – this is pA in Proposition 2. If firm A sets
pAnt = p
A and, firm B has no profitable deviation in undercutting this price (the
shock is small, pA < c) or raising its price above pA (which would imply gaining no
market share).
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We can now move on to identify the strategic cost of information sharing by
allowing for the cost shock to be anticipated as firms can foresee if the rival has an
incentive to deviate.
The strategic cost of information sharing
The results from Propositions 1 and 2 can now be applied to illustrate how
the magnitude of the strategic cost of information sharing depends on the firms’
liquidity positions. I define this strategic cost as the additional profits that a firm
will realize if it deviates from the information-sharing agreement by withholding
information from its rival. In terms of the notation in Figure 3.2 the strategic cost
is given by m− n.
In the discussion of the market equilibrium in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above we
assumed that there is no uncertainty regarding the realization of the firms’ marginal
costs. However, if next period costs are uncertain, firms’ price strategies will be as
described in Proposition 1 as long as both firms have the same expected marginal
costs. Consumers have perfect foresight and anticipate that in expectation next
period the two firms’ introductory prices will be equal – therefore, newcomers are
still indifferent between the two firms if they offer equal prices today.27 Also, in
expectation next period’s optimal market share, q̂ii, is unchanged for both firms
because the expected profit margin on loyal customers stays the same (and is equal
to ( + s)/2). Therefore, firms have no incentive to alter their price strategies when
their expected marginal costs are symmetric; hence, Proposition 1 still applies. Note
27The marginal newcomer will be indifferent between the two firms since pAnt + xt + (p
B
nt+1 +
(1− xt) + s) = pBnt + (1− xt) + (pAnt+1 + xt + s) when pAnt = pBnt and pAnt+1 = pBnt+1.
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also that as long as both firms take the same action in the information sharing
game – ’Share’ or ’Do not share’, – they face symmetric risk of default. If we also
impose the assumption that they have the same cost of funds, then their expected
marginal costs are also symmetric and Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium in
all periods, in which an asymmetric cost shock does not occur and is not anticipated
in the next period.
Now consider the situation where one firm shares information while the other
one does not. The firm that unilaterally shared information is exposed to higher
default risk relative to its rival – therefore, next period its marginal cost will be
above the rival’s marginal cost. This scenario is captured in the discussion of the
equilibrium with asymmetric costs (Proposition 2). Note that within the context
of the supergame of information sharing, firms are i) assumed to detect deviations
with no lag; and ii) assuming that the rival’s liquidity position is common knowledge,
each firm correctly anticipates whether the rival will deviate from the information
sharing agreement. Hence, the shock that will result from the deviation of one firm
will be anticipated by both firms. The anticipation of the shock may, in turn, affect
the firms’ price strategies in the preceding period. Therefore, we need to examine
firms’ price strategies in the period preceding the shock.
The equilibrium in the period preceding the shock
Since a deviation is most profitable at the beginning of the supergame, we will
consider a deviation occurring in period 1 that causes a cost shock to the rival in
period 2. This implies that firms declare their willingness to share information in
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period 0 and they have their first opportunity to do so at the beginning of period
1. 28 In line with the discussion of Proposition 2 suppose that firm B deviates by
withholding information at the beginning of period 1 so that firm A is exposed to
a higher risk of default in that period. The default rate is discovered at the end
of period 1 and firm A incurs costs to secure liquid assets needed in period 2. As
a result, it will operate at a higher marginal cost in period 2 and the equilibrium
price strategies in that period are described by Proposition 2. The next proposition
characterizes a pure-strategy equilibrium of the subgame in period 1 when both
firms anticipate that firm A will be hit by an adverse cost shock of magnitude Δc
in period 2 as a result of firm B’s deviation.
Proposition 3. Let Proposition 2 characterize the anticipated outcome in period 2.
Under the general conditions outlined in Proposition 1, there exists a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in period 1, characterized as follows:
(a) If Δc ≤ Δc, then
pAn,1 = p
B
n,1 = c (3.2.44)
x2 = 1− q∗BB (3.2.45)
28Considering a deviation in period 0 also significantly simplifies the problem as we do not have






n,1 = c (3.2.46)
x2 = 1− q∗BB,2 (3.2.47)
Under the period-1 strategy profiles described above, in period 2 Δc ≡ Δc and
there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium for all values of the cost shock.
The anticipation of next period’s shock affects the expected returns to market
share. When the anticipated shock is small, firm B correctly anticipates that its
return on market share remains unchanged while firm A’s profits decrease. If firm B
maintains a price equal to marginal cost at period 1, firm A can costlessly invest in
market share by matching this price. Any market sharing rule that allows each firm
to capture its loyal customers segment will be sufficient to guarantee that neither
firm will deviate from the proposed equilibrium.
When the anticipated shock is large, here Δc > Δc, firm B realizes larger gains
on its loyal customers segment and its optimal market share in period 2 is larger
than its steady-state level (q̂BB,2 > q
∗
BB). At the same time, A’s optimal market
share shrinks because it realizes smaller (or zero) profits from its loyal customers
in period 2. If q̂AA,2 + q̂BB,2 ≤ 1, the firms can continue selling at marginal cost in
period 1 and, again, under a sharing rule that allows each firm to keep its respective
loyal customer segment, neither firm will deviate from the proposed equilibrium,
pAn,1 = p
B
n,1 = c. In the proof of this proposition it is shown that q̂AA,2 + q̂BB,2 is
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always less than one.
Similar to the period-2 equilibrium when firm A is hit by a ‘small’ shock, the
period-1 equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is not unique. Under the sharing





), c] would be an equilibrium in period 1.29
We see that regardless of the magnitude of the anticipated shock, neither
firm changes its optimal price strategy in period 1 - both firms continue to set
pAn = p
B
n = c. This implies that firms will not change their equilibrium price
strategies in period 0 either. Recall that firms agree to share information in period
0 so the anticipation that one firm may deviate could have affected their period-0
price strategies. The results in Proposition 3 show that despite the anticipation of
one firm deviating (in this case, firm B), firms optimal price strategies in periods 1
and 2 remain the same, where the price rigidity in the market is largely due to the
interaction of the perfectly elastic newcomers’ demand and the profitability of the
mature market.
Finally, note that there is only one relevant threshold level in period 2 as
Δc ≡ Δc. By splitting the market at x = 1 − q̂BB,2, firm A will face no demand
from switchers in period 2 as firm B will retain all of its customers – in period 1 firm
B captures only its future loyal customers. Under this distribution of the market,
by applying Proposition 2 we see that there is a pure strategy equilibrium in period





are the period-1 break-even prices for firm A and firm B, respectively. Their
derivation is similar to the derivation of pA in the proof of Proposition 2.
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A a pure-strategy equilibrium exists as long as firm A has no profitable deviation
in raising its price, e.g. when it faces no demand from switchers when its price is
below cost. In the derivation of the equilibrium during a period of cost asymmetry in
Proposition 2, it was assumed that firms begin the period with equal market shares
and firm A faces demand from switchers unless its break-even price is sufficiently
high. In contrast, when the market in period 2 is distributed such that qBA,2 = 0,
the condition that firm A’s break-even price is sufficiently high is becomes obsolete:
even when firm A is outbid (i.e. when Δc > Δc), it has no profitable deviation in
raising its price above pA. As a result, Δc ≡ Δc.
Proposition 3 shows that firm B’s potential gains from its cost advantage in
period 2 are not dissipated through the competition for market share in period 1.
Recall that firm B profits from its cost advantage only if A’s shock is sufficiently
large. We see that anticipating a large shock in period 2 also does not change the
equilibrium prices in period 1.
The role of liquidity
All else equal, when one firm experiences a higher risk of default relative to
its rival, the size of the cost disparity is determined by this firm’s cost of funds.
Therefore, I will refer to Δc as the liquidity threshold that determines whether a
firm is ‘liquid’, i.e. Δc ≤ Δc or ‘liquidity-constrained’, i.e. Δc > Δc.
Proposition 4. In a market with customer recognition, heterogeneous goods, ho-
mogeneous switching costs, and infinitely patient consumers, a firm’s strategic cost
of information sharing is zero when its rival is liquid (Δcrival ≤ Δcrival) and strictly
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positive when its rival is liquidity constrained (Δcrival > Δcrival).
Proposition 4 states our main result: firms who have cheap access to liquid as-
sets endure a small cost shock when their rival deviates by withholding information.
As a result, the rival does not derive any benefits from its deviation. In contrast,
when a firm is liquidity-constrained it is vulnerable to information asymmetries and
the rival profits from withholding information. Hence, a firm’s temptation to devi-
ate from the information sharing agreement is strictly positive only when the firm’s
rival is liquidity-constrained.
This proposition makes two important contributions. First, it pins down the
key role of liquidity on the cost of sharing information with a rival – firms realize
that they can only benefit from the distress of their rivals if the latter are liquidity
constrained. Second, in light of the market setup so far Proposition 4 identifies con-
ditions, under which imperfect competition does not discourage information sharing,
i.e. the strategic cost of disclosing information can be as low as zero. A simpler
differentiated-goods duopoly model would not produce this result, which empha-
sizes the need to extend the analysis of competition and information sharing to a
richer market framework. In this example, it is the interaction of features such as
customer recognition, overlapping generations of infinitely patient consumers and
product differentiation that produce this finding.
We can use Proposition 4 to make predictions about the market characteristics
that foster information flows between rivals. If the firms within a market are very
dissimilar in their cost of funds, such that one firm is liquid while the other is liquidity
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constrained, then the liquid firm has an incentive to deviate and information sharing
can be sustained only if the that firm is sufficiently patient. Now suppose that firms
who share a market have similar liquidity positions so that they are either both liquid
or both are liquidity constrained – we will refer to such markets as homogeneous.
In a market populated by liquid firms, the strategic cost of sharing information
is zero for both firms, so neither of them has any incentive to deviate from the
information sharing agreement. In the context of the exposition in Section 3.2.1
and Figure 3.2, when firms are liquid we have that m = n. This equality implies
that sharing information is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game in Figure 3.2.
Since it is also the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, information sharing is a matter of
coordinating on the desirable equilibrium outcome. In contrast, in a market with
liquidity constrained firms the strategic cost of information sharing is positive: m >
n. The only Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game is (Sℎare,DoNotSℎare) but
the payoffs (k, k) are not Pareto optimal. By a straight-forward application of the
Folk theorem (Friedman, 1971), liquidity-constrained firms will play the cooperative
strategy of sharing information if the discounted long-term benefits of doing so
outweigh the short-term gains from deviating. Based on this discussion we can
formulate the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. If the net benefits of information sharing are strictly positive and
firms within a market are homogeneous in the cost of securing liquid funds, all else
equal, information sharing is more likely to be sustained in markets populated by
liquid firms relative to markets populated by liquidity constrained firms.
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This hypothesis will be tested in Section 3.3.1.
The role of competition
One of our main questions of interest is whether the strategic cost of informa-
tion sharing is higher under more intense competition. Therefore, we can examine
how the liquidity threshold Δc varies with competition. If Δc falls, then the require-
ment that the shock is small become more stringent – there is a higher probability
that some firms will face a positive strategic cost. Thus, more intense competition
would decreases the likelihood that information sharing occurs. It is our goal to
establish how Δc varies with changes in the competition parameters. As mentioned
earlier, the degree of competition in the market varies along three dimensions –
consumer patience (c), the degree of product differentiation in the market (proxied
by ), and the level of switching costs (s). Since we limit attention to c = 1, the
endogenously determined liquidity threshold Δc depends explicitly on s and  and
we can perform comparative statics. The analysis of how Δc varies with c is not
so straight-forward because the model is not tractable for c away from one. For
this reason, I present some intuition for the market dynamics when c is away from
one and then discuss how a temporary cost asymmetry may affect the firms’ price
strategies. This discussion will illustrate how more intense competition can reduce
the strategic cost of information sharing to zero and facilitate information sharing.
As shown in Villas-Boas (1999), greater consumer patience intensifies com-
petition for newcomers and lowers both the introductory and regular prices. This
result is confirmed in Grozeva (2009) for the augmented model of dynamic com-
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petition with switching costs, which is used here. As competition becomes more
intense, newcomers’ demand becomes more elastic and the high-cost firm has less
flexibility in adjusting its introductory price in response to the cost shock. In the
limit, when c → 1, we saw that the high-cost firm cannot raise its introductory
price without losing demand from all newcomers. This produced the equilibrium
result that for a small shock, price remains unchanged and the low-cost firm real-
izes no additional benefits from its cost advantage. This ensured that the strategic
cost of information sharing can be as low as zero. If newcomers’ demand was not
perfectly elastic, the high-cost firm would be able to raise its price and still capture
market share. The rival’s best response then would be to also raise its price. The
difference between the two prices will depend on the discount factors of firms and
consumers. This is driven by the fact that convergence to steady state is monotonic
and becomes slower as firms become more patient – firms realize that larger market
share hampers their ability to compete for switchers next period so they compete
less aggressively for new customers today. Hence, the low-cost firm will raise its
price in response to the price increase by the firm experiencing the shock and the
more patient firms are, the closer the two prices will be to each other. All of this
implies that when c < 1 a temporary cost asymmetry will always generate addi-
tional benefits to the low-cost firm because it allows it to charge higher prices to all
customer segments and increases its sales to new and loyal customers. At the same
time, the losses of the high-cost firm are mitigated by the firm’s ability to raise its
price without entirely forgoing sales to newcomers. In summary, when c < 1 the
strategic cost of information sharing will be strictly positive (m > n) for all values
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of the cost shock. A lower consumer discount factor makes competition less intense,
thereby increasing the strategic cost of information sharing. This suggests that in
a less competitive market, where the degree of competition is only varied along the
consumer discount factor, a self-enforcing information-sharing agreement will be
harder to sustain because it is more costly. This argument provides a counterpoint
to the perception that more intense competition is necessarily more detrimental to
information-sharing practices.
What happens when competition varies with the degree of product differentia-
tion or switching costs? Limiting attention to c = 1 allows us to perform compara-
tive statics with respect to the liquidity threshold, Δc. The next corollary describes
how the liquidity threshold varies with the degree of product differentiation and
switching costs:
Corollary 2. Under the conditions presented in Propositions 2 and 3, the liquidity
threshold, Δc, increases in the magnitude of switching costs and the degree of product
differentiation.
Not surprisingly, the liquidity threshold increases in s and  because they
increase the value of market share. As market share becomes more valuable the
break-even price of the affected firm falls even lower so the liquidity threshold goes
up. It should be noted, however, that the result with respect to  can be ambiguous
if the distribution of the market was such that firm A faced demand from switchers
during the period of the shock.
When c = 1, increases in switching and transportation costs unambiguously
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relax competition. The equilibrium introductory price is independent of s and 
while the regular price increases in both parameters. 30 Sales to loyal customers,
the profitable customer segment in the market, also increase as switching and trans-
portation costs go up. Holding the cost of liquid funds constant, more intense
competition through lower s and  lowers the liquidity threshold, making the liq-
uidity requirement more stringent. This increases the strategic cost of information
sharing for those firms, whose cost of funds was below the original liquidity thresh-
old and is now above the new threshold. The proof of Corollary 2 also shows that






, are negative. This indicates that the
rate at which higher switching costs raise the liquidity threshold is lower when there
is already a large degree of product differentiation (and vice versa). This finding
is intuitive because higher switching and transportation costs raise the return on
market share (given by ( + s)/2 per unit sold) and, therefore, raise the liquidity
threshold. If the return on market share is already high due to large product differ-
entiation, the relative effect of the switching costs on the return to market share is
smaller.
The result in this section is important because it provides an analysis of how
parameters defining the ex-ante level of competition affect information sharing. Past
studies of information sharing and competition have looked at the interaction of the
two as in their models information sharing relaxes or intensifies competition and the
desirability of an information-sharing regime depends on the change in the compet-
30For c < 1 and complete customer lock-in (the case where s > ), switching costs intensify
the competition for market share as they increase the return from loyal customers.
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itive environment.31 In contrast, in our model, we are able to determine how the
ex ante competition intensity affects information sharing. If competition intensity
is driven by variation in switching or transportation costs, then the strategic cost
of information sharing is on average higher in more competitive markets. In ad-
dition, our dynamic model also identifies a role for consumer patience as affecting
competition. Our heuristic discussion above suggests that more intense competition
through more patient consumers can lower the strategic cost of information sharing
and encourage such practices. Proposition 4 illustrate this result in the limit – when
c = 1 the market is at its most competitive level, holding s and  constant, and the
strategic cost of information sharing can be as low as zero, ensuring that sharing
information is an equilibrium in the one-shot information-sharing game.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data
I use data from a cross-sectional survey of agricultural traders in Madagas-
car, conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and
the Malagasy Ministry of Scientific Research (FOFIFA), and previously used by
Fafchamps and Minten (1999, 2000). The survey was designed to be representa-
tive of traders along the entire food marketing chain – wholesalers, retailers, and
31Of these, only Jappelli and Pagano (1993) and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2006) explicitly look
at changes in the competition parameters to determine how they will affect information sharing.
Jappelli and Pagano (1993) use a permanent cost disparity between the local monopolist and
a potential entrant to provide exogenous variation in the incumbent’s market power. Gehrig
and Stenbacka (2006) use the distribution of borrowers’ switching costs to model the degree of
competition in a duopoly market.
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assemblers, – whose main product traded was a local staple food.32 Traders from
three main agricultural areas (Fianarantsoa, Majunga, Antananarivo) were sam-
pled and particular attention was paid to obtaining observations from both urban
and rural communities. The survey was administered in two rounds - 850 traders
were surveyed in the first round in May-August 1997 and 738 of those respondents
were traced for a follow-up survey in September-November of the same year.33 The
dataset is unique in providing a rich set of measures on traders’ information shar-
ing practices, liquidity position, access to credit, reliance on formal institutions,
contractual risk, and conflict resolution. Table B.1 presents definitions of relevant
variables to be used in the estimation and Table B.6 presents summary statistics.
The business environment captured in the survey is representative of the type
of settings that motivate our study. The data reveals that traders are exposed
to contractual risk from both suppliers and customers – 31% of the second-round
sample report recieving late or no payment from customers in the past twelve months
and 21% report late or no delivery from suppliers for the same period. Only 2 of the
738 traders in the sample have resorted to formal means of contract enforcement
such as the police or the courts.34 Yet, the conflict resolution rate is 77% for the
traders reporting issues with customers and 84% for those reporting issues with
32For a more detailed discussion of the survey design and the sample composition, see Fafchamps
and Minten (1999).
33The questionnaire from the first round gathered information on trader and firm characteristics
while the questionnaire from the second round focused on the traders’ relationships with customers,
suppliers and other traders. The data used in this investigation is drawn from both rounds of the
survey.
34The survey does not ask if traders resort to private enforcers, hence it cannot be determined
if private enforcement is a feasible alternative that may be preferred to the use of information
networks.
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suppliers, suggesting that informal contract-enforcement mechanisms may be at
work.35 There is also evidence that traders do screen customers on the basis of past
performance: among the 285 traders who were asked if delinquent customers will be
refused credit from their other suppliers as well, 74.7% respond that at least some
suppliers will stop extending credit and 24.9% report that most or all suppliers
will do so; less than 1% of the traders state that they would sell on credit to a
new customer. Furthermore, in a developing country context liquidity is likely to
represent a sizeable hurdle to information sharing practices, which facilitates a test
of the model’s liquidity hypothesis.
I obtain data on the traders’ information-sharing practices from a question
that asks respondents about the frequency with which they talk to other traders
about delinquent customers.36 There is also information about the frequency of
discussing the product quality of different suppliers. I choose to use only the question
on discussions about customers because it is more likely to capture the exchange
of information regarding contract performance. Specifically, the data indicate that
there is less room for opportunistic breach of contract with respect to product quality
– 84.5% of the traders report that they always check the supplier’s product quality
before purchase and another 12.5% of the traders report they do so often. Those
traders who state that product quality varies a lot were asked to indicate the reason
for this variation and none of the respondents attribute it to malfeasance on behalf
35The conflict resolution rate is computed as the share of traders who resolved their contractual
disputes with customers/suppliers.
36Fafchamps and Minten (1999) point out that by ‘other traders’ respondents understood ‘other




The question about traders’ discussions of delinquent customers does not make
it clear whether traders disclose information about their own customers or receive
information from other firms. Case study evidence from other markets indicates
that information sharing is based on reciprocity, so I assume that discussions about
delinquent customers point to the existence of information sharing networks with
two-way information flows. The question is directed only at those respondents who
report having regular customers. This reduces our sample size to 344 observations.
While it is not clear if traders communicate directly with their rivals, it is reasonable
to assume that traders who want to withhold information from their rivals will not
disclose it to anyone in that line of business. The possible answers to the question
are ‘daily’, ‘weekly’, ‘monthly’, ‘occasionally/less frequently than once a month’,
and ‘never’. Only 3.2% of the traders report having such discussions at least weekly
compared to 13.3% of traders who engage in such discussions at least monthly; 24%
of the traders report that they never discuss customers with other traders.
Traders who report discussing delinquent customers at least once a month
are coded as respondents who share information, giving rise to a binary dependent
variable. This definition increases the likelihood that the transmission of information
is timely and deliberate. Admittedly, the frequency of communication also depends
on the frequency with which firms experience customer issues. In the sample 35.1%
37Among the full sample of 738 traders, 147 report having received products of lower quality
from their suppliers in the past 12 months. Among those, 50 respondents state that the quality
of products they purchase varies at least somewhat, but none of those 50 respondents identifies
cheating on behalf of the supplier as a cause for this variability. However, when asked why they
think product quality varies a lot, only 3 out of the 738 respondents attribute this variation to
manipulation on behalf of the suppliers.
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of the firms who extend sales credit have not experienced late or no payment from
customers in the past year. Under a binary specification of the dependent variables
traders who face a significantly lower default rate may appear to be less likely to
share information. To use the full information contained in the traders’ reponses I
also report results from coding the dependent variable as categorical according to
the reported frequency of information exchange.
Since information sharing is driven by exposure to contractual risk, I limit
the sample to traders who extend sales credit. 38 I exclude traders who are non-
Christian, a total of ten observations, because of the concerns that they may be
part of closely-knit ethnic networks.39. Traders from the regions Majunga Plaines
and Majunga Hauts Plateaux are also dropped during the estimation procedure
because of their limited representation in the sample, which causes collinearity issues.
Finally, among the traders who state the number of competitors they have over their
regular customers, I keep only those who have at least one competitor in order to
exclude monopolies. I also keep those traders who respond that they do not know
how many competitors they have. The final sample used in the estimation consists
of 279 observations. Table B.1 presents definitions of all variables relevant to the
discussion that follows and Table B.6 shows presents summary statistics.
38Of the traders who are asked about their information sharing practices, 96.5% are selling on
credit. Only 1 trader in the sample reports that he discusses customers with other traders but
does not extend sales credit himself.
39Fafchamps and Minten (1999) note that the Malagasy society tends to be fairly homogeneous
in terms of ethnicity and religion and respondents who identify as non-Christian could represent
the few ethnic minorities in the country
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3.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The theoretical model yields the unequivocal result that firms are more likely
to share information if their rivals are liquid, but it is ambiguous about the impact
of operating in a market with more intense competition. In principle, one would
like to use the liquidity prediction to test the model, and the correlation between
information sharing and competition to gain insight of the relationship between the
two, based on firm-level observational data. This suggests one would estimate a
model of the form
y∗i = 0 ⋅ Liquidityi + 1 ⋅ Competitioni + 2Xi + i (3.3.1)
where
Yi = 1 if y
∗
i > 0
Yi = 0 if y
∗
i ≤ 0
and y∗i > 0 indicates information sharing while y
∗
i ≤ 0 – no information sharing; i
˜ N(0, 2 ) and i = 1, 2, . . . K indexes observations; Liquidity is a measure of the
rival’s liquidity position, Competition measures the intensity of competition in the
market, and X is a vector of controls.
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Liquidity measures
Consistent estimation of 0 requires that E[Liquidityii∣Xi] = 0. Again, in
my model causality runs directly from liquidity to information sharing so this as-
sumption is satisfied in the model. Furthermore, I would argue that for at least one
of the liquidity measures discussed below, it is reasonable to assume that it is not
correlated with i. Thus, I should be able to test the implication of the model that
0 > 0.
The dataset does not allow us to identify a trader’s local competitors. Hence, I
have no explicit information about their number or their liquidity position. Assum-
ing that the model’s predictions hold for more than one competitor and assuming
that markets are homogeneous, I focus on identifying a proxy for the liquidity posi-
tion of traders who operate in the respondent’s market. I construct two such proxies
– one set of liquidity measures (to be discussed below) uses own liquidity to proxy
for market liquidity, and a second set of liquidity measures uses the average liquidity
of traders in the same market. A market is defined as the intersection of main prod-
uct traded and distribution category. With six products traded and 7 distribution
categories, there are 42 possible markets although not all of them are represented in
the sample. Restricting attention to markets with at least two observations, we are
left with 27 markets in the sample. The average value of liquidity within a market
is based on the liquidity measures of all traders in this market after excluding the
observation at hand since we are mainly interested in obtaining information about
the rivals’ liquidity position. I will refer to this set of liquidity proxies as average
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liquidity and to the former set of proxies – own liquidity.
The use of either proxy rests on the assumption that firms within a market
are not too dissimilar in their liquidity positions. This assumption is reasonable if
traders’ liquidity positions are related to the characteristics of agricultural markets
in Madagascar. For example, being able to rely on family members for credit requires
that the trader’s family is not employed in the same enterprise. The data shows
that among the three broad trade categories (assemblers, wholesalers and retailers)
assemblers are the most likely to have non-family members as employees and also
the most likely to have more than three family members with jobs. The availability
of own liquid funds and a credit network can also lead traders to self-select into
markets with high or low volatility of earnings, or markets with high or low entry
costs. For these reasons, I believe the assumption about traders’ similar cost of
capital is likely to be satisfied. In case this assumption is not satisfied for all traders,
then the estimate of 0 would provide a lower bound on the true value of 0 as the
model suggests that in non-homogeneous markets liquid firms are less likely to share
information with their liquidity-constrained rivals.
To measure the liquidity position of each observation and create the proxies
for the market liquidity, I construct two different liquidity scores, referred to as
LS 1 and LS 2. The first liquidity score, LS 1, uses those variables that give us
most confidence in their exogeneity – these are the dummy variable for being able
to borrow from friends/family at the present if financial hardship arises and the
categorical variables for number of family members or friends the trader can borrow
from and number of family members with jobs. A more detailed description of
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these variables is provided in Table B.2. The questions that produce these variables
exclude the respondent’s spouse from the definition of family and friends. Since we
have one dummy variable and two categorical variables that range from 0 to 2, the
maximum liquidity score is equal to 5 and its frequency distribution is presented in
the first column of Table B.3.
Using LS 1, liquidity is exogenous if having a network of friends or family
who are able to extend credit is uncorrelated with unobservable trader/firm char-
acteristics that may also drive information sharing behavior. Ideally, this liquidity
measure would be entirely driven by exogenous variation in family size, geographic
proximity to family and friends, or area-specific characteristics that affect income
levels and diversification of economic activities among the local population. How-
ever, we cannot rule out that the availability of a network of friends or family may
be cultivated over time and is likely based on reciprocal relationships, which raises
the concern that traders who have such networks may be more patient or may have
an unobservable taste for cooperation.40 Hence, I include a dummy variable equal
to one if the trader reports discussing input or output prices with other traders
and a dummy variable equal to one if the trader reports discussing the quality of
suppliers’ products with other traders.41 Both variables may capture unobserved
characteristics that affect the trader’s propensity to cooperate with other traders.
For the second specification of the liquidity score, LS 2, I use variables that re-
flect the availability of personal funds - these are the dummy variables for possessing
40For example, traders who expect to stay in the market/area for a longer period may be more
likely to engage in reciprocal relationships with friends/family as well as local business rivals.
41Similar to the definition of the dependent variable, only traders reporting at least monthly
discussions are coded as actively discussing prices or product quality.
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a bank account, having another source of income (own or through spouse), reporting
formal savings, reporting informal savings, and having access to overdraft facility
(see Table B.4 for the resulting frequency distribution).42 This liquidity score also
ranges from 0 to 5 although none of the traders possesses a score above 3.
It should be noted that the dataset also provides information on variables
that could proxy for the traders’ ability to negotiate favorable payment terms with
customers and suppliers in case of a liquidity crunch. The results from using these
measures of liquidity are qualitatively the same as those reported for LS 1 and LS 2.
I do not report them here because they are ambiguous in terms of their implications
for the trader’s liquidity position. For example, receiving supplier credit on a regular
basis may indicate ability to obtain credit during a liquidity crunch but it may also
indicate that the trader is liquidity constrained even in the absence of shocks.
Under LS 2, liquidity is exogenous if own liquid assets are uncorrelated with
unobservables that affect information sharing behavior. This assumption is more
contestable because traders’ personal assets can be a by-product of the market in
which they operate and unobservable market characteristics can affect both infor-
mation sharing behavior and liquidity. Furthermore, information sharing may also
affect traders’ liquidity. As discussed below I include a set of controls capturing a
number of market characteristics that should minimize the possible bias in 0.
I report results using both LS1 and LS 2 as alternative measures of liquidity.
When using own liquidity as a proxy for the rival’s liquidity, the liquidity score of the
42While the dataset also has information whether the trader has received formal bank credit in
the past, I do not include this variable in the liquidity score because bank credit likely cannot be
obtained quickly enough to cover unexpected cash outflows. Fewer than 10% of the traders in the
final sample had applied for bank loan in the past.
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current observation is used. While LS 1 is more likely to be exogenous and provide
causal estimates, LS 2 is likely to capture market liquidity with less noise because it
is a direct measure of the availability of personal funds. Table B.5 summarizes the
distribution of the liquidity variables based on average market liquidity (for each of
the two measures, LS 1 and LS 2).
Control variables
Table B.7 provides a summary of all control variables included in the esti-
mation of (3.3.1). To capture a large set of market characteristics that may affect
market power and exposure to risk, I include controls for firm size (based on total
sales and coded by the data collectors), firm age, trade category (e.g. wholesalers,
assemblers or retailers), geographic region (or city, as a robustness check), capital
location, main product traded, and access to a telephone. Market-level controls mit-
igate the potential omitted variables bias when using LS 2 and can also proxy for
unobservable characteristics correlated with the level of competition. I also control
for demographic characteristics such as sex, age, and education level.
Information sharing incentives are stronger when the firm is exposed to higher
default risk. To control for exposure to risk, I first include categorical variables
for the number of traders the respondent knows personally.43 Traders with larger
trade networks can disseminate and receive information about delinquent customers
in a more timely manner and they can also anticipate that customers would be
aware of the stronger reputation effects if they default to a well-connected trader.
43Since Fafchamps and Minten report that the data is subject to considerable measurement
error I recode some continuous variables as categorical.
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Hence, traders with larger networks may face significantly lower default risk and
communicate information about customers less frequently. Second, I control for the
trader’s percent of sales on credit. Credit sales reduce a potential omitted variable
bias in the estimate of the liquidity measures – since liquidity may be positively
correlated with credit sales, we can erroneously interpret a positive coefficient of the
liquidity measure as a validation of the model, while in effect it may be driven by
higher exposure to risk (since the latter provides a stronger incentive to engage in
information sharing). As a robustness check, I also estimate (3.3.1) by restricting
the sample to traders with credit sales between 15% and 50% and compare the
results to those for the full sample.
I include discussing prices and discussing suppliers’ product quality as proxies
for unobserved market characteristics that may facilitate cooperation and infor-
mation exchange in the market. As it will be evident from the discussion of the
competition controls below, discussing prices does not suggest price collusion. Fi-
nally, I do not include number of competitors in the set of controls because the
variable appears to be very noisy and does not have any meaningful impact on the
regression results.
Competition measures
I use three measures of competition to establish a correlation between in-
formation sharing and competition intensity. The most straight-forward measure,
Competition, is a self-reported measure of the strength of competition the trader
faces: Competition is equal to one if the trader responds that the level of compe-
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tition in their market is high, and zero – if competition is reported to be low or
moderate. To consistently estimate 1 we need E[Competitionii∣Xi] = 0. This is
satisfied in my model since causality runs directly from competition to information
sharing. As already mentioned, a major distinction between my model and the pre-
vious literature is that I can identify a role for competition that does not generate
a feedback effect of information sharing on competition. Nevertheless, the feedback
effects pointed out by previous studies can also have a role in a real-world setting
and can lead to a simultaneity bias in our estimates. For example, traders who
share information may anticipate lower default rates and extend more sales credit,
leading to more intense competition for customers. This potential endogeneity can
be overcome if there is a suitable instrumental variable. Such an instrument must
be i) correlated with Competition, ii) uncorrelated with  and iii) not included in
X. Table B.8 shows the results of regressing Competition on a number of firm
characteristics. It shows that variables such as having completed high school edu-
cation, being more liquid as measured by LS 1, engaging in product processing as
a secondary activity and having a large share of sales to regular customers are all
associated with a lower propensity of reporting strong competition, so they satisfy
i). None of the remaining firm characteristics, including the dummy for discussing
prices, have significant coefficients. Number of competitors also does not have a sig-
nificant effect on reported competition possibly because it is a very noisy measure
of the true number of direct competitors.
How do we interpret the significant negative coefficients of product processing
and share of regular customers? Product processing can add more variation in the
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quality of the final product so it can be interpreted as indicating greater product
differentiation. A larger share of regular customers could be associated with higher
switching costs and/or a higher degree of product differentiation. Both variables
may satisfy iii) because they are likely to affect information sharing only through
competition. Furthermore, one can argue that they are uncorrelated with , so ii) is
satisfied too. However, they do not pass the tests for weak IV by Staiger and Stock
(1997) and Stock and Yugo (2005). In the absence of stronger instruments, I estimate
(3.3.1) to obtain the OLS (partial) correlation between self-reported competition
intensity, given by Compet and information sharing.
As indicated by the results in Table B.8, the coefficients of sales to regular
customers, and in column (6) those of product processing, are precisely estimated
and consistent with the interpretation that these two variables capture to some
extent the degree of switching costs and product differentiation in the market. For
this reason, I include them as proxies for competition intensity. They are also less
likely to be endogenous and subject to simultaneity bias from the feedback effect
of information sharing on competition.44 This allows us to test the implications of
Corollary 2 – specifically, the corollary predicts that information sharing is more
likely among traders who engage in product processing or have a high share of
sales to regular customers because the latter are indicative of high switching and/or
transportation costs, which raise the liquidity threshold. Because of concerns that
self-reported competition may be endogenous and bias all coefficient estimates, I
44This statement would not be valid if information sharing affects consumer switching costs.
In the model switching costs are assumed to be exogenous and driven by factors, other than the
choice of information-sharing regime.
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add it to the regression separately from the preceding two competition proxies.
The results from Table B.8 also help us rule out variables that may be sus-
pect of indicating collusive practices in the market. For example, discussing prices
with other traders is shown to have no impact on the perception of competition
intensity. This is consistent with the findings in Fafchamps and Minten (2002) who
use this dataset to examine the impact of social capital on firm productivity and
find no evidence that social capital is associated with collusion on prices.45 In fact,
the question that asks traders if they discuss prices with other traders does not
distinguish between input and output prices. Since discussing suppliers’ product
quality is highly correlated with discussing prices, it is more plausible that traders
discuss input prices. Therefore, the price discussion dummy cannot be interpreted
as indicative of collusion.
Interestingly, firms with liquidity score LS 1 greater than 1 are significantly less
likely to report strong competition (column 4), while our second and more explicit
measure of liquidity, LS2, does not have a significant effect (column 5). However,
when I use a liquidity dummy equal to one when LS1 > 2 (not reported), this effect
disappears – LS 1 is no longer significant (p-value = 0.265). Hence, it is possible
that the significance of the LS 1 scores is due to the small number of observations
in the omitted category, i.e. observations with LS 1 equal to or less than 1.
Finally, note that controlling for credit sales in (3.3.1) helps us reduce a poten-
tial omitted variable bias in the estimate of the impact of self-reported competition.
45Fafchamps and Minten (2002) measure social capital in terms of number of traders known,
number of family members in agricultural business and number of people the trader can borrow
from and find that it has no significant impact on traders’ profit margin.
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Evidence from developing countries shows that market power and credit sales can be
positively correlated due to enforcement concerns (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999)
or negatively correlated if sales credit is used as a competitiveness tool (Fisman and
Raturi, 2004; Van Horen, 2007; Fabbri and Klapper, 2008). Hence, competition may
affect the percent of credit sales that a firm extends and, therefore, its exposure to
risk and likelihood to share information. Since we are interested in the impact of
competition ex-post, it is important to control for exposure to risk and the share of
sales on credit is an adequate proxy.
3.4 Results
Unless specified otherwise, all regression results below report probit coefficients
with robust standard errors and include controls for trader and market characteris-
tics as listed in Table B.7.
3.4.1 The Impact of Competition
The raw correlation between the perceived intensity of competition and infor-
mation sharing is 0.078 based on the responses of 377 traders. The correlation is
positive, but not statistically significant. Table B.9 shows the partial correlation
between the two after estimating 3.3.1. Column (1) shows the results of including
only Competition and the main market and demographic controls listed in Table
B.7. Column (2) adds the additional set of controls: % of sales on credit, competi-
tion proxies, and discussing prices and suppliers. Columns (3) - (6) each include a
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different liquidity measure based on the two liquidity specifications, LS 1 and LS 2,
and the two alternative proxies, own liquidity and average market liquidity. Across
all columns the dummy variable for reporting strong competition has a positive and
signficant coefficient, indicating that traders who perceive their markets as more
competitive are more likely to share information about delinquent customers. As
mentioned before, this result has to be interpreted with caution due to possible si-
multaneity bias. If we believe that there is a feedback effect of information sharing
on competition and Competition captures the ex-post level of competition, then this
result would be consistent with the findings in Jappelli and Pagano (1993), Padilla
and Pagano (1997), and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2006) that information sharing inten-
sifies competition. Otherwise, the positive coefficient on Competition is consistent
with the conjecture in our model that information sharing is more likely in ex-ante
more competitive markets (if competition is driven by consumer patience).
The two objective competition measures, product processing and the percent
of sales to regular customers, are included in columns (2) - (6). Product processing
has the expected positive coefficient but is imprecisely estimated. The coefficient on
sales to regular customers is negative and significant in columns (4) - (6), suggesting
that traders with a higher share of sales to regular customers are less likely to share
information. In line with the interpretation of this variable as indicating higher
switching costs or greater product differentiation, this result is inconsistent with the
model’s predictions.
Among the coefficients for the trader and market characteristics, we obtain
that semi-wholesalers and retailers with a fixed point of sale exhibit a higher propen-
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sity to share information relative to wholesalers. Large and medium-sized firms as
well as firms who have been in operation between 5 and 10 years and firms whose
main product is beans or peanuts, relative to traders whose main product is rice (re-
sults for these variables are not reported for brevity), all exhibit a higher propensity
to share information. The estimates also indicate that traders who share informa-
tion about prices are significantly more likely to share information about delinquent
customers. The coefficient on discussing prices is particularly large and significant
at the 1% level. These results largely persist for the rest of the reported regressions.
3.4.2 The Impact of Liquidity
In this subsection the emphasis is on the effect of the liquidity measures on
information sharing. Table B.10 presents the estimates of the liquidity coefficients,
based on several specifications of the liquidity variable. Column (1) lists the re-
sults from using only the main market and demographic characteristics. Columns
(2) through (5) add alternative sets of controls: percent of credit sales, self-reported
competition intensity, competition proxies, and discussing prices and suppliers. Col-
umn (6) presents the results when all above-mentioned controls are included. Fi-
nally, in column (7) I also control for the trader’s beliefs that if other suppliers knew
about the delinquency of a customer, they would not extend credit to this customer.
This question is asked of only a subsample of the traders, which reduces the sample
size to 198 observations. Hence, we report the results from including this control
separately.
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Panel A presents the coefficient estimates of own liquidity, as measured by
liquidity score 1, as a categorical variable. Recall that LS 1 captures traders’ ability
to borrow from friends and family and own liquidity is assumed to proxy for the
liquidity of the trader’s rival. Observations with liquidity scores of 0 are grouped
together with those who have liquidity scores of 1 and constitute the omitted cate-
gory. Relative to this group, the coefficient on observations with liquidity scores of 2
is negative and significant. The coefficients for all other categories are insignificant.
Overall, the results in Panel A do not present a clear picture of the role of liquidity
on information sharing. This may be due to the fact that the omitted category,
traders with liquidity scores of 1 or less, is too small (only 21 observations) to pro-
duce informative results. Therefore, in Panel C we replace the category dummies
with a single dummy variable that seeks to more clearly distinguish liquid from
illiquid firms based on LS 1.
Panel B again presents the results from using own liquidity as a proxy for the
rival’s liquidity position, but uses liquidity score 2 to measure liquidity. In columns
(1) - (4) traders with liquidity scores of 2 or 3 are significantly more likely to share
information relative to traders with liquidity scores equal to 0. This result persists
upon the inclusion of all control variables (column 6) and is consistent with the
model’s prediction. When we include the control for whether the trader believes a
delinquent customer will be refused credit by most traders, the coefficients on the
liquidity score dummies change in a nontrivial way: traders with LS 2 = 1 are now
significantly less likely to share information relative to the more liquidity constrained
group of traders with LS 2 = 0 while the coefficients for having a score of 2 or 3
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remain positive but insignificant.
In Panels C and D, we replace the category dummies for own liquidity with one
aggregate indicator. In Panel C, we use a dummy equal to 1 if LS 1 is greater than
two. The chosen cutoff point treats the bottom one-third (33.55%) of the traders as
operating in liquidity-constrained markets. Admittedly, the cutoff point is arbitrary
chosen but a cutoff of 3 or 4 leads to qualitatively identical results, except that in
some specifications a cutoff of 3 leads to very imprecise, albeit positive, estimates
of the liquidity dummy coefficient. In Panel D we use a dummy equal to 1 if LS
2 > 1 (see Table B.10). This procedure again treats roughly the bottom one-third
(26.56%) of the traders as facing liquidity constraints in their markets. Again,
the model predicts a positive coefficient for the so-constructed liquidity indicator
variables. In both panels C and D, the liquidity estimates are consistently positive
and significant throughout the inclusion of all control variables (columns 1 - 7),
as predicted by the model. When controlling for discussing prices and suppliers,
the liquidity coefficients in both panels increase in magnitude and become more
precisely estimated, possibly due the fact that discussing prices explains a large
part of the variation that was not picked up by liquidity. In column (7) I again
add a dummy variable equal to one if the trader believes a delinquent customer
will be refused credit by most traders. With this additional control, the liquidity
coefficients almost do not change their value and standard error, giving us more
confidence in the stability of the results. In results that are suppressed in this table
for conciseness, it can be seen that in column (7) the coefficient on product processing
becomes large, positive and significant at the 1% level – this estimate is consistent
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with the interpretation that product processing as a secondary activity reflects a
larger degree of product differentiation, which was shown to relax competition and
facilitate information sharing.
In Panels E and F, I use average market liquidity as a proxy for the rival’s
liquidity. In Panel E, the liquidity variable is based on liquidity score 1, while
in Panel F – on liquidity score 2. Higher average liquidity scores indicate higher
average liquidity in the trader’s market. In Panel E the coefficient on liquidity is
positive and significant upon the inclusion of all controls (columns 6 and 7). In
Panel F, the coefficient on liquidity is positive and significant across all columns.
Hence, the results using average market liquidity as a proxy are consistent with the
results that rely on own liquidity (Panels A - D). Together, these results present
consistent evidence that rivals’ liquidity has a positive effect on traders’ propensity
to share information. Results, based on liquidity score 1 are arguably providing
causal estimates, but they are also less precisely estimated, which is consistent with
our conjecture that they are a more noisy measure of the rival’s liquidity position.
Robustness checks
Table B.11 presents several robustness checks for the full set of liquidity mea-
sures used in Table B.10. Column (1) replicates column (6) from Table B.10. Col-
umn (2) replaces the region fixed effects with city fixed effects. The resulting changes
in the estimates are negligible across all liquidity measures. I use region fixed ef-
fects in the main specification because fewer observations are dropped during the
estimation process. In column (3) I restrict the sample to include only firms with
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credit sales between 15% and 50% of total sales.46 This reduces the variation in
exposure to risk through credit sales and still includes about 60% of the sample.
Again, there are no qualitative changes in the results when compared to column (1).
Column (4) limits the sample to only those traders who have experienced late or
no payment from customers in the past twelve months, which I would refer to as
customer default. This reduces the sample to 152 observations but ensures that we
are only looking at markets where cheating is known to occur – hence, some of the
unobserved variation in default risk is reduced. Th set of measures using own liquid-
ity as a proxy (panels A - D) preserve their signs and significance levels compared to
the baseline results. The measures using average market liquidity (panels E and F)
lose significance but remain positive. Overall, these robustness checks confirm that
our results are stable across different specifications, with the exception of average
liquidity measures which become insignificant when restricting the sample to traders
who have experienced customer default.
Table B.12 presents the results from estimating an ordered probit model where
the dependent variable is categorical and reflects the frequency with which traders
exchange information about customers. The dependent variable takes on discrete
values from 1 to 5 where a value of 1 indicates the trader never discusses customers
and 5 indicates that the trader discusses customers daily. Columns (1) - (2) report
results using the own liquidity proxies and columns (3) - (4) show results for the av-
erage market liquidity proxies. This specification of the dependent variable is much
less informative. The only significant predictors of the frequency of the information
46During the estimation, certain controls were dropped given the smaller sample size.
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exchange are the dummies for discussing prices and being a large firm – their signs
are consistent with the probit results. The liquidity coefficient is positive but not
significant for the own liquidity proxy using LS 1 and for the average market liquid-
ity proxy based on LS 2. Again, this is consistent with the prediction of the model
and with the wider set of results presented in Tables B.10 and B.11.
In summary, the results in Tables B.10 and B.11 suggest that firms operating
in liquid markets are more likely to share information about delinquent customers,
as proposed by the model. This result is conditional on the validity of the two
sets of proxies of rival’s liquidity – own liquidity and average market liquidity. The
estimates are robust to the inclusion of various controls and to the use of various
estimation specifications and liquidity measures. Since the first specification of the
liquidity score can be credibly viewed as exogenous, the positive estimate of 0
implies that liquidity has a positive causal effect on information sharing.
Marginal effects
To get a better idea about the magnitude of the effect of liquidity, I compute
the marginal effects of the two liquidity measures. The baseline specification is
based on column (6) of Table B.10. For ease of interpretation, the liquidity proxy
based on own liquidity uses liquidity dummies as defined in Table B.10 instead of
indicator variables for the underlying categorical liquidity variable. Because most
of the explanatory variables are binary estimating marginal effects at the mean
values is not very informative. Therefore, I compute the average marginal effects
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(see Table B.13).47 The probability of information sharing is on average 9.7 points
higher for liquid firms, if liquidity is defined in terms of ability to borrow from
friends and family (i.e., based on the liquidity dummy using LS 1), and 13 points
higher if liquidity is measured by personal funds (i.e., using LS 2). Using average
market liquidity as a proxy, we find that the probability of information sharing is
on average 8.6 points higher for each 1 point increase in the liquidity score of the
market as measured by LS 1 and 17.3 points higher for each 1 point increase in the
liquidity score of the market as measured by LS 2. All reported marginal effects
are significant at the 10% level. These estimates indicate non-trivial changes in
the probability that a trader would share information about delinquent customers
if that trader operates in a liquid market.
3.5 Conclusion
Inter-firm information sharing is of key importance in developing and tran-
sition economies where reliance on formal contracting institutions is limited. The
transmission of information about defectors helps firms screen out bad risks and
reduce their exposure to contractual risk. At the same time, liquidity constraints
are a common characteristics of economies with weak contract enforcement insti-
tutions and imperfect capital markets. In this study I derive a causal relationship
between liquidity and information sharing and offer a systematic investigation into
why inter-firm information sharing practices emerge in some markets and not in




Competition is commonly perceived as the main impediment to voluntary
information exchange. I have shown that the presence of competition does not
necessarily create barriers to information sharing. Second, I have identified con-
sumer patience as a market characteristic, which intensifies market competition
and encourages information sharing behavior. Third, this study sheds light on the
importance of liquidity in the decision of rival firms to share information. The
model suggests that markets populated by liquid firms are more likely to exhibit
information-sharing networks. Using a relatively unexploited dataset on the infor-
mation sharing practices of agricultural traders in Madagascar, I find support for
this hypothesis, based on two alternative measures of liquidity. An important pol-
icy implication of this result is that improved access to low-cost credit can foster
the formation of information-sharing networks and mitigate problems of contract
breach.
I have limited attention to information sharing agreements between two rival
firms in order to focus on the determinants of the strategic cost of information
sharing. A natural extension of the research question would be to consider larger
coalitions where each firm has one or more local rivals but does not face competition
from the rest of the coalition members. In those cases the timing of information
revelation becomes relevant because the informed firms may reveal information only
after their rival has been exposed to the risk of cheating. Furthermore, as originally
pointed out by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), an information sharing coalition can be
a ‘natural monopoly’ – the returns from participating in the coalition increase as
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more firms join in. These are two important features that are outside the scope of
this study but merit further investigation within the context of the model at hand.
Another important component of this line of research is to perform a more
rigorous test of the causal effect of competition intensity on information sharing.
The lack of suitable instruments limits my ability to establish causality using obser-
vational data. The developments in the literature on information sharing in credit
markets clearly show that empirical work in this area lags behind its theoretical
counterpart. Brown and Zehnder (2008) make a significant contribution to this
area by using an experimental setting that allows them to distinguish the impact
of competition from the impact of default risk on lenders’ incentives to pool infor-
mation. The study of information sharing among firms can benefit tremendously




Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using the specification of the price strategies and value functions in terms
of the state variable, xt, we find the optimal price strategies, pnt, and the resulting
distribution of the market. We then show that when consumers are very patient
prices are independent of firms’ market shares and the market converges to the
proposed equilibrium for all values of xt in just one period. We proceed to find
pot and the resulting mass of customers who switch in equilibrium. Finally, we
determine the minimum value of exit costs that ensure that the proposed prices
constitute an equilibrium in pure-strategies and show that within xm, 1−xm neither
firm has a profitable deviation given the proposed equilibrium prices. Without loss
of generality, in the exposition that follows we normalize marginal costs to zero.
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First we specify the firms’ problem in period t by assuming that xt is in some
middle range, (xm, 1− xm), such that both firms poach: qij > 0. The relevant value
functions are given by:
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where
D = ((16 − 4c − 2cb)(2 − 2c − cb)− 16f)
× (2(4 − 2c − cb)(2 − 2c − cb))
Using pAnt − pBnt = a + bxt, we can derive a and b based on the optimal price








(((1− c) + ca)(2 − 2c − cb)− f(2ca+ cb)) (A.1.8)
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where F = ((16 − 4c − 2cb)(2 − 2c − cb)− 16f).
From (A.1.7) and (A.1.8) we can establish that
a = −b/2 (A.1.9)
Using pAnt = e+ fxt we can also derive e and f as functions of b:
f =
−2(2 − 2c − cb)2
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 − (2 − 2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To identify , ,  we use the prespecified quadratic functions for V A(xt) and













4(2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(
10 2(1− c)
+ 4ca− 3cb− (2 − 2c − cb)s− 4(2 − 2c − cb)xt




 +  ⋅ (1− c) + ca− a− bxt
2 − 2c − cb
+ 
(
(1− c) + ca− a− bxt
2 − 2c − cb
)2)
Rearranging and matching the terms, we obtain the expressions for  and :
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 =− b
2(2 − 2c − cb)(18 − 2c − cb) + 16b(2 − 2c − cb)2
32 ((2 − 2c − cb)2 − fb2)
(A.1.13)
 =




e (−4(2 − 2c − cb) + 4(f − b)− f(6 − 2c − cb))
4(2 − 2c − cb)
+
f (10 2(1− c) + 4ca− 3cb− (2 − 2c − cb)s)
4(2 − 2c − cb)
+
f (4(e− a)− e(6 − 2c − cb))
4(2 − 2c − cb)
+
fb
2 − 2c − cb
+
2b((1− c) + ca− a)
(2 − 2c − cb)2
Plugging  in (A.1.7) we can characterize b:
[4b(8 − 2c − cb) + 16(2 − 2c − cb)][(2 − 2c − cb)2 − fb2]
+ fb
3(18 − 2c − cb) + 16fb2(2 − 2c − cb) = 0 (A.1.15)
This equation is independent of s and if we normalize  = 1, it is equivalent
to the one in Villas-Boas (1999). 1 Following the approach in Villas-Boas’s paper,
we let y = (2 − 2c − cb)/b and rewrite (A.1.15) in terms of y. For c → 1 this
equation reduces to
2y3 + 3y2 − f = 0 (A.1.16)
For f ∈ (0, 1) the equation above has three roots in the intervals (−3/2, 1), (−1, 0)
and (0, 1/2). The appropriate solution must also satisfy the second-order conditions
1Equation A15 on pg. 626
163
for each firm, which are:
−8(2 − 2c − cb)− 2(2 − 2c − cb)2 + 8f < 0 (A.1.17)
Rewriting this expression in terms of C = (2−2c−cb), we note that the second-
order conditions are satisfied when  < (4C + C2)/(4f ). Rewriting (A.1.13) in
terms of C, we get  = −(b2C(16 +C) + 16C2b)/(32(C2− fb2)). Then, we can
show that the condition  < (4C + C2)/(4f ) converges to 2y
2 + fy − f > 0
as c → 1. Among the three possible ranges for y, the second-order conditions are
satisfied only when y ∈ (−3/2,−1). Also, y increases in f and y → −1 as f → 1.
From y ∈ (−3/2,−1) we can see that for c → 1 the coefficient b must be
negative. Furthermore, ∂b/∂c < 0, and b→ 0 as c → 1.
Using the fact that b → 0 as c → 1, it can also be seen that a, e, f, 
and  all converge to zero as well. Therefore, pnt converges to zero or marginal
cost whenever c > 0. Obtaining the results for pot, q̂ii and qij is straightforward
after substituting pint in the appropriate expressions. We just note that when c > 0,
piot(p
j




nt) = (c+  + s+ p
j
nt)/(4).
From a = b/2 and xt+1 = ((1− c) + ca+ pBnt− pAnt)/(2 − 2c− cb) we can













Since −b/(2 − 2c − cb) = y−1 and y ∈ (−3/2,−1), it is clear that convergence
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is monotonic and becomes infinitely slow when f → 1.
We now find the limits of the poaching region (xm, 1− xm) by looking for the
range of xt, within which neither firm has a profitable deviation in a price strategy
that does not attract the rival’s previous customers. Normalizing marginal cost to
zero again, consider deviations for firm A such that it does not poach (qBA = 0).
Therefore, the introductory price is given by
pAnt = arg max p
A
nt ⋅
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt − pAnt
2 − 2c − cb
+ f (A.1.19)
+ f ⋅
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt − pAnt
2 − 2c − cb
+ f
(
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt − pAnt
2 − 2c − cb
)2
The first-order condition is
(2 − 2c − cb)((1− c) + ca+ pBnt − 2pAnt)
2 − 2c − cb
(A.1.20)
− f
2 − 2c − cb
− 2f
(
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt − pAnt
2 − 2c − cb
)
= 0




2 − 2c − cb− 2f
2 (2 − 2c − cb− f)
(
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt
)
(A.1.21)
− 2 − 2c − cb
2 (2 − 2c − cb− f)
f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 (A.1.22)
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Firm A will not deviate if xt is such that the payoff from poaching is weakly
greater than the deviation payoff, i.e. V A(pAnt) ≥ V A(pAnt). After some regrouping
and canceling of common terms this inequality reduces to
(pAnt−pAnt) ⋅
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt





2 − 2c − cb
(A.1.24)
+ pAnt ⋅
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(4C − 8f)((1− c) + ca+ pBnt)− 4Cf + C2(3 − s− 4xt)






(C − 2f)((1− c) + ca+ pBnt)− Cf
2(C − 2f)
(A.1.26)
the inequality V A(pAnt) ≥ V A(pAnt) simplifies to
(4C + C2 − 4f)(pAnt)2 ≥ (4C − 4f)(pAnt)2 (A.1.27)
From the second-order conditions in (A.1.17) we can see that 4C + C2 −
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 ≥ pAnt
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4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Using pAnt = e+ fxt, (A.1.27) can be stated as
√











from which we obtain the critical value for xt such that firm A is strictly better off
engaging in poaching:
xt ≤ 1− xm =
2
(




e− C2(3 − s)
−2
(






Thus, when xt ≤ 1 − xm poaching is an equilibrium strategy for firm A and, by
symmetry, when xt ≥ xm poaching is an equilibrium strategy for firm B. As c → 1,
e→ 0 and f → 0, so 1− xm → (3 − s)/(4). Note that xm → ( + s)/(4) which
is equal to the equilibrium level of q̂AA.
We also derive an alternative expression for 1− xm because it will allow us to
sign its derivative with respect to s, which is one of the results stated in Corollary
1. First, using pBnt = e− a+ (f − b)xt = (2e+ b− bxt)/b and rewriting pAnt in terms
of C we obtain
pAnt =
C(C − 2f) + (C − 2f)(2e+ b− bxt)− 2fC
4C − 4f
(A.1.31)
Rewriting again in terms by using M = 4C − 4f
pAnt =


















C(C − 2f − 2f) + (C − 2f)(2e+ b− bxt)
M/
)
which is satisfied for
xt ≤ 1− xm =
C(C − 2f − 2f) + (C − 2f)(2e+ b)− 2We





There are two implicit assumptions used in the derivation of xm. First, in
setting up V A(pAnt) ≥ V A(pAnt) we assume that qBA(pAnt) > 0, which is true for
3−s−(e+fxt)−4xt
4
> 0. This condition is satisfied for
xt < x =
3 − s− e
4 + f
(A.1.35)
As c → 1, e → 0 and f → 0, so x → 3−s4 . Second, we assume that qBA(p
A
nt) = 0
which is true for
3−s−pAnt−4xt
4
≤ 0. Using the expression for pAnt in terms of pAnt we
obtain
xt ≥ x =
(2M + C2)(3 − s)− 2(M + C2)e
(2M + C2)4 + 2(M + C2)f
(A.1.36)
As c → 1, x→ 3−s4 . For x ≤ xt ≤ x poaching is feasible under p
A
nt and not feasible
under pAnt. Tedious algebra shows that 1 − xm ∈ (x, x) and therefore, the analysis
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above is relevant.
We now derive the minimum level of exit costs that ensures that a firm with a
relatively small market share does not have a profitable deviation in raising its price
and selling to switchers only. Suppose that in period t̂ firm A starts with xt̂ = 0
(profits from poaching are highest when the firm has no market share) and deviates






→ 0. From Lemma 1
we know that for c → 1 a firm that sets a price above the rival’s price does not




maximize profits from switchers in period t̂:
pAnt̂ = arg max p
A
nt̂ ⋅








At this price, sales to switchers equal qBA,t̂ = (3 −s)/(8) and the maximum profit












where E stands for exit costs and Π indicates the per-period level of profits within the
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poaching region, which is equal to ( + s)2/(8). We also use Π to designate profits
in the period when the market transitions from (xs, xm) to (xm, 1 − xm) because
we do not have a straightforward expression for profits when xt ∈ (xs, xm) while Π
provides an upper bound on these profits, which slightly strengthens the minimum
required value of exit costs. Comparing the payoff from a one-time deviation to the
payoff from staying on the equilibrium path we can obtain the minimum level of


















A.1.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. 1. ∂pin/∂s < 0 for c < 1 and ∂p
i
n/∂s = 0 for c = 1
We will show the proof for pAnt. Recall that p
A
nt = e + fxt and f = b/2. From
(A.1.15) we can see that b is independent of s and, therefore, f is independent
of s. Therefore, to sign ∂pAnt/∂s we need to find ∂e/∂s. Note that e is also a
function of  and the latter depends on s as well. In the proof of Proposition
1 we show that (A.1.14) and (A.1.11) jointly characterize  and e. We now
explicitly solve for  and e and differentiate the resulting expression for e with
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respect to s.2 We obtain
∂e/∂s =
(
− 4Ccb− 4Cfb+ 3fcb2 + 8C − 8cCb− 8Cc (A.1.43)




2(cb+ Cfb− fcb2 − 2C + 2cC + 2fb− 2cfb)
]
and
∂e/∂s→ −(C − fb)
4(1− f )
(A.1.44)
as c → 1. Note that C − fb > 0 since b < 0 and, therefore,∂e/∂s < 0.
In the limit ∂e/∂s→ 0, since b→ 0 and C → 0.











Since ∂e/∂s→ 0−, we conclude that for c → 1, ∂pAot/∂s > 0.
3. ∂q̂ii/∂s > 0 and q̂ii → 12 as s →  The first part of this statement is a
straightforward derivation of ∂q̂ii/∂s from (2.2.13) and using the fact that
∂e/∂s→ 0.
2The explicit solutions for  and e were found using Mathematica 7.0. We do not include these
solutions here because of their length. Files containing the exact solutions for  and e are available
upon request.
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To show that q̂ii → 12 as s →  , note that as pn → 0(or marginal cost),
q̂ii → ( + s)/4 which clearly converges to 1/2 as s→  .
4. ∂xm/∂s > 0 and xm → 12 as s→ 










b[W + (C − 2f)]
(A.1.46)
The denominator of this expression is negative because b < 0 while W > 0
and C − 2f > 0.
We will now show that for c → 1 the numerator of ∂(1− xm)/∂s is positive.


















Plugging this expression into the numerator and using ∂e/∂s → −(C −























−(M − 2W )(C − fb) + 2C2(1− f )
]
This expression is positive since M − 2W < 0 and C − fb > 0. Therefore,
the numerator of ∂(1 − xm)/∂s is positive. Combined with the fact that the
denominator is negative, we obtain that ∂(1− xm)/∂s < 0, or ∂xm/∂s > 0.
Showing that xm → 12 as s →  is a straightforward application of the result
that xm → ( + s)/(4) as c → 1.
A.1.3 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Corollary 2 states that if switching costs are sufficiently high, the no-poaching
region extends to the entire market, so the result from Proposition 2 regarding
convergence to steady state applies automatically to all xt ∈ [0, 1]. First, note that
for (x̃m, 1 − x̃m) to extend to [0, 1], it must be that q̂ii(pjnt) = 1 and no deviations
are profitable within (1− q̂BB, q̂AA). The first condition holds when
s ≥ (2 + c + 2f ) (A.1.50)
The second condition is satisfied if x = 0, or pAnt ≤ 0, or pAnt ≤ 0. First, if
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x = 0, then from (A.1.69) poaching is not feasible. In terms of s, x = 0 whenever
s ≥ s1 =
(11 + 8f )(1 + f )− 10c(1 + f )− 2c (1− 3f )
(5 + 2c )(1 + f )− 2c(3 + f )
 (A.1.51)
Second, pAnt ≤ 0 implies that poaching is not profitable so firm A will not
deviate. This condition is satisfied when
s ≥ s2 =
7(1− c)2 + f (1− c)(11− 3c) + 42f − 4(1 + f )(1− c)2xt
(1 + f )(1 + 4f + 2c )− 2c(1 + 3f )
 (A.1.52)
Finally, pAnt ≤ 0 ensures that the deviation price must be below zero in order
for firm A to attract a positive mass of switchers and this condition is satisfied when
s ≥ s3 =
1 + f − c
f
 (A.1.53)
Therefore, combining (A.1.50), (A.1.51), (A.1.52) and (A.1.53) we obtain suf-
ficient conditions for (x̃m, 1− x̃m) to cover the whole market:
s ≥ max((2 + c + 2f ),min(s1, s2, s3)) (A.1.54)
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A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The firms’ value functions within the no-poaching region were presented in





2 − 2c − cb− 2f
2(2 − 2c − cb− f)
(
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt
)
(A.1.55)
− 2 − 2c − cb





2 − 2c − cb− 2f
2(2 − 2c − cb− f)
(
(1− c)− ca− cb+ pAnt
)
(A.1.56)
− 2 − 2c − cb
2(2 − 2c − cb− f)
f
Let A = 2 − 2c− cb− 2f, B = 2 − 2c− cb− f and C = 2 − 2c− cb.















































Note that the optimal price strategies are independent of xt. Applying p
A
nt − pBnt =
a+ bxt we see that b = 0 for all c, which also leads to a = 0:














+ 0 ⋅ xt (A.1.59)
= a+ bxt (A.1.60)
From a = −2Ac
2B+A
a, we obtain that a = 0. Therefore, in equilibrium pAnt = p
B
nt.
Applying a = b = 0, we can match the expression for the optimal pAnt with
e+ fxt and identify e:
pAnt =[2B − A]−1 (A(1− c)− Cf) (A.1.61)
= e + 0 ⋅ xt
where now A = 2(1− c) + 4f, B = 2(1− c) + 2f and C = 2(1− c). Since
a = b = 0, we also have pBnt = e.
To find e, we match the coefficients in the value functions
V A(xt) = + xt + x
2
t (A.1.62)














from which we obtain  =  + s+ e and  = −2 . Substituting for  in e,
e =
(2(1− c) + 4f)(1− c)− 2(1− c)f ( + s+ e)
2(1− c)
e =
(1− c) − f (s− )
1 + f
(A.1.63)
Therefore, pAnt = p
B
nt = ((1 − c) − f (s − ))/(1 + f ) and  = ((2 + f − c) +
s)/(1 + f ). From the equality of the firms’ prices, we obtain that xt+1 = 1/2,
which is also the steady-state distribution of the market since it falls within the
no-poaching region where firms always set pAnt = p
B
nt.
Having found the optimal pnt, it is straightforward to show that indeed q̂ii >
1/2 when s > c and q̂ii = 1 when s ≥ (2 + 2f + c) since
q̂ii =




(2(1 + f )− c) + s
4(1 + f )
(A.1.65)
Hence, for s > c our conjecture that there is complete customer lock-in for some
xt close to the middle is correct.
We now find the limits of the no-poaching region, (x̃m, 1 − x̃m), which are
determined by the values of xt that guarantee that neither firm has a profitable
deviation in a strategy that involves poaching. Suppose that firm A starts period t
with a relatively low market share and considers deviating in period t by selecting
a price pAnt > 0 such that qBA(p
A
nt) > 0. From the proof of Proposition 1 we know
that when firm A intends to poach its best response function is given by (A.1.3).
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nt) =[8C + 2C
2 − 8f]−1
(
4(C − 2f)((1− c) + pBnt) (A.1.66)
− C2(4xt + s− 3)− 4Cf
)
The proposed equilibrium price for firm A is given by
pAnt(p
B
nt) = [2(C − f)]−1
(
(C − f)((1− c) + pBnt)− Cf
)
(A.1.67)





8C + 2C2 − 8f
pAnt +
C2
8C + 2C2 − 8f
(3 − s− 4xt) (A.1.68)
Note that as c → 1, C → 0 and, therefore, pAnt → pAnt - the optimal deviation price
converges to the equilibrium price and we have shown that qBA(p
A
nt) = 0. However,
when consumers are not very patient, a deviation to a poaching strategy is feasible
when qBA(p
A
nt) > 0. Defining M = 4C − 4f we can restate this requirement in
terms of (A.1.68) and identify the highest level of firm A’s market share that would
render poaching feasible:






Hence, firm A has room for deviation if x̃m < x.
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Firm A does not have a profitable deviation in poaching if V A(pAnt) ≥ V A(pAnt).




Substituting in the value of pAnt from (A.1.68), we find that firm A will not deviate
to poaching if its market share is sufficiently high:









By symmetry, we can conclude that firm B will not deviate to poaching when xt ≥
1− x̂m.
From (A.1.71) and (A.1.69) we can see that x̂m ≤ x for all pAnt ≥ 0, which
guarantees that indeed there is room for deviation within the no-poaching region
although it is not optimal to do so. Note that poaching is not feasible under pAnt < 0
because the deviation price must be at least zero, which implies that pAnt > p
A
nt and




nt) = 0. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider
deviations to poaching only when pAnt ≥ 0.
Note that if x̂m ≤ 1 − q̂BB, firm A will have no profitable deviations within
the no-poaching region. On the other hand if x̂m > 1 − q̂BB, then (x̂m, 1 − x̂m)
will define the boundaries of the no-poaching region. For this reason, we state that
x̃m = max(0, 1− q̂BB, x̂m).
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Finally, we check that the second-order conditions are satisfied for the coeffi-
cients found above:
− 2(2 − 2c − cb− f)
2 − 2c − cb
< 0 (A.1.72)
− 2(2 − 2c − f (−2))
2 − 2c
< 0
2(1− c + f )
1− c
< 0 ∀ f > 0, c > 0
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3





2 − 2c − cb− 2f
2(2 − 2c − cb− f)
(
(1− c) + ca+ pBnt
)
(A.1.73)
− 2 − 2c − cb











(4(2 − 2c − cb)− 8f)
(
(1− c)− ca− cb+ pAnt
)
+ (2 − 2c − cb)2(4xt −  − s)
− 4(2 − 2c − cb)f
]
Note that because we assume that xt+1 ∈ (x̃m, 1− x̃m), next period prices are
formed according to the affine functions that we specified for the no-poaching region.
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Therefore, we can apply a = b = 0,  = ((2 + f − c) + s)/(1 + f ),  = −2 , in





(7− 23c + 13f + 62f + 2c (11 + f ) + 2c(−8− 7f + 2f ))
2(1 + f )(5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f )
(A.1.75)
−




c (1 + 3f )− 2c(1 + 7f + 2f ))s
2(1 + f )(5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f ))
+
2(1− c)(1− c + 2f )






c4 + 4f − 2f )− 2− 2c (2− f )− 5f − 32f
)














(1 + f )(5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f )
+
4(1− c)(1− c + 2f )
5 + 22c + 6f − c(7 + 2f )
xt
We now find the range of xt such that, conditional on p
A
nt as described in
(A.1.76), firm B does not have a profitable deviation in choosing an introductory
price such that it does not attract any switchers. Let pBnt stand for the optimal
deviation price, which is given by:
pBnt =
2 − 2c − cb− 2f
2(2 − 2c − cb− f)
(
(1− c)− ca− cb+ pAnt
)
(A.1.77)
− 2 − 2c − cb
2(2 − 2c − cb− f)
f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Checking that V B(pBnt) ≥ V B(pBnt) reduces to
(M + C2)(pBnt)
2 ≥M(pBnt)2 (A.1.78)
which implies that firm B will not deviate to a no-poaching strategy if










Note that if 1−x̃s < 1−x̃m, then the region, in which B poaches in equilibrium
while A does not is defined by (1−x̃m, 1). On the other hand, if 1−x̃s > 1−x̃m, there
are no pure-strategy equilibria in (1− x̃s, 1− x̃m) – if the firms follow the strategies
prescribed in (A.1.76) and (A.1.77), B has a profitable deviation in selecting a price
such that it does not poach. If B does not poach, then A’s best response is described
by Proposition 2. However, as soon as A chooses to follow this price strategy, B has
a profitable deviation in poaching.
By similar arguments we can identify an equilibrium in the case xt ∈ (0, x̃m),
where firm A has a profitable deviation in poaching.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. The set-up of the problem is identical to the one discussed in Section 2.3.1 of
Chapter 2. Recall that the firms’ optimal price strategies are expected to depend on
the state variable, xt, and we defined the firms’ price strategies and value functions
as affine and quadratic functions in xt, respectively. In the Proof of Proposition 1 in
Appendix A, where we have shown that the undetermined coefficients characterizing
these functions, a, e, f,  and  converge to zero as c → 1 and the firms’ optimal
price strategies become independent of the market share. In the limit, c = 1, we
have that a = b = 0, which immediately implies that pAnt = p
B
nt regardless of the
current distribution of the market. From e = f = 0, we also see that pAnt = p
B
nt = 0,
or marginal cost if c > 0. Throughout the rest of the proof I assume that marginal
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cost is positive so that pAn = p
B
n = c.
At this point we assume that in case of a tie the market is evenly split. Since
prices are independent of market share, the equilibrium where pAn = p
B
n = c and
xt = 1/2 is a steady state. In addition, from the Proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix
A we have that in steady state:
piot(p
j





























To show that neither firm has a profitable deviation from the proposed equi-
librium price, pnt = c, we need the two lemmas stated in the text to describe market
dynamics when c = 1.
∙ Lemma 1: Competition for newcomers intensifies as consumers become more
patient. As a result, pin and p
i
o fall as c goes up.




(1− c) + ca+ pBnt − pAnt






2 − 2c − cb
(B.1.6)
Let w = 1/(2 − 2c − cb) indicate the weight of the price differential on
the location of the marginal consumers, xt+1. On the equilibrium path b ≤ 0
and ∂b/∂c < 0, so ∂w/∂c > 0 - as consumer patience increases, the marginal
newcomer becomes more sensitive to the difference between the introductory
prices offered today. As a result, pn goes down. Since po is increasing in the
rival’s pn, as introductory prices fall, regular prices fall as well.
∙ Lemma 2: When c = 1, demand from newcomers is perfectly elastic.







this equilibrium price as p and consider a deviation price pAnt for firm A. The
marginal newcomer will either switch next period or will stay with the current
supplier. In both cases her consumption expenditure in the second period will
be at least as high as the expenditure from switching. For example, if she
purchases from firm A in her first period she will switch if p+ (1− x) + s <
p + x. If the consumer stays, she will be the marginal stayer and will be
offered a price such that she is just indifferent between switching and staying:
p + (1 − x) + s = p + x. In either case, in her second period the marginal
consumer will spend at least p + (1 − x) + s if she first purchases from A
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and p + x + s if she purchases from B. Hence, a newcomer located at x will
purchase from A if:
pAnt + x+ (p+ (1− x) + s) ≤ p+ x+ (p+ x+ s)
pAnt ≤ p
It is clear that for pAnt > p, the inequality above cannot be satisfied for any
x. Therefore, if A deviates to a price above the proposed equilibrium price,
p, it will make no sales to newcomers. Similarly, if firm A offers a price below
p it will capture the entire market of newcomers. Hence, newcomers’ demand
becomes perfectly elastic when consumers are infinitely patient.
Exit Costs
Lemma 2 shows that if one firm deviates by raising its price above marginal
cost, it forgoes sales to newcomers and starts next period with no market share.
The only incentive for a firm to raise its price is to maximize profits from switchers.
Profits from switchers would be greatest when the firm starts the period with no
market share because of the higher mass of potential switchers.
Suppose that in period t̂ firm A starts with xt̂ = 0 and deviates from the






→ 0. From Lemma 2 we see





maximize profits from switchers in period t̂:
pAnt̂ = arg max p
A
nt̂ ⋅








At this price, sales to switchers equal qBA,t̂ = (3 −s)/(8) and the maximum profit












where E stands for exit costs (to be incurred at the end of the period in which the
firm makes no sales to newcomers) and Π indicates the per-period level of profits
within the poaching region, which is equal to ( + s)2/(8). Comparing the payoff
from a one-time deviation to the payoff from staying on the equilibrium path we can
obtain the minimum level of exit costs that guarantees that firm A has no profitable


















As long as E ≥ E firm A does not have a profitable deviation in raising its price
above marginal cost. The same argument goes for firm B.
Next, consider a deviation such that firm A undercuts the rival by setting
a price just below marginal cost. Note from (B.1.2) that at pn = c, the optimal
mass of loyal customers for each firm, q̂ii(p
j
nt = c) =
+s
4
, does not exceed one half
since we specified that s ≤  . Therefore, capturing the full market of newcomers
in the preceding period brings no additional gains since neither firm keeps more
than half of the market. In addition, sales to switchers are profit-neutral as well
(price equals marginal cost), implying that neither firm can derive additional gains
from undercutting the rival. Hence, the firms do not have a profitable deviation in
lowering pn below cost.
From the arguments above it also becomes clear that any sharing rule can
ensure a pure strategy equilibrium at marginal cost as long as the firms capture
their respective segments of loyal customers.
B.1.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. From a = b/2 and xt+1 = ((1− c) + ca + pBnt − pAnt)/(2 − 2c − cb) we













Since −b/(2 − 2c − cb) = y−1 and y ∈ (−3/2,−1), convergence is monotonic
and becomes infinitely slow when f → 1.
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For c = 1, b = f = 0, which implies that firms’ introductory prices are inde-
pendent of market share and equal to each other (a = b = 0) – hence, convergence
to xt+1 = 1/2 occurs in just one period starting from any initial distribution of the
market, xt.
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. (a) From Lemma 2 we see that the demand from newcomers is perfectly
elastic. Therefore, firm i can capture the entire market of newcomers by un-
dercutting, i.e. setting pi∗nt = p
j




from undercutting is strictly higher than the payoff from matching the rival’s
price because sales to newcomers double, the profit margin on newcomers is pos-
itive and the corresponding loss of revenue from sales to switchers is negligible
as  → 0. The payoff from matching the rival’s price is also higher than the
payoff from exceeding it because the latter strategy results in sales to switchers
only and the presence of exit costs as outlined in Proposition 1 ensures that
this strategy is strictly dominated. Finally, note that firm i may also choose to
undercut by more than  if pjnt exceeds the price that maximizes i’s joint profits
from newcomers and switchers.
(b) First note that when pjnt ≤ ci undercutting is costly for firm i and capturing mar-
ket share beyond firm i’s loyal customer segment has no future value. Therefore,
undercutting will yield a strictly lower payoff than matching the rival’s price.
Furthermore, when pjnt is sufficiently low, the payoff from investing in market
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share falls below the payoff from targeting switchers only at a price above cost.
Therefore, firm i will raise its price above the rival’s when pjnt is sufficiently low.
B.1.4 Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. We define pi as the break-even price that yields firm i indifferent between
competing in the newcomers market, in which case it sells to both newcomers and
switchers, and targeting switchers only. The decision not to sell to newcomers takes
into account the forgone profits from loyal customers next period, the exit costs to
be incurred at the end of the current period and the possibly lower per-generation
profits next period due to starting with no market share. If the market price falls
below pi, firm i is better off targeting switchers only because the investment in
market share would exceed the returns. Thus, pi represents the minimum price at
which firm i would be willing to sell to newcomers.
(a) By the definition of pi, when pi ≤ pjnt firm i will compete for market share. Thus,
it will either match or undercut the rival’s price. By Lemma 3 undercutting is




(b) Similarly, when pi > pjnt firm i realizes a higher payoff if it targets switchers
only, which entails setting pint > c
i (for sales to switchers to be profitable).
Together with ci ≥ pjnt, we obtain that pi∗nt > p
j
nt. Note that even if c
i is high
enough to raise pi such as to suppress demand from switchers (qji = 0 when
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pint ≥ cj +  − s), firm i is still strictly better off setting pint > p
j
nt, in which case
it makes no sales to new customers.
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2




n, we will first derive conditions, under which
firm A does not have a profitable deviation from the proposed equilibrium.




n = c, which is less than c̃, firm A has no profitable
deviation in undercutting firm B’s price as established in part (b) of Lemma
3. The only possible profitable deviation for firm A would be to raise its price
above cost, which would imply that it makes no sales to newcomers (Lemma
2). Therefore, it will set pAnt with the objective of maximizing profits from
switchers in the current period. Note that at this point the minimum level of
exit costs, E is not sufficient to deter A from targeting switchers only because
the payoff from investing in market share is lower than the one used in (B.1.11)
to derive E. Under cost asymmetry, firm A’s demand from switchers is given
by qBA(p
A
nt) = ( − s− pAnt + c)/(4). Since xt = 1/2, firm A cannot induce all
of firm B’s previous customers to switch unless it lowers its price below c − s,
which is clearly not profitable. Therefore, the price that would maximize profits
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from switchers, is given by
max (pAnt − c̃) ⋅




 − s+ c+ c̃
2
(B.1.15)
from which it can be seen that firm A’s optimal price that targets switchers only
is greater than the rival’s current price, p∗n.
If firm A sets pAnt = p
∗
n, it will capture half of the newcomers market because
pAnt = p
B
nt, but it will also sell at a price below cost to both newcomers and
switchers. However, if Δc is not too high, firm A will recuperate some of these
losses next period when it sells to the loyal customers attracted today. On the
other hand, if firm A sets pAnt > p
B
nt, it will make no sales to newcomers, will
forgo profits from loyal customers next period and will incur exit costs at the end
of period t. Since the loss per unit sold to new customers and the maximum
profit from targeting switchers only depend on Δc, we can find the highest
cost differential, within which firm A’s stream of profits from matching B’s
price and investing in market share is higher than its stream of profits if selling
to switchers only. Since we assume the shock lasts one period only and this is
common knowledge, both firms know that they will start next period with equal
marginal cost. Therefore, pAnt+1 = p
B
nt+1 = c and firm A’s profit from investing
in market share today equals its steady-state level of profit: Π̄ = ( + s)2/(8).
In period t+ 1 the market goes back to equilibrium so we only need to analyze






nt = c weakly dominates the payoff from targeting switchers.
Π(pAnt = p
B
nt) ≥ Π(pAnt > pBnt) (B.1.16)

























where ( − s+ c− c̃)/(8) is the profit-maximizing level of sales to switchers.
At pAnt = p
B
nt = c firm A’s sales to switchers are given by qBA = ( − s)/(4) as
stated in Proposition 1. At pAnt = ( − s + c + c̃)/2, demand from switchers is





















 − s+ c− c̃
8
)
and can be rewritten as
(c̃− c)2 + 2(5 − s)(c̃− c)− 2f ( + s)2 − 16E + ( − s)2 ≤ 0 (B.1.19)
Using Δc = c̃− c, the positive root of (B.1.19) is given by
Δc1 =
√
(5 − s)2 + 2f ( + s)2 + 16E − ( − s)2 − (5 − s) (B.1.20)
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and the inequality from (B.1.18) is satisfied for Δc ∈ [0,Δc1]. Therefore, for
Δc ≤ Δc1, the payoff from maintaining pAnt = pBnt = c weakly dominates the
payoff from targeting switchers only by setting pAnt > p
B
nt.















and is satisfied for










Therefore, we have established that for Δc ≤ Δc where Δc = Δc1 if Δc <  − s
and Δc = Δc2 if Δc ≥  − s, firm A does not have an incentive to deviate
to a higher introductory price despite its higher marginal cost. Proposition 1
has established that firm B does not have a profitable deviation when pAnt = c,
either, so pAnt = p
B
nt = c is indeed an equilibrium in pure strategies.
The rest of the statements in part (a) follow immediately since pAnt = p
B
nt =
p∗n = c. I only note that firm A’s price to loyal customers adjusts upwards to
reflect the firm’s higher marginal cost; as a result, its loyal customers segment
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Finally, I note that the pure-strategy equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is
not unique. Any pair of prices such that pAnt = p
B
nt = p and p ∈ [pA, c] would
constitute a Nash equilibrium in period t and a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the subgame from period t onwards. Whenever pAnt is below cost, by Lemma
4 firm B’s best response is to match A’s price as long as the cost of acquiring
market share by selling below marginal cost does not exceed the future profits
that can be derived from it. Similarly, if pBnt is below cost, firm A’s best response
is to match B’s price until the profits from market share are exhausted. Since
A’s profits from future market share are smaller and its break-even price higher,
pA determines the lowest price level, at which a tie would constitute a Nash
equilibrium.
(b) To prove this part of the proposition I will use the concept of a break-even price
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as defined in Lemma 4 to show that firm A does not have profitable deviations
away from the proposed equilibrium (part (i) below).
Part (a) of Lemma 4 states that firm A will match firm B’s price as long as pBnt
is at or above firm A’s break-even price, pA. Note that we can use the proof
in part (a) of this proposition to derive pA. We can express pA in terms of the
maximum loss per unit sold to a new customer that firm A is willing to incur
in order to capture market share. We derived Δc as the maximum difference
between firm A’s cost and the rival’s offer, pBnt = c, such that firm A competes
for newcomers. Therefore, firm A’s break-even price can be stated in terms of
the maximum difference between firm A’s cost and the rival’s offer, pBnt = c,
such that firm A competes for newcomers. Therefore, firm A’s break-even price
can be stated as:
pA = c̃−Δc (B.1.25)
From part (b) of Lemma 4 we know that if pBnt is below p
A, firm A will not lower
its price any further and will forgo profits from market share. In particular,
firm A’s best response is to set a price that maximize profits from switchers.
Indicate this price by p̂A > c̃ and suppose that firm A deviates from the steady-
state equilibrium pAnt = p
B
nt = c by raising its price to p̂
A. Then, firm B has an
incentive to raise its price to some level above its own marginal cost but below
p̂A, because it can still capture the entire market of newcomers and can sell to
new customers at a price above cost. Let firm B’s best response to pAnt = p̂
A be
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given by pB∗nt (p̂
A) = p̂A − , where  ∈ (0, p̂A − c).
If pB∗nt (p̂
A) > c̃, by part (a) of Lemma 3 firm A has an incentive to undercut B’s
price. If pB∗nt (p̂
A) ≤ c̃ by part (a) of 4 firm A would match B’s price. Similarly,
since A’s price is above B’s marginal cost, B has an incentive to undercut as
well, and as a result the introductory price drops to pA. At this point, firm A
sets pA and does not have an incentive to undercut B’s price, while B settles at
pBnt < p
A and captures the entire market of newcomers. However, at pBnt < p
A,
firm Amay have an incentive to raise its price to p̂A again, which triggers another
round of undercutting. Therefore, without imposing additional conditions on
pA, there will be no equilibrium in pure strategies when c̃− c > Δc.
Suppose that (pAnt, p
B
nt) = (p
A, pA−) and let c̃ > −s+c. Therefore, qBA(pAnt =
c̃) = 0 – firm A cannot sell to switchers at a profit and therefore targeting
switchers with any price above c̃ is not a profitable deviation. Note, however,
that qBA(p
A) may still be positive, so firm A would be selling to switchers at a
price below cost if it maintains pAnt = p
A. Therefore, it would have a profitable
deviation in raising its price to at least c̃ to avoid costly sales to switchers.
Then, firm B would also raise its price to just below A’s price and a round of
undercutting will follow again. However, firm A will have no profitable deviation
if qBA(p
A) = 0, which is true for
pA ≥  − s+ c (B.1.26)
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Using (B.1.25), we can rewrite the above condition as
c̃−Δc ≥ Δc =  − s+ c (B.1.27)
which produces
c̃− c ≥ Δc+  − s (B.1.28)
Therefore, we have derived a sufficient condition to ensure that at (pAnt, p
B
nt) =
(pA, pA − ), firm A has no profitable deviation.
So far we have shown that when Δc > Δc, firm A’s best response to a price
at or below pA is to set pA itself. On the other hand, firm B’s best response
to pAnt = p
A is given by min(p̂B, pA − ), where p̂B is the price that would
optimize firm B’s profits from new customers, conditional on being below A’s




A,min(p̂B, pA − )), where → 0.
Profits:
The result that ΠB,t > Π
∗ follows immediately by noting that pA > p∗n, p
B
ot >
p∗o, qBB,t > q̂
∗
BB and q1B = 1: firm B realizes higher profits on both loyal
and new customers. Specifically, B’s profit from loyal customers is given by
( + s+ pA − c)2/(8) for → 0, which is greater than its steady-state profit of
1p̂Bnt+1 = arg max(p̂
B







( + s)2/(8) since pA > c. Next period, the market goes back to steady state
so pAnt = p
B
nt = c, implying that ΠB,t+1 = Π
∗
Firm A’s profit from loyal customers in period t is given by ΠA,t = ( +s+p
A−
c̃)2/(8) for → 0, which is less than its steady-state profit from loyal customers
since pA < c̃. Also, ΠA,t+1 < Π
∗ follows from the fact that in period t firm A
makes no sales to newcomers and does not have loyal customers in period t+ 1,
hence ΠA,t+1 = 0.
B.1.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (a) When Δc ≤ Δc we see from Proposition 2 that pAn,2 = pBn,2 = c where
(pAn,2, p
B
n,2) are the two firms’ prices to new customers in period 2. Firm B’s
optimal market share in period 2 is unchanged, q̂BB,2 = q
∗
BB, so any distribution
of the market at time 1 that allows firm B to capture newcomers in the range
(q̂BB,2, 1), i.e. its future loyal customers, will bring in the same profit in period
2. Let (pAn,1, pn, 1
B) indicate the two firms’ introductory prices in period 1.
Suppose that pAn,1 = p
B
n,1 = c and the market sharing rule is such that B captures
all newcomers in (1− qBB,2). Firm B does not have a profitable deviation away
from pBn,1 = c because undercutting is costly without bringing in additional
revenues, and setting a higher price forgoes next-period profits altogether.




n,1 = c. For
the same reasons as firm B, firm A does not have a strictly profitable deviation
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in raising its price. Also, firm A does not have a profitable deviation in lowering
its price if it can capture all newcomers in the range (0, 1 − qBB,2). Under a
price tie, a market sharing rule that allows firm A to sell to newcomers located
within (0, 1 − q̂BB,1) is crucial to finding a pure-strategy equilibrium because
it ensures that firm A will face no demand from switchers in period 2 when it
sells below cost. If, instead, the current price strategy led to a distribution of
the market such that x2 < q̂BB,2, then firm A would have a profitable deviation
in undercutting in order to capture the full market and avoid costly sales to
switchers next period. Hence, under a market sharing rule that splits the market




n,1 = c constitutes a Nash equilibrium in
period 1.
By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2, any price strategy pair
such that pAn,1 = p
B
n,1 = p < c and p is sufficiently close to marginal cost, would
also constitute a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in period 1. I limit attention




(b) From Proposition 2 we see that a large shock in period 2 implies higher profits
from loyal customers for firm B (because the rival’s introductory price is higher
and ∂pBo /∂p
A
n > 0) and also a larger loyal customer segment, q̂BB,2 > q̂
∗
BB. On
the other hand, firm A’s profits from loyal customers will be lower, and its
optimal market share, q̂AA,2, will be lower as well (and possibly zero if the cost
shock is very large).
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Consider again pAn,1 = p
B
n,1 = c and suppose that q̂AA,2 + q̂BB,2 ≤ 1. Under
the same sharing rule and arguments used in part (a), pAn,1 = p
B
n,1 = c is a
Nash equilibrium in period 1 as long as the firms split the market such that
x2 = 1−q̂BB,2. As long as A and B capture their future loyal customer segments,
q̂AA,2 and q̂BB,2 respectively, while firm A also captures all customers in the range
(q̂AA,2, 1− q̂BB,2), then neither firm has an incentive to undercut or to raise its
price above the rival’s price.
The key condition here is that the firms’ loyal customer segments do not overlap,
i.e. it is necessary that q̂AA,2 + q̂BB,2 ≤ 1. We can now show that this condition
is always satisfied. Recall from Proposition 2 that firm B’s equilibrium price in
period 2 is given by p∗n < p
B
n,2 < p
A where pA is firm A’s break-even price while
p∗n is the price that optimizes firm B’s profits from switchers and newcomers in
period 2 and is bounded below by c. Consider the upper bound of pBn,2: p
A. By
plugging this equilibrium price in (3.2.13) and (3.2.14) to replace pBnt and p
A
nt,
respectively, and using c̃ to designate firm A’s marginal cost in period 2, we can









 + s+ pA − c
4
(B.1.30)
We can rewrite q̂AA,2 + q̂BB,2 as:
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q̂AA,2 + q̂BB,2 =



















The first term above is equal to the firms’ optimal market share in steady state,
q∗ii, from Proposition 1. Therefore, we can rewrite








which is always less than one because q∗ii ≤ 1/2 since s ≤  while Δc and Δc are
positive. Note that q̂AA,2 + q̂BB,2 ≤ 1 is valid for any equilibrium introductory
price below pA because q̂ii,2 in increasing in p
j
n,2.
Similar to part (a), any price strategy pair such that pAn,0 = p
B
n,0 = p < c and p
is sufficiently close to marginal cost, would also constitute a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in period 0. Note that the lower bound on the price that would be
a Nash equilibrium is constrained by the lowest price that firm A will accept
to maintain because its future profits from market share are smaller. Hence,
the range [p, c], within which identical prices constitute an equilibrium, is much
smaller and can be the empty space if firm A does not retain any loyal customers
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in period 1 (plausible if the cost shock is very large).
From the modification of the sharing rule, x1 = 1− q̂BB,1 when pAn = pBn , it is
clear that next period firm A will face no demand from switchers. As a result, firm
A has no profitable deviation when it is outbid at pBn,1 = p
A − . Recall from the
proof of Proposition 2 that we had to derive Δc ≥ Δc as a necessary condition to
ensure that firm A faces no demand from switchers at pAn,1 = p
A and a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists. Now that the shock is anticipated, the equilibrium distribution
of the market in the period preceding the shock guarantees that qBA,1 = 0 and the
equilibrium in part (b) of Proposition 2 applies as soon as Δc > Δc. Hence, we
can state that Δc ≡ Δc and conclude that in period 1, there exists a pure strategy
equilibrium for all values of the cost shock.
B.1.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof is a straightforward result of Propositions 2 and 3. Define the
strategic cost of information sharing for firm B as the net present value of the
benefits that it will forgo as a result of revealing information to its rival when the
latter has revealed information as well. Conditional on firm A’s cost shock being
small, i.e. Δc ≤ Δc, Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate that firm B does not realize
higher profits in period 1 (pBn,1 = p
∗




n) upon exposing firm
A to a higher risk of default by withholding information. On the other hand, firm
B realizes strictly higher profits when firm A’s cost of funds is sufficiently high,
Δc > Δc, since firm B sells at a price above cost to all new customers in period
204
2 and also generates higher profits from loyal customers. These profits are not
competed away in period 1 as demonstrated by Proposition 3.
B.1.8 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. To sign the derivative of Δc with respect to s, we need to modify the expres-
sion for Δc from (B.1.18) to reflect the fact that in period 2 firm A faces no demand
from switchers. Therefore, we rewrite (B.1.18) as:
F (Δc) = (−Δc)(1
2

























= 0 and (B.1.36) becomes:





+ E = 0 (B.1.37)
I apply the Implicit Function Theorem with respect to (B.1.36) to obtain
∂Δc/∂s and ∂Δc/∂ :
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8( 2 − s2)
32 2
(B.1.45)
≥ 0 since s ≤  (B.1.46)
We can also obtain the cross-partial derivatives:







Table B.1: Variable Definitions.
Variable Name Definition
age traders’s age
capital =1 if the trader operates in the capital city, 0 otherwise
categ firm category; =1 if wholesaler, =2 if semi-wholesaler;
=3 if retailer with a fixed point of sale; =4 if retailer without
a fixed points of sale; =5 if assembler for the manufacturing sector;
=6 if assembler for the own purposes
discuss prices =1 if the trader shares information about (input or output) prices
at least once a month, 0 otherwise
discuss suppliers =1 if the trader shares information about supplier quality
at least once a month, 0 otherwise
HS education educational level of the trader; =1 if trader has at least high-school
education, 0 otherwise
family members =0 if the respondent has no family members with salary jobs; =1 if 1− 2
with jobs family members with jobs; = 2 if > 2 family members with jobs
firm age age of the firm: =1 if < 5 years, =2 if 5− 10 years, =3 if > 10 years
main product main product traded: 1-rice, 2-tapioca, 3-corn, 4-beans, 5-sweet potatoes,
6-peanuts
product processing =1 if the trader processes the product as a secondary activity, 0 otherwise
region geographic region: 1-Tana Hauts Plateaux, 2-Vakinankaratra,
3-Fianar Hauts Plateaux, 4-Fianar Côte et falaise, 5-Majunga Plaines,
6-Majunga Hauts Plateaux
sex =1 if trader is male, 0 otherwise
sizecat firm size category: =1 if small, =2 if medium, =3 if large
shares info =1 if the trader shares information about delinquent customers
at least once a month, 0 otherwise
strong competition =1 if the trader perceives the level of competition as strong, 0 otherwise
telephone access =1 if the trader has access to a telephone, 0 otherwise
traders known # other traders the respondent knows personally; =1 if the trader knows
< 4 traders, =2 if 4− 9 traders, and =3 if 10 or more traders
Table B.2: Liquidity Scores Components.
Liquidity Dummy Variables Liquidity
Specification Used Score (LS) Range
LS 1
can borrow from friends/family
0 to 5
has 1− 3 family members/friends to borrow from
has > 3 family members/friends to borrow from
has 1− 2 family members with jobs






has another source of income
has overdraft facility
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Table B.3: Frequency distribution of Own Liquidity Score 1.
LS 1 Freq. Percent Cum.
0 5 1.63 1.63
1 16 5.21 6.84
2 82 26.71 33.55
3 90 29.32 62.87
4 82 26.71 89.58
5 32 10.42 100.00
Total 307 100
Table B.4: Frequency distribution of Own Liquidity Score 2.
LS 2 Freq. Percent Cum.
0 81 26.56 26.56
1 114 37.38 63.93
2 83 27.21 91.15
3 27 8.85 100.00
Total 305 100
Table B.5: Frequency distribution of Average Liquidity Scores.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Avg. Liq. Score 1 299 3.031 .352 1.5 4 3.018
Avg. Liq. Score 2 299 1.156 .320 0 3 1.222
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Table B.6: Summary Statistics. IS stands for information sharing. Significance level
of differences in means across the two samples are indicated as follows: *** indicate
significance at the 1% level, ** – significance at the 5% level, and * – significance
at the 10% level.
All No IS IS
Variable Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Information sharing (IS) 0.132 304 0 264 1 40
Age 38.96 300 38.96 260 39.86 40
Sex 0.587 300 0.585 260 0.6 40
HS education 0.046 304 0.042 264 0.075 40
Wholesaler 0.267 303 0.274 263 0.225 40
Semi-wholesaler 0.125 303 0.125 263 0.125 40
Retailer w/ fixed selling point 0.436 303 0.418 263 0.55 40
Retailer w/o fixed selling point 0.036 303 0.042 263 0 40
Assembler manufacturing 0.026 303 0.027 263 0.025 40
Assembler private use 0.106 303 0.11 263 0.075 40
Assembler hired 0.003 303 0.004 263 0 40
Firm age: < 5 yrs 0.322 304 0.333 264 0.25 40
Firm age: 5− 10 yrs 0.497 304 0.492 264 0.525 40
Firm age: > 10 yrs 0.181 304 0.174 264 0.225 40
Main Product: Rice 0.75 304 0.784 264 0.525 40 ***
Main Product: Tapioca 0.046 304 0.045 264 0.05 40
Main Product: Corn 0.016 304 0.015 264 0.025 40
Main Product: Beans 0.118 304 0.102 264 0.225 40 *
Main Product: Potatoes 0.026 304 0.023 264 0.05 40
Main Product: Peanuts 0.043 304 0.03 264 0.125 40 **
Traders known: < 4 0.08 303 0.072 263 0.1 40
Traders known: 4− 9 0.396 303 0.384 263 0.475 40
Traders known: > 9 0.528 303 0.544 263 0.425 40
Small firm 0.15 301 0.169 261 0.025 40 *
Medium-sized firm 0.342 301 0.326 261 0.45 40
Large firm 0.508 301 0.506 261 0.525 40
Capital region 0.214 304 0.2 264 0.325 40
Region:
Tana Hauts Plateaux 0.248 303 0.232 263 0.35 40
Vakinankaratra 0.274 303 0.289 263 0.175 40
Fianar Hauts Plateaux 0.281 303 0.278 263 0.3 40
Fianar Cte et falaise 0.149 303 0.144 263 0.175 40
Majunga Plaines 0.013 303 0.015 263 0 40
Majunga Hauts Plateaux 0.036 303 0.042 263 0 40
Telephone access 0.508 303 0.513 263 0.475 40
Discusses suppliers 0.244 303 0.205 263 0.5 40 ***
Discusses prices 0.322 304 0.25 264 0.8 40 ***
Processing products 0.083 303 0.087 263 0.05 40
% sales to reg. customers 36.753 304 37.682 264 30.625 40
% credit sales 30.987 304 31.64 264 26.675 40
Strong competition 0.759 303 0.745 263 0.85 40
Liquidity score 1 3.049 304 3.011 264 3.3 40


















log(% of sales to regular clients)
product processing
Additional controls




Table B.8: Determinants of Competition Intensity. Probit estimates; the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the trader reports strong market competition. All
regressions control for the market and demographic characteristics listed in Table
B.7. Coefficients reported, robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicate
significance at the 1% level, ** – significance at the 5% level, and * – significance
at the 10% level.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Strong Competition
HS education -1.285*** -1.309*** -1.299*** -1.278*** -1.249*** -1.339*** -1.450***
(0.434) (0.430) (0.437) (0.417) (0.451) (0.431) (0.433)
Processing -0.629 -0.629 -0.633 -0.619 -0.552 -0.723* -0.693
(0.422) (0.423) (0.426) (0.421) (0.418) (0.438) (0.437)
Log(sales to -0.409** -0.373** -0.408** -0.421** -0.396** -0.441*** -0.435**
regular customers) (0.165) (0.184) (0.165) (0.167) (0.162) (0.169) (0.194)
Log(% credit sales) -0.071 -0.048
(0.175) (0.179)
Discuss prices -0.027 0.016
(0.244) (0.254)
Discuss suppliers 0.018 -0.099
(0.253) (0.279)
Liquidity Score 1 = 2 -0.933* -0.926*
(0.531) (0.476)
Liquidity Score 1 = 3 -1.111** -1.194***
(0.510) (0.445)
Liquidity Score 1 = 4 -0.964* -1.013**
(0.536) (0.491)
Liquidity Score 1 = 5 -0.821 -0.794
(0.565) (0.520)
Liquidity Score 2 = 1 -0.216
(0.275)
Liquidity Score 2 = 2 0.141
(0.332)
Liquidity Score 2 = 3 -0.314
(0.385)
6− 10 competitors -0.358 -0.605
(0.405) (0.423)
11− 15 competitors 0.390 0.029
(0.979) (0.868)
> 15 competitors 0.455 0.322
(0.687) (0.669)
Unknown # competitors -0.127 -0.190
(0.246) (0.253)
Observations 273 273 271 273 272 273 271
2 69.14 71.02 71.61 77.80 73.33 71.74 83.83
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Table B.9: Probit estimates. All regressions control for the market and demographic
characteristics listed in Table B.7. Coefficients reported, robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** indicate significance at the 1% level, ** – significance at the 5%
level, and * – significance at the 10% level.
Dep. Var.: IS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strong Competition 0.478* 0.794** 0.789* 0.767* 0.925** 0.804**
(0.280) (0.388) (0.428) (0.415) (0.385) (0.400)
Semi-wholesaler 0.507 1.160** 1.401** 1.304** 1.338** 0.723
(0.375) (0.545) (0.601) (0.604) (0.591) (0.575)
Retailer with 0.810*** 1.105** 1.392*** 1.361** 1.565*** 0.596
fixed selling point (0.306) (0.520) (0.539) (0.617) (0.588) (0.536)
Assembler manufacturing 0.674 -0.094 -0.326 0.207 0.232 -0.171
(0.589) (0.881) (0.888) (0.990) (0.891) (0.936)
Assembler individual 0.414 0.797 1.185* 1.178 1.398* 0.396
(0.419) (0.663) (0.646) (0.764) (0.747) (0.705)
Firm Age: 5− 10 yrs 0.469 0.745* 0.682 0.825* 0.654 0.694
(0.295) (0.425) (0.443) (0.447) (0.421) (0.434)
Firm Age: > 10 yrs 0.304 0.538 0.404 0.352 0.684 0.640
(0.334) (0.446) (0.452) (0.430) (0.463) (0.451)
Medium-sized firm 1.456*** 2.232*** 2.381*** 2.732*** 2.396*** 2.309***
(0.533) (0.656) (0.633) (0.655) (0.615) (0.675)
Large firm 1.073** 1.793*** 2.056*** 2.149*** 1.852*** 1.769**
(0.520) (0.674) (0.672) (0.632) (0.627) (0.690)
4− 9 traders known -0.338 -0.198 -0.123 -0.168 -0.068 -0.275
(0.447) (0.479) (0.444) (0.587) (0.527) (0.490)
> 9 traders known -0.392 -0.863 -0.798* -0.738 -0.842 -0.979*
(0.448) (0.530) (0.481) (0.616) (0.609) (0.563)
Capital region 0.048 1.329 1.648* 2.097* 1.313 1.527
(0.553) (0.900) (0.979) (1.113) (0.966) (0.931)
Telephone access -0.322 -0.366 -0.423 -0.379 -0.345 -0.381
(0.273) (0.304) (0.303) (0.356) (0.324) (0.313)
Processing 0.599 0.897 0.974 0.683 0.504
(0.717) (0.689) (0.828) (0.750) (0.788)
Log(% sales to -0.417 -0.281 -0.522* -0.697** -0.540*
regular customers) (0.276) (0.290) (0.306) (0.306) (0.288)
Discuss prices 2.050*** 2.168*** 2.346*** 2.291*** 2.090***
(0.369) (0.394) (0.406) (0.388) (0.382)
Discuss suppliers 0.223 0.375 0.320 0.174 0.251
(0.338) (0.331) (0.364) (0.346) (0.335)
Log(% credit sales) 0.226 0.038 0.208 0.465 0.378
(0.262) (0.260) (0.259) (0.301) (0.279)
Liquidity Controls:
Own Liq. Score 1 Y
Own Liq. Score 2 Y
Avg. Liq. Score 1 Y
Avg. Liq. Score 2 Y
Observations 277 253 253 253 253 253
2 39.75 99.76 125.46 111.20 93.84 98.91
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Table B.10: Probit estimates of the probability of sharing information using Liquid-
ity Score 1. All regressions control for the market and demographic characteristics
listed in Table B.7. Coefficients reported, robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** indicate significance at the 1% level, ** – significance at the 5% level, and * –
significance at the 10% level.
Dep. Var.: IS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
Own Liq. Score 1 = 2 -0.911** -0.953** -0.853* -1.152** -1.001** -1.075** -1.026*
(0.437) (0.427) (0.439) (0.458) (0.490) (0.526) (0.573)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 3 -0.007 -0.011 0.074 -0.281 0.028 0.078 -0.041
(0.425) (0.421) (0.427) (0.457) (0.474) (0.514) (0.612)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 4 -0.491 -0.489 -0.425 -0.764 -0.214 -0.162 0.124
(0.465) (0.457) (0.462) (0.502) (0.538) (0.569) (0.623)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 5 0.082 0.101 0.123 -0.165 0.757 0.853 0.785
(0.495) (0.494) (0.495) (0.512) (0.523) (0.590) (0.664)
Observations 279 279 279 254 279 254 198
2 59.70 59.76 61.45 65.58 106.38 125.90 103.28
Panel B
Own Liq. Score 2 = 1 0.163 0.181 0.192 0.264 -0.553 -0.378 -1.016**
(0.285) (0.277) (0.281) (0.281) (0.415) (0.416) (0.472)
Own Liq. Score 2 = 2 0.813** 0.825** 0.796** 0.907*** 0.719 0.798* 0.499
(0.339) (0.331) (0.339) (0.329) (0.440) (0.434) (0.548)
Own Liq. Score 2 = 3 0.912** 0.925** 0.967** 1.092** 0.826 1.122* 0.548
(0.463) (0.458) (0.464) (0.486) (0.564) (0.597) (0.725)
Observations 278 278 278 253 278 253 198
2 48.54 47.59 48.83 59.15 93.93 111.20 100.37
Panel C
Own Liq. Score 1 > 2 0.553** 0.575** 0.576** 0.478* 0.812*** 0.887*** 0.887***
(0.256) (0.258) (0.254) (0.276) (0.306) (0.319) (0.331)
Observations 279 279 279 254 279 254 198
2 44.73 43.84 47.90 51.41 96.89 112.51 89.70
Panel D
Own Liq. Score 2 > 1 0.725*** 0.725*** 0.706*** 0.764*** 1.039*** 1.105*** 1.103***
(0.250) (0.249) (0.251) (0.258) (0.345) (0.331) (0.418)
Observations 279 279 279 254 279 254 198
2 47.88 47.42 48.45 60.41 93.82 101.90 87.48
Panel E
Avg Liq. Score 1 -0.026 -0.053 0.404 0.244 0.017 1.135** 1.484***
(0.438) (0.440) (0.427) (0.438) (0.440) (0.485) (0.560)
Observations 277 277 277 253 277 253 198
Chi2 39.45 38.73 93.26 47.77 39.82 93.84 85.71
Panel F
Avg Liq. Score 2 1.279* 1.273* 1.137** 1.053* 1.163* 1.100* 1.219**
(0.663) (0.679) (0.574) (0.633) (0.619) (0.588) (0.584)
Observations 277 277 277 253 277 253 198
Chi2 41.41 40.73 95.17 48.26 42.42 98.91 101.90
Controls:
Market/ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographics
Log(% credit sales) Y Y Y
Strong Competition Y Y Y
Processing / Log(% sales Y Y Y
to regular customers)
Discuss prices / Y Y Y
Discuss suppliers
Suppliers will not extend credit Y
to delinquent customers
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Table B.11: Robustness Checks – probit estimates of the probability of sharing
information. All regressions control for the market and demographic characteristics
listed in Table B.7, except that in column (2) we replace the regional FE with
city FE. Coefficients reported, robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicate
significance at the 1% level, ** – significance at the 5% level, and * – significance
at the 10% level.
Dependent Variable: IS Baseline City FE 15− 50% Credit Sales Past Default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Own Liq. Score 1 = 2 -1.075** -7.153*** -1.382** -1.596**
(0.526) (2.180) (0.573) (0.720)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 3 0.078 -1.744 -0.136 -0.107
(0.514) (1.146) (0.582) (0.513)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 4 -0.162 -0.673 -0.412 -1.056
(0.569) (1.125) (0.671) (0.733)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 5 0.853 1.516 0.797 -0.495
(0.590) (1.411) (0.662) (0.771)
Observations 254 158 233 152
2 125.90 58.27 116.09 59.55
Panel B
Own Liq. Score 2 = 1 -0.378 -0.133 -0.378 -0.642
(0.416) (0.680) (0.455) (0.692)
Own Liq. Score 2 = 2 0.798* 2.266** 1.073** 1.593**
(0.434) (0.882) (0.491) (0.694)
Own Liq. Score 2 = 3 1.122* 1.475 1.314** 2.206**
(0.597) (0.903) (0.573) (0.911)
Observations 253 157 232 152
2 111.20 90.75 97.87 63.13
Panel C
Own Liq. Score 1 > 2 0.887*** 3.457*** 0.867** 0.700*
(0.319) (1.113) (0.378) (0.376)
Observations 253 157 232 152
2 111.85 57.82 103.48 67.52
Panel D
Own Liq. Score 2 > 1 1.105*** 2.129*** 1.377*** 2.007***
(0.331) (0.560) (0.368) (0.572)
Observations 253 157 232 152
2 100.71 86.82 84.11 60.32
Panel E
Avg Liq. Score 1 1.135** 1.426 1.201** 0.914
(0.485) (0.922) (0.512) (0.612)
Observations 253 157 232 152
Chi2 93.84 88.29 90.82 67.64
Panel F
Avg Liq. Score 2 1.100* 2.810*** 1.330** 0.984
(0.588) (0.846) (0.602) (0.848)
Observations 253 157 232 152
Chi2 98.91 81.87 97.85 70.81
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Table B.12: Ordered probit estimates. Columns report estimates for the own and
average market liquidity. All regressions control for the market and demographic
characteristics listed in Table B.7. Coefficients reported, robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** indicate significance at the 1% level, ** – significance at the 5%
level, and * – significance at the 10% level.
Dep. Var.: IS Liquidity Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 2 0.190
(0.327)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 3 0.435
(0.322)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 4 -0.058
(0.361)
Own Liq. Score 1 = 5 0.890**
(0.453)
Own Liq. Score 2 = 1 -0.162
(0.213)
Own Liq. Score 2 = 2 0.076
(0.256)
Own Liq. Score 2 = 3 0.227
(0.347)
Avg Liq. Score 1 0.113
(0.306)
Avg Liq. Score 2 0.778**
(0.348)
Log(% credit sales) 0.065 0.125 0.128 0.141
(0.137) (0.130) (0.129) (0.126)
Processing 0.323 0.275 0.328 0.304
(0.306) (0.316) (0.306) (0.315)
Log(% sales to regular customers) 0.140 0.068 0.052 0.066
(0.158) (0.153) (0.152) (0.151)
Discuss prices 1.552*** 1.430*** 1.455*** 1.457***
(0.247) (0.224) (0.225) (0.229)
Discuss suppliers 0.044 0.274 0.200 0.221
(0.226) (0.205) (0.202) (0.201)
Strong Competition 0.020 -0.035 -0.016 -0.044
(0.176) (0.178) (0.174) (0.176)
Semi-wholesaler 0.193 0.123 0.112 -0.115
(0.280) (0.261) (0.264) (0.278)
Retailer with fixed selling point 0.290 0.215 0.239 -0.134
(0.224) (0.221) (0.236) (0.261)
Assembler manufacturing -0.603 -0.578 -0.675 -0.682
(0.545) (0.533) (0.508) (0.518)
Assembler individual 0.104 0.026 0.064 -0.251
(0.287) (0.278) (0.304) (0.305)
Firm Age: 5− 10 yrs 0.059 0.015 0.014 0.008
(0.229) (0.216) (0.213) (0.212)
Firm Age: > 10 yrs -0.332 -0.247 -0.206 -0.182
(0.253) (0.242) (0.239) (0.244)
Medium-sized firm 0.110 0.109 0.128 0.169
(0.231) (0.234) (0.227) (0.229)
Large firm 0.432** 0.397* 0.422** 0.431**
(0.208) (0.216) (0.209) (0.211)
4− 9 traders known -0.193 -0.161 -0.177 -0.202
(0.325) (0.313) (0.306) (0.306)
> 9 traders known -0.277 -0.290 -0.310 -0.341
(0.307) (0.289) (0.278) (0.277)
Observations 270 270 270 270
Chi2 132.52 146.62 124.80 145.02
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Table B.13: Average marginal effects of liquidity. Estimates are based on column
(6) of Table B.10
Avg. Marginal Effect St. Error Z-stat P-value
Own Liq. Score 1 > 2 0.097 0.032 3.00 0.003
Own Liq. Score 2 > 1 0.130 0 .038 3.43 0.001
Avg. Liq. Score 1 0.086 0.052 1.66 0.096
Avg. Liq. Score 2 0.173 0.065 2.66 0.008
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